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ABSTRACT
SELF-MASTERY IN PLATO
Brian Reese
Susan Sauvé Meyer

This dissertation addresses an interpretive puzzle involving Plato’s apparently
incompatible accounts of psychic conflict. I argue that a better understanding of the soul
helps to resolve this puzzle, and that we can properly understand Plato’s conception of the
soul by focusing on his account of self-mastery (

ε

α

). Self-mastery is a

concept well-suited to this project because it is treated consistently across Plato’s dialogues
and features centrally in discussions of psychic conflict.
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Searching for you, but if there’s no one,
what am I searching for? Still you. Some
sort of you. Not for myself? Am I you?
Need I search for me? For myself?
Is my self you? I know: Self.
Is that you? Is it me?
Robert Lax, 21 Pages
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In the first Alcibiades, Socrates distinguishes the self from its various possessions.
He provisionally identifies the self with the soul, and counts the body as among its
possessions (129d1–130c2). The self, or soul, is said to possess the body by ‘ruling’ or
‘mastering’ it (130a13). Socrates then suggests that the self is to be identified, not simply
with the soul, but only with the rational or intellectual part of it (133b2–c2). Finally, he
claims that the rational or intellectual part of the soul is divine (133c4). This results in a
surprising claim about self-knowledge: it turns out that to know yourself is to know
something divine (133c6).
While these claims are striking, scholars are quick to point out that we should not
be too hasty in assigning such radical views to either the historical Socrates, or to the
Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. For it must be remembered that these claims are found in a
work whose authenticity has been a matter of dispute since at least the nineteenth century,
when Schleiermacher first called it into question. 1 Since then, the first Alcibiades has been
largely neglected in surveys of Socrates and Plato. Indeed, even the limited scholarship

Schleiermacher (1836) pp. 328–336. Nobody thought the first Alcibiades was dubious until Schleiermacher
decided that it was too “insignificant and poor” to be attributed to Plato. As Annas (1985) pp.113–114 writes:
“The influence of Schleiermacher’s judgement is surprising considering the total absence of grounds given
other than taste. It is noteworthy that Schleiermacher is in fact ambivalent […]; after insulting every aspect
of the dialogue’s form and content he concludes that after all the Alcibiades contains some fine parts worthy
of Plato. He is the first of many scholars to entertain fantastic hypotheses such as that Plato wrote parts of it;
wrote a dialogue spoiled by somebody else; improved someone else’s inferior dialogue, and so on. The
desperation of these moves suggests that the basic problem is inability to make sense of the dialogue as a
whole in terms of some leading theme.”
1
1

that has engaged with it during the last two centuries has tended to concentrate on questions
of authenticity, rather than on questions of philosophical content.
I mention the first Alcibiades, however, only to lay it aside. This dissertation is in
no way a contribution to that neglected literature. Nevertheless, the following pages will
reveal that each of the striking claims canvassed above are in fact rigorously argued for
elsewhere in Plato, in dialogues widely recognized as canonical. This fact can be more
readily appreciated, I submit, by focusing—not on these more controversial claims directly,
but rather on the seemingly more plausible and familiar claim that the soul, provisionally
identified with the self, is to be understood as a kind of ruler or master (130a13). This
dissertation thus undertakes a sustained examination of the concept of self-mastery (τ
κρείττω αυτο ).
I argue that Plato offers a consistent account of self-mastery across dialogues: we
are self-mastered whenever reason rules. This, in itself, is not a groundbreaking revelation.
However, scholars have not sufficiently appreciated how central self-mastery is to Plato’s
philosophical psychology, nor has this concept been examined systematically—and so this
dissertation fills a rare lacuna in more contemporary Platonic scholarship. Not only is selfmastery a central concept in Plato, but the fact that it is treated consistently across dialogues
makes it an indispensable tool for addressing a whole nexus of concepts, questions and
scholarly debates. In short, self-mastery serves as an organizing concept, which can help
scholars to navigate a wide range of topics. It also helps to reveal new insights and latent
resources in the works of Plato.
Not only does an examination of self-mastery help to reveal new insights and
resources, but these insights and resources in turn shed light on many entrenched scholarly
2

debates. This dissertation takes off from one such entrenched debate, which turns on a
question about the soul: is it simple or composite? While this question putatively concerns
Plato’s metaphysical psychology, the answer has substantive implications for longstanding debates in Plato’s moral psychology. I begin, then, with an entrenched debate
about psychic conflict in the Protagoras and the Republic.

§1 THE DEBATE
Plato seems to countenance the possibility of psychic conflict for a composite soul,
but deny it for a simple one. Considered independently, each of these views is reasonable:
the internal complexity of a composite soul seems to allow for the possibility of conflict,
while a simple soul seems to lack the internal complexity that would render it capable of
conflict. A puzzle arises, however, when attempting to explain how (or whether) Plato can
coherently endorse both conceptions of the soul.
The prevailing interpretation resolves this puzzle by maintaining that Plato’s
account of the soul develops over the course of his written works. Perhaps Plato is merely
recording the Socratic view in dialogues like the Protagoras, where he seems to treat the
soul as simple and reinterprets putative cases of psychic conflict as cases of ignorance;
perhaps Plato himself only later came to recognize, in dialogues like the Republic, that the
soul is something composite. Whatever the explanation, most adherents of this interpretive
strategy think that Plato’s account develops for the better, at least insofar as the composite
soul seems better-suited to explain the phenomenon of psychic conflict. 2

Cooper (1984) p. 91 captures the common view well when he writes: “That Plato in the Republic is selfconsciously rejecting this Socratic theory is by now well accepted; and most philosophical readers no doubt
agree that the Republic’s theory is a distinct improvement.” Other proponents of this ‘common view’ include
Brickhouse and Smith (1994), Bobonich (2007), Irwin (1977, 1995), Lorenz (2006), Moss (2014), Penner
3
2

The thesis that Plato’s account of the soul develops over the course of his written
works is characteristic of so-called ‘developmentalist’ readings of Plato. According to
developmentalist readings, Plato’s views significantly develop over the course of his life,
and these developments in his thought are recorded in his writings. Such developmentalist
readings are often contrasted with so-called ‘unitarian’ readings of Plato, according to
which his views remain more-or-less consistent throughout his life and throughout his
writings.3 Since developmentalist readings rely on certain orderings of the dialogues, a
brief word on chronology is in order.

§2 CHRONOLOGY
The first comprehensive study of stylistic changes in the works of Plato was
completed by Lewis Campbell in 1896. 4 This study assigned every dialogue to one of three
groups on the basis of measurable stylistic differences. These stylistic differences were also
believed to have chronological significance. Dialogues most closely resembling the Laws
in style were placed in the ‘late’ group, while those dialogues most closely resembling the
Republic in style were placed in the ‘middle’ group. 5 All other dialogues were placed in
the ‘early’ group. But within each of these three groups no further attempt was made to
order the dialogues, as there was considered to be no principled way to do so. These early

(1992), Reeve (1992), and Vlastos (1988).
3 In addition to developmentalist and unitarian readings, some scholars recognize ‘revisionist’ readings. Frede
(2017) helpfully disambiguates these three readings as follows: “Whereas unitarians regard the dialogues as
pieces of one mosaic, and take the view that Plato in essence maintains a unified doctrine from his earliest to
his latest works, revisionists maintain that Plato’s thought underwent a fundamental transformation later in
his life, while developmentalists hold that Plato’s views evolved significantly throughout his career.”
4 See Kahn (2002) for an excellent discussion of the history, merits, and limitations of Platonic chronology.
5 Diogenes Laertius (III.37) suggests that the Laws was the last work Plato ever wrote. The significance of
the Republic is taken to be that it is a dialogue on an entirely new scale.
4

stylometric results were later bolstered by scholars such as Ritter, Dittenberger, and more
recently, Brandwood.6
However, the analysis of stylistic development in the dialogues of Plato has not
been the sole method for determining chronology. Other scholars have attempted to order
the dialogues by grouping them according to what they believe to be philosophical
developments in Plato’s thought. It is this latter method that is more characteristic of
modern developmentalist readings—and so it is worth distinguishing this method from the
former. While these latter sorts of developmentalist chronologies, like the former stylistic
chronologies, group the dialogues according to a threefold division of early, middle and
late—their pronouncements about ordering are far more substantive. This is because they
attempt to order the dialogues within each grouping, according to what they take to be
certain philosophical developments in Plato’s thought. In this regard, such chronologies
are far more substantive, and far outstrip the measurable stylometric results that had served
to justify the original threefold grouping. 7
Now, although my own reading of Plato leans unitarian, I am prepared to concede
at least this much to the developmentalist: in the pages that follow, I assume and adopt an
uncontroversial ordering of canonical dialogues. By this I mean that all of the dialogues
that I engage with are widely held to be genuine works of Plato, and the order in which I
engage with them is consistent with any commonly accepted developmentalist
chronology—of either the stylistic or philosophical variety. I also wish to be clear that I

See Brandwood (1990). Again, see Kahn (2002) for an excellent discussion of the history of stylometry.
Kahn (2002) p. 96: “the traditional developmentalist who recognizes that the stylistic division is
chronological must simply accept the fact that Plato’s stylistic and philosophical developments do not
proceed at the same pace.”
5
6
7

will not be endeavoring to read ‘later’ dialogues back into ‘earlier’ dialogues; I only aim
to demonstrate that the accounts found in the various dialogues I examine are not
inconsistent or incompatible with one another.
By taking these developmentalist assumptions on board, I aim to forestall any
objection to the effect that my interpretation has been built upon the sand: that I have fatally
erred, or at least committed a serious interpretive faux pas, by adopting a haphazard or
heretical ordering; that I have naively assumed that the dialogues can be unproblematically
interpreted synchronically; or that I have failed to provide (or worse, fail to possess)
sufficient justification for analyzing them in the order that I do. But, in having made this
concession, I also wish to shift the interpretive burden away from the unitarian and toward
the developmentalist by demonstrating that my reading not only makes better philosophical
sense of the texts in question, but also dispenses with the need to attribute any change of
mind to Plato. If there is anything to recommend in Shorey’s proposal that we “assume
contradiction or serious alteration in Plato’s thought only in default of a rational [...]
explanation of the variation in the form of its expression,”8 then, in having provided such
an explanation, I will have thereby undermined the chief consideration favoring a
developmentalist reading.9 The developmentalist can no longer maintain that their reading
is the most charitable way of interpreting Plato.
Against the developmentalist, then, I argue that Plato’s account of the soul did not
undergo any sort of radical development, and that his various treatments of psychic conflict

Shorey (1903) p. 5: “If we are anxious to find out inconsistencies in appearance, we shall find them in
abundance.”
9 Annas (1985) p. 7: “I have found more and more to doubt in the orthodox modern ways of reading Plato
[…] There are many signs that the orthodox, developmental reading of Plato is crumbling in places and losing
its unquestioned dominance.”
6
8

are not incompatible. This can be seen most clearly by focusing on his account of selfmastery, which features centrally in virtually all such discussions. My examination of selfmastery helps to explain why Plato variously treats the soul as simple and composite, but
it also eventuates in a deeper understanding of his account of the self and of selfknowledge, and yields substantive insights into the so-called Socratic Paradoxes: that
virtue is wisdom or knowledge, and that all of the virtues form a unity.

§3 OVERVIEW
In chapter one, I focus on self-mastery as it is treated in the Protagoras, the Phaedo,
and the Republic. I argue that Socrates consistently maintains that someone is self-mastered
whenever they are ruled by reason. Although Socrates does not explicitly treat the soul as
something composite in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo, the discussion of self-mastery
in the Republic leads directly to the suggestion that the soul has parts (430e6–431b1).
While this might seem like a genuine (and perhaps inconsistent) development, I go on to
argue that it is not.
In the final book of the Republic, Socrates corrects what he thinks could have been
an easy misconception of his earlier discussion of the soul’s tripartite structure. The
account of various ‘parts’ is only perspicuous, Socrates now claims, when the soul is
analyzed in its embodied state. When the soul is disembodied, its true nature, and whether
it is something simple or composite, promises to become manifest. What Socrates strongly
suggests is that the disembodied, immortal soul is simply the rational part of the embodied
soul (611e1–612a8). If this suggestion is correct, then the account of the soul found in the

7

Republic is not as obviously incompatible with the view of the soul found in the Protagoras
or the Phaedo as many scholars have supposed.
In chapter two, I focus on the Timaeus, where the tantalizing suggestion from the
final book of the Republic is taken up and further developed. The lower two parts of the
embodied soul are now explicitly said to be mortal, while the rational part alone is said to
be both divine and immortal (69c6–70b9). I proceed to unpack the way in which the
immortal rational soul is ultimately identified with a divine intellect (νο ς). This divine
intellect not only rules the entire cosmos, but should ultimately come to rule in each human
soul (42a2). I subsequently outline the way in which the human soul is supposed to
assimilate itself to this divine intellect, and so become self-mastered.
In chapter three, I bring the analysis of the previous two chapters to bear on the
discussion of self-mastery in Plato’s final work, the Laws. Self-mastery is once again
glossed as the rule of reason—but self-mastery is now also said to issue in virtue (645b1).
After discussing a related dilemma about virtue that has exercised recent commentators, I
provide a novel resolution to it that turns on a careful analysis of self-mastery and the virtue
of moderation. I subsequently argue that the account of the soul that Plato develops in this
final work is consistent with his earlier treatments by examining an additional set of
arguments that aim to establish that the immortal rational soul is both the natural ruler of
all things, and ultimately who we really are (959a4).
In chapter four, I return to the Protagoras. The analysis undertaken in the prior
chapters helps to illuminate many of the issues surrounding the discussion of virtue and
self-mastery in this dialogue. In particular, it helps to shed light on why Socrates argues
that all of the virtues form a unity, and why the difficulties Protagoras raises ultimately
8

occasion an argument that knowledge is sufficient for virtue. It also explains why Socrates
would claim that self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom or knowledge (358c3). With
all of this place, it is finally possible to answer the interpretive question with which we
began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras concerned to reinterpret putative cases of
psychic conflict as cases of ignorance, and what happens to this account in light of the
argument for soul-partitioning found in the Republic?

9

CHAPTER ONE
SELF-MASTERY & PSYCHIC CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION
In the Republic, Socrates divides the soul into three parts: appetite, spirit, and
reason. He tells us that whenever we find ourselves pulled in opposing directions with
respect to one and the same thing, it is because these parts of our soul are engaged in
conflict (439c5). To help illustrate this point, he relates the story of Leontius, who happens
upon a pile of corpses lying near the side of the road (439e8). Leontius has an appetite to
look at these corpses, but he reasons that this appetite is base and should not be indulged
(439e9). Obedient to reason, he persists for a time in averting his eyes. Eventually,
however, he is overcome by his perverse appetite (440a1).10 Upon looking at the corpses,
Leontius angrily reproaches himself.
This story is supposed to illustrate a paradigm case of psychic conflict: Leontius
both wants to look and does not want to look at the corpses. He is conflicted: he is described
as struggling with himself (439e10) and fighting an internal civil war (440b2). 11 This is
supposed to be because his appetite and his reason are pulling him in opposite directions.12
But the mere fact that Socrates is prepared to countenance this sort of psychic conflict in
the Republic is puzzling. It is puzzling because in another well-known dialogue, the
Protagoras, Socrates works hard to reinterpret such putative cases of psychic conflict as,
instead, cases of ignorance (353c5–357e10).

Appetite is described as “forcing (βιάζωνταί) him contrary to reason (παρ τ ν λογισμόν)” (440b1).
Cf. Laws 644d7–645b1
12 Cf. Republic 431a6–b1
10
10
11

How should we handle this apparent inconsistency? For the better part of a century,
most commentators have simply embraced it by adopting a ‘developmentalist’ reading of
Plato.13 According to this sort of reading, the accounts found in Protagoras and the
Republic are indeed inconsistent. One reason for this inconsistency is supposed to be that
Plato’s view of the soul develops. In the Protagoras, the soul seems to be presented as
though it were something simple, and so incapable of internal conflict.14 In the Republic,
by contrast, the soul is presented as something composite. The partitioning of the soul is
supposed to be what allows Socrates to finally countenance the possibility of psychic
conflict: the various parts of the soul can now conflict with one another, in just the way
that the story of Leontius illustrates.
I wish to reject this developmentalist reading of Plato. I argue, instead, that Plato’s
account of the soul remains consistent across dialogues. I demonstrate this by undertaking
a sustained examination of self-mastery (τ κρείττω αυτο ). Self-mastery is a concept
well-suited to this project because it is treated consistently across dialogues, and features
centrally in discussions of psychic conflict. In this chapter, I focus on self-mastery as it is
treated in the Protagoras (§1), the Phaedo (§2), and the Republic (§3).15 I demonstrate that,
in all three dialogues, Socrates consistently describes the person who exhibits self-mastery
as someone ruled by reason or knowledge. Although Socrates does not explicitly treat the
soul as something composite in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo, the discussion of self-

Brickhouse and Smith (1994) pp. 90n25, 98n35; Bobonich (2007) p. xv; Cooper (1984) p. 3; Irwin (1977)
p. 191, (1995) p. 209; Lorenz (2006) p. 28; Moss (2014) p. 36; Penner (1992) p. 129; Reeve (1992) pp. xi,
113n9; and Vlastos (1988) pp. 105–6. Notable exceptions include Shields (2001, 2007); Gerson (2006, 2014);
Kahn (1987, 2004); and Carone (2001)
14 Cf. Frede (1992), p. xxx
15 Cf. Phaedo 80a1; Protagoras 353c5; Republic 431d3
11
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mastery in the Republic leads more-or-less directly to soul-partitioning. While this might
seem like a departure from the earlier Socratic view, I go on to demonstrate that it is not.
In the final book of the Republic, Socrates corrects what he thinks could have been
an easy misconception of his earlier discussion of the soul’s tripartite structure. The
account of various ‘parts’ is only perspicuous, Socrates now claims, when the soul is
analyzed in its embodied state (612a6). When the soul is stripped of its corporeal
accretions, its true nature, and whether it is something simple or composite, promises to
become manifest (612a5). What Socrates strongly suggests is that the disembodied,
immortal soul is simply the rational part of the embodied soul (611e1–612a8). If this
suggestion is correct, then the account of the soul found in the Republic is not as obviously
incompatible with view of the soul found in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo as many
scholars have supposed.

§1 THE PROTAGORAS
In the Protagoras, Socrates famously claims that those who possess knowledge will
unfailingly act on it. However, he does not think that the majority of people will agree. He
offers the following description of what most people think about knowledge:
Most people think this way about it, that it is not powerful (ο κ σχυρόν), neither a master
nor a ruler (ο δ’ γεμονικ ν ο δ’ ἀρχικ ν ε ναι). They do not think of it in that way at all,
but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a person, what rules ( ρχειν)
them is not knowledge but rather anything else, sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure,
sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of it as being utterly dragged
around by these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does the matter seem like that to
you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing, capable of ruling a person, and
that if someone were to know what is good and bad, then they would not be forced by
anything to act (πράττειν) otherwise than knowledge dictates ( πιστήμη κελεύ ), and
wisdom (φρόνησιν) would be sufficient to save them? (352b3–c7)16
δοκε δ το ς πολλο ς περ πιστήμης τοιο τόν τι, ο κ σχυρ ν ο δ’ γεμονικ ν ο δ’ ἀρχικ ν ε ναι· ο δ
ς περ τοιούτου α το ντος διανοο νται, ἀλλ’ νούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπ πιστήμης ο τ ν πιστήμην
12

16

Protagoras grants that the many think of knowledge in this way, but he sides with Socrates,
against the popular view, in maintaining that “wisdom and knowledge (σοφίαν κα
πιστήμην) are the most powerful (κράτιστον) forces in human activity” (352d1).17
Socrates proceeds to explain why the majority of people will remain unconvinced:
They maintain that most people are unwilling to do (ο κ θέλειν πράττειν) what is best,
even though they know what it is and are able ( ξ ν α το ς) to do it. And when I have
asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are
being overcome ( ττωμένους) by pleasure or pain or are being mastered (κρατουμένους)
by the things I referred to just now. (352d4–e2)18

Socrates and Protagoras maintain that if someone possesses knowledge, then they cannot
be forced to act against its decrees. The many deny this by appealing to an ostensibly clearcut case of psychic conflict: one can know what is best and be capable of acting on that
knowledge, while nevertheless remaining unwilling to do it. They describe this failure to
act on their knowledge as the experience of ‘being overcome.’ What they mean by this,
Socrates conjectures, is that they are “being mastered (κρατούμενοι) by pleasant things like
food, drink and sex, all the while knowing that these things are ruinous” (353c5).

α το ρχειν ἀλλ’ λλο τι, τοτ μ ν θυμόν, τοτ δ δονήν, τοτ δ λύπην, νίοτε δ ρωτα, πολλάκις δ
φόβον, ἀτεχν ς διανοούμενοι περ τ ς πιστήμης σπερ περ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης π τ ν λλων
πάντων. ρ’ ο ν κα σο τοιο τόν τι περ α τ ς δοκε , καλόν τε ε ναι
πιστήμη κα ο ον ρχειν το
ἀνθρώπου, κα άνπερ γιγνώσκ τις τἀγαθ κα τ κακά, μ ν κρατηθ ναι π μηδεν ς στε λλ’ ττα
πράττειν
ν πιστήμη κελεύ , ἀλλ’ καν ν ε ναι τ ν φρόνησιν βοηθε ν τ ἀνθρώπ ;
All Greek texts sourced from Burnet (ed.) Platonis Opera, 7 vols. (1900–7) and compiled by the Thesaurus
Linguae Graecae. Translations: Protagoras (1992) Lombardo and Bell; Phaedo (2002) Grube, revised by
Cooper; Republic (1992) Grube, revised by Reeve; Timaeus (2000) Zeyl; Sophist (1993) White; Laws I-II
(2015) Meyer; Laws III-XII (2016) Schofield, and occasionally (1970) Saunders. Translations often altered
for consistency with terminology in the present work.
17 πάντων κράτιστον φάναι ε ναι τ ν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων
18 ἀλλ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τ βέλτιστα ο κ θέλειν πράττειν, ξ ν α το ς, ἀλλ
λλα πράττειν· κα
σους δ γ ρόμην τι ποτε α τιόν στι τούτου, π δον ς φασιν ττωμένους λύπης
ν νυνδ γ
λεγον πό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους τα τα ποιε ν το ς ποιο ντας.
13

Socrates recognizes that if he is to defend the efficacy of knowledge, then he must
provide an alternative account of the experience that the many call ‘being overcome.’ The
importance of this alternative account should not be understated: Socrates claims that “it is
upon this very point that all the arguments rest” (355a1). Central to this account is Socrates’
claim that someone cannot act against what they take to be best at the very moment they
choose to act:
[N]o one who knows (ε δώς) or believes (ο όμενος) there is something else better than what
they are doing, something possible, will go on doing what they have been doing when they
could be doing what is better. Self-defeat (τ ττω ε ναι) is nothing other than ignorance
(ἀμαθία), and self-mastery (τ κρείττω αυτο ) is nothing other than wisdom (σοφία).
(358b8–c5)19

This point is simply an application of Socrates’ more basic conviction that:
[N]o one goes willingly ( κ ν ρχεται) toward the bad or what they believe (ο εται) to be
bad; neither is it in human nature ( ν ἀνθρώπου φύσει) to wish ( θέλειν) to go toward what
one believes (ο εται) to be bad instead of toward the good. (358c10–d3)20

If it is not ‘in human nature’ to go toward the bad rather than the good, then if someone
recognizes that their chosen course of action was worse than some other course of action
available to them (which is the experience the many call ‘being overcome’) it is because
they did not actually know or believe it was worse. Far from their reasoned judgement
being overcome by some opposing psychic force, their experience seems better described
as a case of ignorance.21 Yet in order to respect the undeniable fact that it surely seems as

ο δε ς ο τε ε δ ς ο τε ο όμενος λλα βελτίω ε ναι
ποιε , κα δυνατά, πειτα ποιε τα τα, ξ ν τ
βελτίω· ο δ τ ττω ε ναι α το λλο τι το τ’ στ ν ἀμαθία, ο δ κρείττω αυτο λλο τι σοφία.
20
λλο τι ο ν, φην γώ, πί γε τ κακ ο δε ς κ ν ρχεται ο δ π ο εται κακ ε ναι, ο δ’ στι το το,
ς οικεν, ν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, π ο εται κακ ε ναι θέλειν έναι ἀντ τ ν ἀγαθ ν·
21 Cf. Protagoras 358c7
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though people often do other than what they know or believe to be best, Socrates grants
that people must believe that there is some better course of action both before and after the
regretted action is performed.
This seems to be the account: at some time prior to the moment of action, a person
correctly believes that X is better than Y. However, when certain pleasures related to Y are
close at hand, this person succumbs to them. They now believe that Y is better than X, and
they act on this belief. At some later time, after the action is performed, they regain the
correct belief that X is better than Y, and so come to regret the completed action.22 On this
sort of account, no one acts against what they believe to be best—it is just that, at the very
moment of action, people often substitute a correct belief about what is best for an incorrect
belief about what is best.23
Why do we lose correct beliefs at the crucial moment of action? Socrates suggests
that it is because different (and even incompatible) actions can seem or appear best to us at
different times. I might think that going to the gym early tomorrow morning is the best
course of action now, but I might think that sleeping in is the best course of action tomorrow
morning, when my bed is comfortable and warm, and the room is chilly. What this suggests
is that our temporal proximity to the pleasures and pains related to certain courses of action
can impact our beliefs about which of them is best. Socrates bolsters this suggestion by
likening our experience of things at a temporal distance to our experience of things at a
spatial distance:

Brickhouse and Smith (2002, 2005), Devereux (1995), Penner (1996, 1997) Shields (2001, 2007) and
Singpurwalla (2006) all endorse this interpretation of Socrates’ re-description of ‘being overcome.’
23 Scholars have also distinguished between synchronic and diachronic akrasia (Brickhouse and Smith,
Penner, Price), between narrow akrasia and implementation failure (Shields), and between knowledgeakrasia and belief-akrasia (Penner).
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Do the same magnitudes appear to our sight larger when close at hand, smaller when farther
away, or not? [...] And similarly for thicknesses and pluralities? And equal sounds seem
greater when close at hand, and lesser when farther away? (356c5–8)24

Socrates thinks that just as things that are far away can appear smaller than they really are,
the pleasures or pains related to some distant action can appear less potent than they really
are; and just as objects that are closer to us can appear larger than they really are, the
pleasures or pains related to some present action can appear more potent than they really
are.25 These sorts of distortions can (and often do) affect our views about which course of
action is best.
How is knowledge supposed to save us from these sorts of distortions? Well,
Socrates insists that people who have a measuring craft, which he characterizes as a kind
of knowledge (357b4), won’t be deceived by these distortions, since their knowledge will
prevent them from ever mistaking the way things appear for the way they really are. 26 The
thought is simple: if we measure, say, the size of some object, we will not be deceived into
thinking that it is larger than it really is when it happens to be near at hand, or smaller than
it really is when it happens to be far away. Possessing this knowledge of measurement
would effectively remove the power of appearances. As Socrates puts the point:
If our doing well consisted in doing and taking large quantities, and avoiding and not doing
small ones, what would be the salvation for our life? The measuring craft ( μετρητικ
τέχνη) or the power of appearance ( το φαινομένου δύναμις)? The power of appearance
makes us wander and exchange the same things up and down many times, and regret our
actions and choices with respect to the large and the small. But the craft of measurement
would make the appearance powerless by showing the truth (τ ἀληθές), and remaining in
φαίνεται μ ν τ ψει τ α τ μεγέθη γγύθεν μ ν μείζω, πόρρωθεν δ λάττω· ο ; […] Κα τ παχέα
κα τ πολλ σαύτως; κα α φωνα α σαι γγύθεν μ ν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δ σμικρότεραι;
25 Cf. Singpurwalla (2006) p. 246: “the temporal proximity of pleasures or pains often distorts our estimation
of their worth.”
26 I am indebted to Singpurwalla (2006), Moss (2008), and Callard (2014) for this general point.
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the truth the soul would have peace, and so this craft would save our lives. (356c8–e1)27

Socrates thinks that knowledge guarantees that we hold on to correct beliefs in the face of
appearances which conflict with them. 28 So individuals with knowledge will never have
the experience of losing—at the crucial moment of action—the correct belief about which
course of action is best.
But what about those who lack this knowledge? If only those who possess the
measuring craft are immune to the power of appearance, then anyone lacking the
knowledge of this craft would be susceptible to their distorting effects. Indeed, appearances
are said to be so powerful that anyone failing to possess the measuring craft will inevitably
“exchange the same things up and down many times, and regret [their] actions and
choices.” What Socrates seems to suggest is that, while being taken in by deceptive
appearances is impossible for those who possess knowledge, it is a ubiquitous experience
for those who lack knowledge.
What cognitive state is ascribed to those without knowledge? Recall that, on
Socrates’ account, everyone unfailingly acts in accordance with what they either know or
believe to be best (358c3, 358d1). Socrates argues that knowledge is so powerful because
it infallibly discerns what is actually best, and so renders those who possess it immune to
the distorting power of appearances. Knowledge is thus sufficient for right action, or virtue
(356e1). So it follows that what the many are unreflectively describing as their knowledge

Ε ο ν ν τούτ
μ ν ν τ ε πράττειν, ν τ τ μ ν μεγάλα μήκη κα πράττειν κα λαμβάνειν, τ δ
σμικρ κα φεύγειν κα μ πράττειν, τίς ν μ ν σωτηρία φάνη το βίου; ρα μετρητικ τέχνη
το
φαινομένου δύναμις; α τη μ ν μ ς πλάνα κα ποίει νω τε κα κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν τα τ
κα μεταμέλειν κα ν τα ς πράξεσιν κα ν τα ς α ρέσεσιν τ ν μεγάλων τε κα σμικρ ν, δ μετρητικ
κυρον μ ν ν ποίησε το το τ φάντασμα, δηλώσασα δ τ ἀληθ ς συχίαν ν ποίησεν χειν τ ν ψυχ ν
μένουσαν π τ ἀληθε κα σωσεν ν τ ν βίον;
28 Knowledge is not said to remove the appearances; it simply makes them powerless.
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being overcome is, in fact, something else. The only other cognitive state Socrates seems
to countenance is belief.
Now belief, unlike knowledge, is fallible. Someone who merely possesses belief
would thus be susceptible to the distorting power of appearances. For example, suppose
that someone possesses the (true) belief that going to the gym tomorrow morning is the
best course of action. In the morning, however, they succumb to the pleasure of their warm
bed and so ‘exchange’ the (true) belief that going to the gym is the best course of action
for the (false) belief that remaining in bed is the best course of action. They later regain
their (true) belief that going to the gym was in fact best, and so regret sleeping in.
Yet even if this experience could be properly described as ‘being overcome’ by the
pleasure of a warm bed, the fact remains that whenever someone acts on a false belief about
what is best, they are not in that moment conflicted, but simply mistaken (357d9). At the
crucial moment of action, they were ignorant.29 Regardless of whether people possesses
belief or knowledge, then, absolutely no one can be described as acting in one way while
simultaneously thinking that they should act in another way. No one, that is, can act against
their reasoned judgement of what is best at the very moment they act. 30

Cf. Protagoras 358c7: “Well, then, do you say that ignorance is to have a false belief and be deceived
about matters of importance?” See also Protagoras 357e3: “So this is what ‘being overcome by pleasure’
is—ignorance in the highest degree.”
30 Insofar as someone can properly be described as being conflicted, it can only be before they choose to act.
When they act, they believe the chosen course of action is best. But before they act, being conflicted might
be glossed in several ways. (1) It might be that they are vacillating between beliefs about different, and
possibly incompatible, courses of action. Yet this is a somewhat implausible explanation, since the closer
pleasures are in time, the larger or more potent they seem to become. It is not as though the pleasures would
vacillate between appearing smaller and larger since—insofar as they are approaching in time—they are only
getting larger. (2) It might instead be that we can hold on to our true belief that the pleasure should be avoided
for a while, lose that belief for a moment, regain it at some later moment, and then lose it again. But there is
no principled explanation, as far as I can see, for why that should be the case. (3) More plausibly, it might be
that we can stand firm in our belief that the pleasure should be resisted for a time, begin to lose credence in
that belief as the pleasures related to an alternative course of action appear to get larger or more potent, and
finally succumb to the pleasure and so lose our true belief. If this is correct, then Socrates would seem to (a)
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So we now have a better sense of why Socrates thinks that ‘self-defeat’ is nothing
other than ignorance and ‘self-mastery’ is nothing other than wisdom (358c3). On the one
hand, since beliefs are susceptible to the distorting power of appearances, they can
sometimes be false or mistaken. Whenever someone is self-defeated, it will turn out that
they were acting on a false or mistaken belief: they acted from ignorance. On the other
hand, since knowledge is immune to the distorting power of appearances, someone who
possesses knowledge will never be taken in by them. Whenever someone is self-mastered,
it will turn out that they were either acting from knowledge, or at least from true belief.31
Finally, it is worth reemphasizing that, on such an account, all actions are the result of
reasoned judgements of one variety or another. 32 Socrates thus appears to argue in the
Protagoras as if the soul were simple or wholly rational.33 As we will see in the next
section, Socrates continues to argue this way in the Phaedo.

deny both synchronic knowledge-akrasia and synchronic belief-akrasia, (b) countenance diachronic beliefakrasia, and (c) deny diachronic knowledge-akrasia.
31Indeed, in the Meno (98b1–c1), knowledge and true belief are said to be equivalent in their practical effects
on behavior. However, Socrates in the Republic (506c7) offers us a clue about why he might have neglected
this option in the Protagoras: “Haven’t you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are shameful and ugly
things? The best of them are blind—or do you think that those who express a true belief without knowledge
are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?” In a word: although someone would
indeed be self-mastered whenever they act on a true belief, their self-mastery would not be worth very much.
This is because true beliefs have a tendency to wander off, and so the sort of self-mastery exhibited by such
a person would not be reliable. Much more will be said about this in the chapters that follow.
32 Even if all actions are the result of reasoned judgments, it may nevertheless be the case that desires attend
those reasoned judgments. See Kahn (1987), Moss (2008), and Singpurwalla (2018) for convincing
arguments that desires attend reasoned judgments about value. If they are right about this, and I think that
they are, then Socrates countenances both cognitive and motivational conflict in the Protagoras, even if he
is not prepared to countenance psychic conflict.
33 Cf. Frede (1992) p. xxx
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§2 THE PHAEDO
According to developmentalist readings of Plato, the Phaedo was likely written
some time after the Protagoras.34 The Socrates of the Phaedo continues to treat the soul as
though it were simple or wholly rational (78c1, 80b8). Unlike the Socrates of Protagoras,
however, the Socrates of the Phaedo now marks a distinction between the embodied and
disembodied soul.35 This distinction, it should be noted, is worked out in contexts where
discussions of self-mastery are again at the fore. As I will demonstrate, an examination of
the soul and of self-mastery in the Phaedo not only helps to shed light on the account of
the soul found in the Protagoras, but also turns out to be propaedeutic to the argument for
soul-partitioning found in the Republic.

2.1 Soul & Body
In the Phaedo, Socrates offers a sustained argument for the immortality of the soul.
He notes that the primary aim of those who practice philosophy correctly is preparation for
death. Death, according to Socrates, is nothing other than the separation of the soul from
the body (64c5). One way in which philosophers, or lovers of wisdom, prepare for death is
by actively “turning away from the body toward the soul” (64e4). Evidence of this ‘turning
away’ can be found in their lack of interest in the attainment and enjoyment of bodily
pleasures, the chief examples of which are the pleasures of food, drink and sex (64d3–7).
These, of course, are the very same pleasures that the many had claimed to be ‘overcome

It is often credited as the earliest dialogue to contain what F.M. Cornford (1957) famously dubbed the
‘twin pillars’ of Platonism: the doctrine of the forms and the immortality of the soul. The presence of these
doctrines are often taken as evidence of a genuine philosophical development in the Phaedo—indicating that
it was written after the Protagoras, which contains no explicit treatment of, or reference to, either doctrine.
35 The contrast between soul and body can also be found in the Protagoras. Cf. Protagoras 312c1, 313a2–
314b3, 326b1, 337c1, 351a2
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by’ in the Protagoras (353c5). In the Phaedo, however, these pleasures are now relegated
to the body.
Such bodily pleasures, and indeed the body itself, are considered by the lovers of
wisdom to be a positive hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge (65b1). There are two
reasons for this. First, there is no truth in the bodily senses: they are inaccurate, imprecise
and often deceptive. Second, knowledge can be grasped by reason alone, which is now said
to belong exclusively to the soul (65b7–c2). Indeed, Socrates claims that “the soul reasons
best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure,
but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and, as far as possible, having no
contact or association with it in its search for being” (65c5). The body is presented as a
hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge, in part, because the bodily senses are incapable
of grasping the truth (66a1) and, in part, because the pleasures of the body, which are
enjoyed through the senses, often distract the soul in its pursuit of knowledge (66a5). These
sorts of considerations lead philosophers to reason as follows:
There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion, because as
long as we have a body (τ σ μα χωμεν) and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall
never adequately attain what we desire (ο μή ποτε κτησώμεθα καν ς ο πιθυμο μεν),
which we affirm to be the truth (τ ἀληθές). The body keeps us busy in a thousand ways
[…] It fills us with wants ( ρώτων), desires ( πιθυμι ν), fears (φόβων), all sorts of illusions
(ε δώλων παντοδαπ ν) and nonsense, so that, as it is said both in truth and in fact no
wisdom (φρον σαι) of any kind ever comes to us from the body […] and it is the body and
the care of it, to which we are enslaved (δουλεύοντες). (66b2–d2)36

Κινδυνεύει τοι σπερ ἀτραπός τις κφέρειν μ ς [μετ το λόγου ν τ σκέψει], τι, ως ν τ σ μα
χωμεν κα συμπεφυρμένη
μ ν ψυχ μετ τοιούτου κακο , ο μή ποτε κτησώμεθα καν ς ο
πιθυμο μεν· φαμ ν δ το το ε ναι τ ἀληθές. Μυρίας μ ν γ ρ μ ν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τ σ μα […] ρώτων
δ κα πιθυμι ν κα φόβων κα ε δώλων παντοδαπ ν κα φλυαρίας μπίμπλησιν μ ς πολλ ς, στε τ
λεγόμενον ς ἀληθ ς τ ντι π’ α το ο δ φρον σαι μ ν γγίγνεται ο δέποτε ο δέν. […] δι τ σ μα,
δουλεύοντες τ τούτου θεραπεί
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The body is now held to be the source of the passions that distract us in a thousand ways
and even enslave us. Philosophers throw off the shackles of embodiment by “separating
the soul as far as possible from the body” (67c6). They do this by “accustoming it to gather
itself and collect itself out of every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can”
(67d1). This concerted effort to separate the soul from the body is the kind of ‘death’ that
philosophers actively pursue while they are alive.
This active pursuit of death is contrasted with the sort of pursuits that people who
avoid and resent death engage in—the pursuit of things like money or fame. Socrates refers
to the people who pursue such things as the lovers “of wealth or of honor, either or both”
(68c1). In the Republic, of course, the lover of wisdom, the lover of honor, and the lover
of wealth show up as three distinct character-types corresponding to the three distinct parts
of the soul (435d7–436a2). Here in the Phaedo, however, the lovers of wealth and the
lovers of honor are jointly characterized as ‘lovers of the body’ (68c1). So much for an
initial unpacking of the distinction between soul and body.

2.2 Disembodiment & Embodiment
When Socrates later returns to his examination of the relationship between soul and
body (79b1), he is mainly concerned to distinguish the soul in its disembodied state from
the soul in its embodied state. This distinction is cashed out in both ontological and
epistemological language:
When the soul investigates itself by itself (α τ καθ’ α τήν) it passes into the realm of
what is pure, eternal, immortal and unchanging, and being akin ( ς συγγεν ς ο σα) to this,
it always stays with it whenever it is itself by itself (α τ καθ’ α τήν) and can do so; it
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ceases to stray and it remains in the same state, as it is in touch ( φαπτομένη) with things
of the same kind, and its experience is what we call wisdom (φρόνησις). (79d1–5)37

When the soul leaves behind the body in its investigations and passes “itself by itself” into
the realm of what is immortal, it is then in touch with an unchanging reality. Its grasp of
this pure, unchanging reality is characterized as wisdom or knowledge. However, when the
soul “makes use of the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or
some other sense” (79c3) it is dragged down by the body toward things which are never
the same, and so the soul becomes confused, as though it were drunk (79c8). Its cognitive
grasp of this impure, ever-changing world is characterized as belief.38
So both knowledge and belief are characterized as cognitive states of the soul, much
as they were in the Protagoras. Here, however, we learn that knowledge is the result of the
reasoning that the soul engages in ‘itself by itself’ (65b7–c2, 79d1), while belief is the
result of the type of reasoning that the soul engages in when it ‘makes use of the body’
(65b1, 66a4, 79c8).39 The epistemic superiority enjoyed by the soul that possesses
knowledge (as a result of its contact with a pure and unchanging reality), allows Socrates
to make a related point about the sovereignty of the soul over the body:
When the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be ruled
(δουλεύειν κα ρχεσθαι), and the other to rule and be master ( ρχειν κα δεσπόζειν). Then
again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think
that the nature of the divine is to rule and to master ( ρχειν τε κα γεμονεύειν), whereas
that of the mortal is to be ruled and be subject ( ρχεσθαί τε κα δουλεύειν)? (80a1–6)40
ταν δέ γε α τ καθ’ α τ ν σκοπ , κε σε ο χεται ε ς τ καθαρόν τε κα ἀε ν κα ἀθάνατον κα σαύτως
χον, κα ς συγγεν ς ο σα α το ἀε μετ’ κείνου τε γίγνεται, τανπερ α τ καθ’ α τ ν γένηται κα ξ
α τ , κα πέπαυταί τε το πλάνου κα περ κε να ἀε κατ τα τ σαύτως χει, τε τοιούτων φαπτομένη·
κα το το α τ ς τ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται;
38 Cf. Phaedo 65a9, 83d7, 84b1
39 See Fine (2016) for an argument that the sort of ‘Two Worlds’ view I am advancing here is not, despite
the apparently overwhelming evidence to the contrary, operative here in the Phaedo.
40
ρα δ κα τ δε τι πειδ ν ν τ α τ
σι ψυχ κα σ μα, τ μ ν δουλεύειν κα ρχεσθαι φύσις
προστάττει, τ δ ρχειν κα δεσπόζειν· κα κατ τα τα α πότερόν σοι δοκε μοιον τ θεί ε ναι κα
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Given that the soul is the natural ruler and master of the body, it is not at all surprising to
find Socrates claiming that only the true practitioner of philosophy—the lover of wisdom,
who actively seeks to separate the soul as far as possible from the body while alive—is
capable of wholly mastering the body and its attendant desires:
No one may join the company of the gods who has not practiced philosophy and is not
completely pure when they depart from life, no one but the lover of learning (φιλομαθε ).
It is for this reason […] that those who practice philosophy in the right way (ο ρθ ς
φιλόσοφοι) keep away from all bodily desires (σ μα πιθυμι ν), endure (καρτερο σι)
them and do not surrender themselves to them. (82c1–5)41

Philosophers more than anyone else exhibit self-mastery because they more than anyone
else have worked to separate the soul from the body. This separation enables the soul of
the philosopher to assume its natural place as ruler and master:
The soul of the philosopher achieves calm from all bodily desires ( πιθυμι ν); it follows
reason and is always in this state (κα ἀε ν τούτ ο σα), contemplating the true and the
divine (τ ἀληθ ς κα τ θε ον), which is not the object of belief (ἀδόξαστον). (84a2–b1)42

Recall that Socrates had claimed in the Protagoras that “self-mastery is nothing other than
wisdom” (358c3). This claim is now fleshed out by the account that Socrates develops in
the Phaedo. Wisdom, defined as the possession of knowledge by the soul (itself by itself),
is attained by actively separating the soul as far as possible from the body while alive. The

πότερον τ θνητ ; ο δοκε σοι τ μ ν θε ον ο ον ρχειν τε κα γεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τ δ θνητ ν
ρχεσθαί τε κα δουλεύειν;
41 Ε ς δέ γε θε ν γένος μ φιλοσοφήσαντι κα παντελ ς καθαρ
ἀπιόντι ο θέμις ἀφικνε σθαι ἀλλ’ τ
φιλομαθε . ἀλλ τούτων νεκα […] ο ρθ ς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τ ν κατ τ σ μα πιθυμι ν πασ ν κα
καρτερο σι κα ο παραδιδόασιν α τα ς αυτούς
42 ἀλλ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, πομένη τ
λογισμ κα ἀε ν τούτ ο σα, τ ἀληθ ς κα τ
θε ον κα τ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη κα π’ κείνου τρεφομένη
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soul, because it is akin to the immortal and divine, also turns out to be the natural ruler and
master of the body (80a4). As the soul comes to possess wisdom, so too does it come to
possess greater mastery over the body. But how exactly does the soul come to possess
wisdom and so master the body? It is to this question that we now turn.

2.3 Conflict
Socrates claims that the soul comes to master the body by continually opposing the
desires that arise from it, using both harsh and gentle methods (94d1). Socrates deploys a
striking example in order to illustrate what he has in mind:
Of all things in a human being, is there anything other than the soul that you say is the
ruler, and especially a wise soul? Does the soul rule by acquiescing (συγχωρο σαν) to the
body’s passions (κατ τ σ μα πάθεσιν) or by actually opposing ( ναντιουμένην) them?
What I mean is something like the following. When the body is hot and thirsty the soul
pulls ( λκειν) it in the opposite direction, to not drinking; when the body is hungry, to not
eating, and we see a thousand other ways the soul opposes the things of the body
( ναντιουμένην τ ν ψυχ ν το ς κατ τ σ μα). (94b5–c1)43

This example is striking, in part, because exactly the same example is later deployed in the
argument for soul-partitioning in the Republic.44 Indeed, this example makes clear that at
least some of the opposition to the soul’s rule over the body is specifically motivational.
When thirst is present, for example, the soul opposes the body’s desire for drink; it pulls in
the opposite direction, toward not-drinking (94b10). The soul and the body thus stand in
conative or motivational conflict. In the Phaedo, then, bodily desires are characterized in
exactly the kind of language that had been missing in the Protagoras—language that

τ ν ν ἀνθρώπ πάντων σθ’ τι λλο λέγεις ρχειν
ψυχ ν λλως τε κα φρόνιμον; Πότερον
συγχωρο σαν το ς κατ τ σ μα πάθεσιν κα ναντιουμένην; λέγω δ τ τοιόνδε, ο ον καύματος νόντος
κα δίψους π το ναντίον λκειν, τ μ πίνειν, κα πείνης νούσης π τ μ σθίειν, κα λλα μυρία που
ρ μεν ναντιουμένην τ ν ψυχ ν το ς κατ τ σ μα
44 Republic 439b3; Cf. Laws 644d7–645b1
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emphasizes the motivational pull of such states in the direction of their target objects or
activities.45
But it is important to remember that, here in the Phaedo, this kind of conflict is
explicitly treated as a felt manifestation of the soul’s embodiment. The soul itself is not
conflicted. The conflict is rather between the soul and the body. And we should also
remember that the philosopher attempts to free themselves from such conflict by separating
their soul as far as possible from their body. Socrates even goes so far as to suggest that
the soul holds “converse with desires and passions and fears ( πιθυμίαις κα

ργα ς κα

φόβοις) as if it were one thing talking to something different ( ς λλη ο σα λλ πράγματι
διαλεγομένη)” (94d5). He bolsters this suggestion with yet another example that shows up
in the argument for soul-partitioning in the Republic. This example is taken from Homer’s
Odyssey, where Odysseus is given to rebuke his heart and command it to endure its
passionate anger for a time. Socrates now asks:
Do you think that when he composed this the poet thought that his soul was […] a thing to
be directed by the passions of the body ( π τ ν το σώματος παθημάτων)? Did he not
rather regard it as leading and mastering them ( γειν τε τα τα κα δεσπόζειν), being itself
a much more divine thing? (94d7–e4)46

Notable, of course, is that what Socrates will eventually call the ‘rational part’ of the soul
when this same passage is deployed in the Republic is here in the Phaedo simply referred
to as the ‘soul.’ Similarly, what Socrates will eventually call the ‘spirited part’ of the soul
when this same passage is deployed in the Republic is here in the Phaedo simply referred

See Singpurwalla (2018) for an excellent discussion of the target objects and activities of each of the three
parts of the soul in the Republic. That account I take to be consistent with what Socrates says here.
46 ρ’ ο ει α τ ν τα τα ποι σαι διανοούμενον ς […] α τ ς ο σης κα ο ας γεσθαι π τ ν το σώματος
παθημάτων, ἀλλ’ ο χ ο ας γειν τε τα τα κα δεσπόζειν, κα ο σης α τ ς πολ θειοτέρου τιν ς πράγματος
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to as the ‘body.’ I will return to these points in section three below.

2.4 Soul & Self
Before turning to the Republic, however, it is worth noting that coming to see the
body and its attendant affections as not properly belonging to oneself is an explicit and
philosophically significant theme in the Phaedo. This theme is front and center at the
conclusion of the dialogue, when Socrates reproves Crito for continuing to conflate him
with the body that will be buried or burned after death (115c5). Indeed, Socrates had just
finished explaining to Crito that everyone who has “purified themselves sufficiently by
philosophy will live in the future altogether without a body ( νευ τε σωμάτων ζ σι)”
(114c4). Part and parcel of the purification achieved through philosophy is coming to view
the pleasures and other passions of the body as belonging, not to oneself, but to something
foreign (94d5, 114e1).47
The Phaedo can thus be seen to unpack at least two of the more significant claims
originally introduced in the Protagoras. We now have a better sense of what that wisdom
is which had been said to be nothing other than self-mastery: it is the knowledge belonging
exclusively to the soul, which is the natural master or ruler of the body. Despite being the
natural master or ruler of the body, however, the soul is initially said to be “imprisoned in
and clinging to the body, forced to examine other things through it as though in a cage and
not by itself, wallowing in every kind of ignorance” (82e3).48 This, of course, also gives us

Phaedo 114e: “That is the reason why people should be of good cheer about their souls, if during their life
they have ignored the pleasures of the body ( δον ς τ ς περ τ σ μα) and its ornamentation as of no concern
to them and as doing them more harm than good, but instead have seriously been concerned with the pleasures
of learning (μανθάνειν).
48 After philosophy gets a hold of the soul, it is slowly freed from its imprisonment in the body (83a1–b4).
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a better sense of what that ignorance is which had been said to be nothing other than selfdefeat: it is the result of false beliefs that belong to the soul which is imprisoned in the body
and forced to investigate things through it.
Not only this, but the whole host of passions by which the many had claimed to be
overcome in the Protagoras are now, in the Phaedo, relegated to the body. Once again,
they are characterized in the kind of language that had been missing in the Protagoras—
language that emphasizes the motivational pull of such states. By unpacking the distinction
between soul and body, the Socrates of the Phaedo thus introduces the suggestion that the
soul and the body can stand in motivational conflict. Yet the soul remains in the Phaedo,
just as it was in the Protagoras, something simple and essentially rational.
Properly speaking, then, we still do not have psychic conflict; the soul can only be
said to conflict with the body. So it seems that Socrates of the Phaedo does not actually
countenance ‘psychic’ conflict any more than had the Socrates of the Protagoras: while
the soul may be deceived when it is forced to investigate things through the body (and so
acquire false or mistaken beliefs), it is still the case that everyone acts only on the basis of
what they know or believe to be best (99a4–b4).49 It is also still the case in the Phaedo that
the soul in possession of knowledge (reasoning itself by itself) is wise, while the soul in
possession of belief (reasoning through the body) is ignorant whenever its beliefs turn out
to be false or mistaken.50

As Butler (2019) p. 16 notes, Socrates in not only making a general point that applies to all human action,
but also defends this claim in propria persona.
50 Pleasures and pains are said to rivet the soul to the body so that the soul “shares the beliefs of the body
(το μοδοξε ν τ σώματι)” (83d7). Cf. Butler (2019) p. 15: “the power of bodily desire and pleasure is
always described as working by securing the cooperation of the soul’s capacity for choice rather than by
motivating actions directly or by overriding the soul’s concurrent choices or beliefs.”
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§3 THE REPUBLIC
According to the prevailing developmentalist story, the Socrates of the Republic is
no longer the historical Socrates, at least as Plato understood him or chose to present him
in dialogues like the Protagoras. He is now something resembling the mouthpiece of Plato,
himself, who is prepared to advocate for philosophical ideas and positions which may not
have been endorsed by the historical Socrates.51 This is supposed to explain why Plato has
the Socrates of the Republic rehabilitate the phenomenon of ‘being overcome’ against its
purported denial by the Socrates of the Protagoras. Since Plato now recognizes that the
soul is composite (in a way that he had not entertained in either the Protagoras or the
Phaedo) he is now finally in a position to countenance the possibility of psychic conflict.
Turning to the Republic, we are prepared to resist this sort of reading.

3.1 Soul Partitioning
Just before the argument for soul-partitioning, Socrates is discussing the virtue of
courage.52 In the Protagoras, courage had been so problematic that it had prompted
Socrates to re-characterize ‘being overcome’ as ignorance, and to claim that such ignorance
is nothing other than self-defeat, while wisdom is nothing other than self-mastery. It is
precisely at this juncture in the Republic that Socrates once again takes up a discussion of
self-mastery and self-defeat. But he now observes that such phrases seem absurd because
the same thing is both doing the mastering and getting defeated. This absurdity is what first

See Bobonich and Destrée (2007) for an excellent discussion of what they refer to as ‘the standard story.’
Glaucon is made to distinguish the sort of true beliefs about courage possessed as the result of education
and law from the sort of true beliefs about courage “which you find in animals and slaves (θηριώδη κα
ἀνδραποδώδη) and which is not the result of education” (430b6). Socrates says that the former is merely his
“account of civic (πολιτικήν) courage” (430c3). See chapters three and four for more on this general point.
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leads him to suppose that the soul has parts. The passage is instructive:
Yet isn’t the expression ‘self-mastery’ ridiculous (τ μ ν κρείττω α το γελο ον)? He who
is stronger than himself would also presumably be weaker than himself, and he who is
weaker than himself, stronger, since the same person is induced by all these expressions (
α τ ς γ ρ ν πασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται). […] Nonetheless, the expression seems to
me to mean that, in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse part and
that, whenever the naturally better part is in control ( γκρατές) of the worse, this is
expressed by saying that the person is self-mastered (τ κρείττω α το ). At any rate, one
praises someone by calling them self-mastered. But when the smaller and better part is
overpowered by the larger part, because of bad upbringing or bad company (τροφ ς κακ ς
τινος μιλίας), this is called being self-defeated ( ττω αυτο ). (430e6–431a3)53

He suggests that the absurdity of these phrases can be mitigated by supposing that the soul
has a better part and a worse part—and that whenever the ‘naturally better’ part masters
the worse, this is what most people mean when they claim that someone is self-mastered.
This is the very first instance in the Republic where Socrates suggests that the soul is
composite—a suggestion that had not been made in either the Protagoras or the Phaedo.54
Socrates finally seems prepared to countenance the sort of ‘being overcome’ that he had
worked so hard to reinterpret as ignorance in the Protagoras. How can we explain this?

3.2 Appearance & Reality
In the final book of the Republic, in a passage that directly recalls a familiar
discussion from the Protagoras, Socrates notes that one and the same thing can appear to
be different sizes depending on whether it is viewed from close up or from far away:

53Ο

κο ν τ μ ν κρείττω α το γελο ον; γ ρ αυτο κρείττων κα ττων δήπου ν α το ε η κα
ττων
κρείττων· α τ ς γ ρ ν πασιν τούτοις προσαγορεύεται. […] φαίνεταί μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ο τος λόγος
ς τι ν α τ τ ἀνθρώπ περ τ ν ψυχ ν τ μ ν βέλτιον νι, τ δ χε ρον, κα ταν μ ν τ βέλτιον φύσει
το χείρονος γκρατ ς , το το λέγειν τ κρείττω α το παινε γο ν. ταν δ π τροφ ς κακ ς τινος
μιλίας κρατηθ π πλήθους το χείρονος σμικρότερον τ βέλτιον ν, το το δ ς ν νείδει ψέγειν τε κα
καλε ν ττω αυτο
54 It is implicitly there, however, as Singpurwalla (2006) notes.
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The same magnitude seen from close at hand and from far away does not appear equal
[...] and the same thing appears bent when looked at in water and straight when out of it
[...] and it is clear that every confusion (ταραχή) of this sort is in our souls. (602c6–12)55

Socrates goes on to note that measuring, now said to be the work of the rational part of the
soul (602d6), would help to ensure that we do not succumb to the way that things appear.56
He also notes that even when the reasoning part has shown us the truth about how things
really are, the appearance to the contrary may nevertheless remain: a stick submerged in
water still appears bent, even when we are aware that it is straight. This is now taken to be
further evidence for the view that the soul is composite:
But many times when this part has measured and indicated that some things are larger or
smaller or the same size as others, the opposite appears to it at the same time concerning
these same things [...] Didn’t we say that it is impossible for the same thing to believe
opposites about the same things at the same time [...] Then the part of the soul that believes
contrary to the measurements could not be the same as the part of the soul that believes in
accordance with the measurements [...] But the part that believes in measurement and
calculation (λογισμ ) would be the best part of the soul [...] So what opposes it would be
something inferior in us (τ ν φαύλων ν τι ε η ν μ ν). (602e4–603a8)57

Socrates likens the conflict between appearances and the conflict between beliefs to the
conflict between actions, and presumably the sort of reasoned judgements that generate
them: “just as in matters of sight [a person] was at war with themselves and held opposite
beliefs at the same time concerning the same things, so in matters of action they are at war

τα τόν που μ ν μέγεθος γγύθεν τε κα πόρρωθεν δι τ ς ψεως ο κ σον φαίνεται [...] Κα τα τ
καμπύλα τε κα ε θέα ν δατί τε θεωμένοις κα ξω [...] κα π σά τις ταραχ δήλη μ ν νο σα α τη ν τ
ψυχ
56 Cf. Sophist 235e ff., Statesman 285b ff., and Philebus 41e ff.
57 Τούτ δ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι κα σημαίνοντι μείζω ττα ε ναι
λάττω τερα τέρων σα τἀναντία
φαίνεται μα περ τα τά [...] Ο κο ν φαμεν τ α τ μα περ τα τ ναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον ε ναι [...]
Τ παρ τ μέτρα ρα δοξάζον τ ς ψυχ ς τ κατ τ μέτρα ο κ ν ε η τα τόν [...] λλ μ ν τ μέτρ γε
κα λογισμ πιστε ον βέλτιστον ν ε η τ ς ψυχ ς [...] Τ ρα τούτ ναντιούμενον τ ν φαύλων ν τι ε η
ν μ ν.
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and fight against themselves” (603d1).58 This presents us with some additional evidence
for thinking that—in both the Protagoras and the Republic—the sort of conflict that
Socrates has in mind is a conflict between two reasoned judgements. But note that even
when these reasoned judgements diverge or conflict, it is still the case that—whatever
choice we make—we will be acting in accordance with our all-things-considered view of
what is best.59 Even here in the Republic, then, Socrates seems to maintain that one always
acts in accordance with what one either knows or believes to be best. 60
Now, it is worth pointing out that Socrates claims that “the part of the soul that
believes contrary to the measurements (τ παρ τ μέτρα ρα δοξάζον τ ς ψυχ ς) could
not be the same as the part of the soul that believes in accordance with the measurements
(τ κατ τ μέτρα ο κ ν ε η τα τόν).” What we have are two conflicting beliefs, with
absolutely no mention of knowledge, and—as had been made clear in both the Protagoras
and the Phaedo—belief is epistemically inferior to knowledge. Socrates is nowhere more
explicit about this fact than here in the Republic:
Haven’t you noticed that beliefs without knowledge (τ ς νευ πιστήμης δόξας) are
shameful (α σχραί)? The best of them are blind (α βέλτισται τυφλαί)—or do you think that
those who have a true belief without knowledge (ο νευ νο ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες) are
any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road? (506c6–9)61

The best of our beliefs are blind. Without knowledge, it seems, even true beliefs are not

See Singpurwalla (2006) and (2018) for excellent discussions of this point.
Cf. Singpurwalla (2006) p. 255
60 While Socrates thinks that most people in most domains of life are perfectly content to “act, acquire and
form their beliefs” (505d7) simply on the basis of what appears best to them, they are not content with
appearances when it comes to the good: “Nobody is satisfied to acquire what is believed good, but they seek
out the reality, and everyone disdains belief (δόξαν) here.” Cf. Protagoras 358d1
61 ο κ σθησαι τ ς νευ πιστήμης δόξας, ς π σαι α σχραί; ν α βέλτισται τυφλαί, δοκο σί τί σοι τυφλ ν
διαφέρειν δ ν ρθ ς πορευομένων ο νευ νο ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;
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worth all that much. Returning to the case of Leontius, we are prepared to see why.

3.3 Leontius Revisited
Leontius, recall, is conflicted: he is struggling with himself (439e10) and fighting
an internal civil war (440b2). According to Socrates, this is because his appetite and his
reason are pulling him in opposing directions. The rational part of his soul believes that he
should not look at the corpses, while the appetitive part of his soul believes that he should
look at the corpses.62
It is here worth recalling the example from section one, involving an early morning
workout.63 I am now going to describe the case of Leontius in the same terms I used to
describe that case. Suppose that Leontius possesses the (true) belief that not looking at the
corpses is the best course of action. As he approaches them, however, he succumbs to his
appetite.64 He thus ‘exchanges’ the (true) belief that not looking is the best course of action
for the (false) belief that looking is the best course of action. After looking at the corpses,
he regains the (true) belief that not looking was in fact best, and so regrets his action and
reproaches himself. Now, note that even if this case could be properly described as
Leontius’ reason ‘being overcome’ by his appetite, the fact remains that when he acted on
his false belief about what was best, he was not in that moment conflicted, but simply

Some scholars have suggested that the desires of appetite are non-rational in the sense that they are bare,
blind, brute, or simple urges. For example, see Penner (1990, 1996). See Moss (2015) for an extremely
convincing argument that this is not how Republic 437e4–5 should be read. See also Carone (2001) and
Lorenz (2004) for interpretations that reject the ‘bare urge’ view.
63 Suppose that someone possesses the (true) belief that going to the gym tomorrow morning is the best course
of action. In the morning, however, they succumb to the pleasure of their warm bed and so ‘exchange’ the
(true) belief that going to the gym is the best course of action for the (false) belief that remaining in bed is
the best course of action. They later regain their (true) belief that going to the gym was in fact best, and so
regret sleeping in.
64 Reeve (1992) p. 115: a fragment of comedy “tells us that Leontius was known for his love of boys as pale
as corpses.” If this is correct, then Leontius’ appetite could be understood as a desire for sexual gratification.
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mistaken.65 At the crucial moment of action, he was ignorant.
We are now prepared to see that the case of Leontius should be described this way.
For Socrates still maintains in the Republic that no one can act against their reasoned
judgement of what is best: “Every soul ( πασα ψυχή) pursues the good and does everything
for its sake (κα τούτου νεκα πάντα πράττει)” (505d7–e1).66 If this thesis is operative in
the present context, as it seems to be, then the case of Leontius simply cannot be described
or interpreted as Leontius’ reason being overcome by his appetite if ‘being overcome’
means what the many had meant by it in the Protagoras—namely, that one can know what
is best and be capable of acting on that knowledge, while nevertheless remaining unwilling
to do it.67 Leontius cannot, while either believing or knowing that not looking at the corpses
is the best course of action, choose to look at them (353c5).68
Since the belief that looking is the best course of action and the belief that not
looking is the best course of action are opposites, and Socrates grants that it is possible to
hold both beliefs simultaneously, it follows that they belong to two different parts of the

Cf. Protagoras 357d9
δ διώκει μ ν πασα ψυχ κα τούτου νεκα πάντα πράττει
67 Some scholars have thought that Socrates introduces ‘good independent’ desires at Republic 438a1–5. For
example, see Penner (1990), Reeve (1988) and Woods (1987). The phrase ‘good-independent’ is due to Irwin
(1977). However, Irwin himself does not seem to use this phrase to indicate what subsequent scholars have
taken it to indicate—namely, desires that depend in no way on an agent’s evaluation of their objects as good.
Rather, what Irwin seems to have in mind when he claims that appetitive desires are ‘good-independent’ is
that they are unconcerned with the overall good of the whole soul or person. For example, the desire to smoke
counts as a good-independent desire for Irwin. The thought, presumably, is that smoking is unhealthy and so
not in one’s overall best interest. Indeed, anything “unrelated to deliberation about the good of the whole
soul” (1977 p. 193) will count either as good-independent (e.g. appetitive desires) or as only partly gooddependent (e.g. spirited desires) for Irwin. All of this is simply to say that the subsequent literature does not
seem to deploy this phrase in a way that Irwin himself would endorse. He is even more explicit about this in
later work (1995), p. 208. This fact, as far as I can tell, has not been flagged in the literature. At any rate, see
Carone (2001), Moss (2015), and Weiss (2008) for entirely convincing arguments that appetitive desires—
and indeed all desires—are in some way ‘good-dependent.’
68 Both Callard (2017) and Kamtekar (2006) refer to this as the ‘desire thesis.’ Some scholars have taken the
thesis to be that people desire what appears good to them, while others have taken the thesis to be that people
desire what is really good. On either interpretation, my point holds.
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soul. Leontius is thus experiencing genuine psychic conflict. But while he can certainly
hold these two opposing beliefs (and, presumably, the correspondingly opposed desires
that attend them) simultaneously, it is still the case that he can only act on one of them. He
must therefore make a choice about which course of action is best—about which belief
(and perhaps corresponding desire) to act on.69 His action will ultimately reveal his choice.
Leontius, of course, turns out to be self-defeated; he made the wrong choice.
So although the Republic is indeed the first place where this sort of case can
properly be described as ‘psychic’ conflict, the sort of cognitive and motivational struggle
that it captures is familiar, and seems to have been countenanced somewhat implicitly in
the Protagoras (in the discussion of the distorting power of appearances) and somewhat
more explicitly the Phaedo (when the soul is described as standing in conative or
motivational conflict with the body). Indeed, as we will now see, Socrates is also prepared
to maintain in the Republic that the person who possesses knowledge will simply not
experience conflict—psychic or otherwise.

3.4 When Knowledge Rules
Recall that, in the Protagoras, Socrates had claimed that someone who possesses
knowledge would never be taken in by the distorting power of appearances and so would
never come to regret their actions. In the Republic, too, those who are ruled by knowledge
possess an astonishing degree of psychic peace.70 When discussing the sort of individual
Cf. Singpurwalla (2018): “Indeed, the cognitive character of the parts explains the motivational character
of the parts: it is because the rational part forms its desires on the basis of calculation that it desires the things
that it does, and it is because the appetitive and spirited parts forms their attitudes on the basis of what merely
appears good or bad that they desire the things that they do.”
70 The rational part of the soul is said to possess “knowledge of what is advantageous for each part, and for
the whole soul” (442c5). It is this fact that makes it the natural ruler of the entire soul, since “it is really wise
and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul” (441e3). Cf. Cooper (1984), p. 6
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who corresponds to the ideal city (i.e. the individual wholly ruled by knowledge or
wisdom), Socrates tells us:
They set in place what is really their own and rule themselves (τ ντι τ ο κε α ε θέμενον
κα ρξαντα α τ ν α το ). They put themselves in order, are their own friends, and
harmonize the three parts of themselves like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high,
low, and middle. They bind together those parts and any others there may be in between,
and from having been many they become entirely one (κα παντάπασιν να γενόμενον κ
πολλ ν), moderate and harmonious (σώφρονα κα ρμοσμένον). Only then do they act
[…] regarding as wisdom (σοφίαν) the knowledge ( πιστήμην) that oversees such actions.
(443d3–e6)71

These individuals join what had previously been three into one, binding them together in
such a way that, from having been many, they become “entirely one (παντάπασιν να).”
Such people, as the diction here seems to imply, are so radically unified that the several
parts of their composite soul become a single whole.72 For the composite soul that is ruled
by knowledge, then, psychic conflict is no more possible than it had been for someone
ruled by knowledge in the Protagoras. The self-mastery they display is simply an
expression of their wisdom.
Any suggestion, then, that the views of the Republic and the Protagoras are in
tension with respect to psychic (or even cognitive or motivational) conflict is at best
oversimplifying and distorting. On the one hand, when knowledge rules in the composite
soul, such a person enjoys exactly the sort of psychic peace that Socrates had claimed they
would in the Protagoras (356e1). On the other hand, anyone who does not possess
ἀλλ τ ντι τ ο κε α ε θέμενον κα ρξαντα α τ ν α το κα κοσμήσαντα κα φίλον γενόμενον αυτ
κα συναρμόσαντα τρία ντα, σπερ ρους τρε ς ρμονίας ἀτεχν ς, νεάτης τε κα πάτης κα μέσης, κα ε
λλα ττα μεταξ τυγχάνει ντα, πάντα τα τα συνδήσαντα κα παντάπασιν να γενόμενον κ πολλ ν,
σώφρονα κα ρμοσμένον, ο τω δ πράττειν δη […] σοφίαν δ τ ν πιστατο σαν ταύτ τ πράξει
πιστήμην
72 As Shields (2007) p. 13 notes: “his diction implies something closer to the activity of a carpenter or joiner,
who fits pieces together so that they are smoothly dovetailed and seamlessly fused, thus forming a fully
unified entity.”
36
71

knowledge “wouldn’t be entirely free from civil war within themselves, and wouldn’t be
one, but rather in some sense two” (554d9–e1). Plato thus continues to presuppose the
hypothetical impossibility of acting against knowledge. In both the Protagoras and the
Republic, knowledge is sufficient for virtue. But what are we to make of the fact that the
soul is now treated as composite, rather than simple? Is this a genuine development?

3.5 Immortality Revisited
Soul partitioning comes at a cost. One such cost is indicated in the final book of the
Republic, where Socrates turns once again to an argument for the immortality of the soul.
In the Phaedo, Socrates had noted that anything composite is “by nature liable to be divided
up into its component parts, and only that which is incomposite, if anything, is not liable
to be divided up” (78c). So if the soul turns out to be composite, that would raise serious
doubts about its immortality. Socrates now rehashes this worry in the Republic. He notes
that “it isn’t easy for a composite of many parts to be immortal […] yet this is how the soul
now appeared to us” (611a9).
How could it have been that the Socrates of the Phaedo saw no reason to think that
the soul was composite, especially when he had evidently accepted the possibility of
motivational conflict? Indeed, the Socrates of the Phaedo had utilized two of the same
examples that the argument for soul-partitioning in the Republic rely on. He appealed to
the same example of thirst, which is used to distinguish reason from appetite—and to the
same passage from the Odyssey, which is used to distinguish spirit from reason. 73 But the
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Cf. Phaedo 94d6–e4; Republic 441b3–c1
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Socrates of the Phaedo had not assigned appetitive or spirited desires to the soul, but only
to the body.
Still there can be little doubt that Plato recognized that for a body to give rise to
desires it must be ensouled, and that there must therefore be some way in which the soul is
responsible for even the lower desires that, in the Phaedo, are simply assigned to the body.
Nevertheless, the Socrates of the Phaedo had not regarded conflicts between the body and
the soul as any reason to think that the soul ‘itself by itself’ was something composite.
Perhaps surprisingly, neither does the Socrates of the Republic. In a striking passage,
Socrates now considers what the soul might look like in its disembodied state:
Yet our recent argument and others as well compel us to believe that the soul is immortal
(ἀθάνατον). But to see the soul as it is in truth ( στ ν τ ἀληθεί ), we must not study it as
it is while it is maimed by its association with the body and other evils—which is what we
were doing earlier—but as it is in its pure state, that’s how we should study the soul,
thoroughly and by means of reasoning (λογισμ ). We’ll then find that it is a much finer
thing than we thought [...] What we’ve said about the soul is true of it as it appears at
present. But the condition in which we’ve studied it is like that of the sea-god Glaucus,
whose original nature (τ ν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν) can’t easily be made out by those who catch
glimpses of him. Some of the original parts have been broken off, others have been crushed,
and his whole body has been maimed by the waves and by the shells, seaweeds, and stones
that have attached themselves to him, so that he looks more like a wild animal than his
natural self ( στε παντ μ λλον θηρί οικέναι ο ος ν φύσει). The soul, too, is in a
similar condition when we study it, beset by many evils. That, Glaucon, is why we have to
look somewhere else in order to discover its true nature [...] To its love of wisdom (Ε ς τ ν
φιλοσοφίαν α τ ς). We must realize what it grasps and longs to have intercourse with,
because it is akin to the divine and immortal and what always is ( ς συγγεν ς ο σα τ τε
θεί κα ἀθανάτ κα τ ἀε ντι), and we must realize what it would become if it followed
this longing with its whole being, and if the resulting effort lifted it out of the sea in which
it now dwells, and if the many stones and shells (those which have grown all over it in a
wild, earthy, and stony profusion because it feasts at those so-called happy feasting on
earth)74 were hammered off it. Then we’d see what its true nature (ἀληθ φύσιν) is and be
able to determine whether it has many parts or just one (ε τε πολυειδ ς ε τε μονοειδής) and
whether or in what manner it is put together. But we’ve already given a decent account, I
Cf. Republic 519a7–b4: “However, if a nature of this sort [one that is vicious but clever] had been
hammered at from childhood and freed from the bonds of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened
to it by feasting, greed and other such pleasures and which, like leaden weights, pull its vision downwards—
if being rid of these, it turned to look at true things, then I say that the same soul of the same person would
see these most sharply, just as it now does the things it is presently turned towards.”
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think, of what its condition is and what parts it has when it is immersed in human life ( ν
τ ἀνθρωπίν βί ). (611b7–612a8)75

Socrates is here comparing the embodied soul to the sea-god Glaucus, whose is covered
with shells, seaweed, and stones that have attached themselves to him while submerged
under the sea, so that he looks more like “a wild animal than his natural self” (611d4).76
According to this image, these stones and shells attach themselves while Glaucus is
submerged under the sea. To grasp his true nature, we must lift him out of the sea and
hammer off these accretions.
So too for the soul. We must think what it would be like if (1) it entirely followed
its love of wisdom, (2) that effort lifted it out of the sea in which it now dwells, and (3) its

τι μ ν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, κα
ρτι λόγος κα ο λλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ν· ο ον δ’ στ ν τ ἀληθεί ,
ο λελω βημένον δε α τ θεάσασθαι πό τε τ ς το σώματος κοινωνίας κα λλων κακ ν, σπερ ν ν με ς
θεώμεθα, ἀλλ’ ο όν στιν καθαρ ν γιγνόμενον, τοιο τον καν ς λογισμ δια θεατέον, κα πολύ γε κάλλιον
α τ ε ρήσει […] ν ν δ ε πομεν μ ν ἀληθ περ α το , ο ον ν τ παρόντι φαίνεται· τεθεάμεθα μέντοι
διακείμενον α τό, σπερ ο τ ν θαλάττιον Γλα κον ρ ντες ο κ ν τι δίως α το δοιεν τ ν ἀρχαίαν
φύσιν, π το τά τε παλαι το σώματος μέρη τ μ ν κκεκλάσθαι, τ δ συντετρ φθαι κα πάντως
λελωβ σθαι π τ ν κυμάτων, λλα δ προσπεφυκέναι, στρεά τε κα φυκία κα πέτρας, στε παντ μ λλον
θηρί οικέναι ο ος ν φύσει, ο τω κα τ ν ψυχ ν με ς θεώμεθα διακειμένην π μυρίων κακ ν. ἀλλ
δε , Γλαύκων, κε σε βλέπειν. […] Ε ς τ ν φιλοσοφίαν α τ ς, κα ννοε ν ν πτεται κα ο ων φίεται
μιλι ν, ς συγγεν ς ο σα τ τε θεί κα ἀθανάτ κα τ ἀε ντι, κα ο α ν γένοιτο τ τοιούτ π σα
πισπομένη κα π ταύτης τ ς ρμ ς κκομισθε σα κ το πόντου ν ν ν στίν, κα περικρουσθε σα
πέτρας τε κα στρεα ν ν α τ , τε γ ν στιωμέν , γεηρ κα πετρώδη πολλ κα γρια περιπέφυκεν π
τ ν ε δαιμόνων λεγομένων στιάσεων. κα τότ’ ν τις δοι α τ ς τ ν ἀληθ φύσιν, ε τε πολυειδ ς ε τε
μονοειδής, ε τε π χει κα πως· ν ν δ τ ν τ ἀνθρωπίν βί πάθη τε κα ε δη, ς γ μαι, πιεικ ς
α τ ς διεληλύθαμεν.
76 Cf. Phaedrus 230a ff., but especially Republic 588c ff., where Plato has Socrates offer another image of
the composite soul: “Well, then, fashion a single kind of multicolored beast with a ring of many heads that it
can grow and change at will—some from gentle, some from savage animals. […] Then fashion another kind
of animal, that of a lion, and one of a human being. But make the first much the largest and the other second
to it in size […] Now join the three of them into one, so that they somehow grow together naturally […]
Then, fashion around them the image of a human being so that anyone who sees only the outer covering and
not what’s inside will think it is a single creature, a human being […] Our words and deeds should insure
that the human being within this human being (το ἀνθρώπου
ντ ς νθρωπος) has the most control
( γκρατέστατος); second, that he should take care of the many-headed beast as a farmer does his animals,
feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing; and third, that he
should make the lion’s nature his ally, care for the community of all his parts, and bring them up in such a
way that they will be friends with each other and with himself…” At 589d1–e2, Socrates twice notes that the
‘human’ part of our nature is perhaps better described as divine.
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various accretions were hammered off. What would the soul look like then? The sea
presumably stands for the visible world of becoming, or for embodied life, while the soul’s
accretions might simply stand for the desires of appetite and spirit—or perhaps for the
appetitive and spirited parts of the soul themselves. But in either case, these accretions are
removed as a result of the soul wholly following its love of wisdom. 77 Glaucus seems like
an animal, but he is in fact a god. What does this imply about the human soul?
As we will see in the next chapter, the Timaeus unpacks many of these intriguing
suggestions. The two lower parts of the embodied soul turn out to be mortal, while only
the rational part is immortal (69c6–70b9). At death, the rational part of the soul will be
separated from the lower two parts of the soul. Much as in the Phaedo, the disembodied
soul is treated in the Timaeus as something simple and essentially rational (41d–42a). So
while Plato sees good epistemic or pragmatic reasons to pursue the study of the soul
immersed in human life in the Republic as a kind of complement to the study of the
immortal, rational soul carried out in the Phaedo—the views defended in the Phaedo and
the Protagoras have not been left behind.78 Indeed, they return in the Timaeus, to which
we will now turn.

The apparent reference to the Phaedo that is embodied in this recommendation suggests that the moral
psychology of that dialogue remains a live option even at the end of the Republic. This suggestion is further
supported by the fact that in passages focusing on the soul of the philosopher, concepts and claims familiar
from the Phaedo reappear, such as the concept of purification (527d5–e2), and the claim that the philosopher
simply abandons bodily desires and pleasures rather than seeking harmony with them (485d10–e1).
78 It is a further (interesting) question as to whether Plato had this view worked out when he wrote the
Protagoras. I think my reading certainly allows for this, though I do not argue for that controversial thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO
SELF-MASTERY & APOTHEOSIS IN THE TIMAEUS
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, I argued that Socrates consistently describes the person
who exhibits self-mastery as someone ruled by reason or knowledge. I explored some of
the psychological facets of this rule, but I now want to turn squarely to the epistemological
and metaphysical side of things. In order to do this, I will again be drawing on the Republic,
where Plato most directly and explicitly links his epistemology and ontology. While I will
also briefly discuss the Phaedo and the Sophist, the bulk of this chapter will be focused
squarely on the Timaeus—for it is in the Timaeus that Plato makes explicit what had only
been implicit at the conclusion of the Republic. Namely, that the immortal soul is just the
rational part of the embodied soul. As I will demonstrate, a better understanding of Plato’s
metaphysical and epistemological commitments will allow us to better appreciate what the
soul ultimately amounts to on his account.
That the Timaeus is dramatically linked to the Republic is made clear in the initial
framing of the dialogue, where Socrates alludes to a discussion about politics held on the
previous day (17c3). In giving a brief reprisal of that discussion, he references not a few of
the arguments that had been uniquely rehearsed in the Republic (17e1–19a5).79 Moreover,

The discussion was about the sort of political structure a city should have (17c2, cf. 369a1). The city should
be subdivided into three classes (17c7, cf. 434b8). Each person within the city is to do the one job for which
they are best suited (17d2, cf. 397e1). The guardians are supposed to act gently toward their own subjects
and harshly toward foreigners (18a2, cf. 440d5). They are to have both physical and cultural training (18a9,
cf. 376e2). They are to live communally and hold property in common (18b2, cf. 416e3). Women, too, have
a corresponding share in all occupations and aspects of life in the city (18c1, cf. 454d9). Children and spouses
are also to be held in common (18c9, cf. 457c9). All citizens within the same generation are to be considered
brothers and sisters, so that everyone in the city believes that they are part of a single family (18d1, cf. 461d2).
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that the Timaeus is dramatically linked to the Phaedo is made clear when, in the ensuing
discussion, it is argued that intellect (νο ς) is the supremely good demiurge or craftsman
of the sensible cosmos, and that this divine craftsman “wanted all things to come to be, as
much as possible, like itself” (29e3). Many commentators have understood this argument
to be part and parcel of Plato’s attempt to provide the sort of cosmogony that a young
Socrates had hoped to find in the writings of Anaxagoras; a hope which was ultimately
dashed when, as Socrates puns in the Phaedo, he discovered that Anaxagoras “did not use
intellect (νο ς)” (97c1), but instead offered strictly mechanistic explanations for natural
phenomena. What emerges from the account developed in the Timaeus is that the rational
part of the human soul is patterned after this intellect (νο ς).
In the present chapter, I unpack the way in which Plato ultimately identifies the
disembodied soul with intellect.80 Armed with this account, a partial explanation for why
so many commentators have insisted on a philosophical break between the view of the soul
offered up in the Protagoras and the Republic will be ready-to-hand: by focusing more-orless exclusively on Plato’s moral psychology, such commentators have failed to adequately
appreciate Plato’s metaphysical and epistemological commitments—commitments which
remain firmly in place throughout the dialogues under discussion, and which directly
inform his psychology. As I will demonstrate, it is precisely these commitments which both
shape and inform his view of the soul. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, the
account of the soul that Plato develops in his very last work, the Laws, is entirely
compatible with the accounts found in the Protagoras, Phaedo, Republic and Timaeus.

Marriages will be secretly arranged, so that the best natures are bred together (18e1, cf. 459d5). Finally,
children are to be carefully watched in order to identify which of them have the best natures (19a2, cf. 536e4).
80 Cf. Timaeus 42a2: intellect turns out to be our own ‘superior’ nature.
42

With all of this in place, we will then be furnished with a comprehensive account of the
soul, which will finally allow us to reconcile Plato’s seemingly incompatible positions visà-vis psychic conflict in the Protagoras and the Republic.
This chapter proceeds as follows. After first introducing and explaining the central
epistemological and metaphysical commitments common to both the Phaedo and the
Republic, I show that these very same commitments remain firmly in place throughout the
Timaeus (§1). I then take up an examination of craftsmanship, with the aim of
demonstrating the way in which it is distinguished from other modes of production. As the
craftsman who is said to produce the cosmos is ultimately identified with ‘νο ς,’ I explore
some possible translations of this term before arguing that ‘intellect’ should be the
preferred translation (§2). I then briefly turn to the Sophist in order to help explicate the
relationship between intellect, soul, and knowledge. Following a general examination of
soul, I turn to a treatment of the human soul, in particular (§3). In the final section, I outline
the way in which the human soul is supposed to assimilate itself to this intellect and so
become self-mastered (§4).

§1 EPISTEMOLOGY & ONTOLOGY
Plato links his epistemology and ontology by making forms, or beings, the objects
of knowledge. As Socrates explains in the Republic: “what is completely (παντελ ς ν) is
completely knowable (παντελ ς γνωστόν) and what is in no way is in every way
unknowable” (477a2).81 Consequently, what is most real for Plato are not sensible things,

Plato is here following Parmenides. Cf. Parmenides, On Nature, B 8.34–36: “The same is for thinking and
for being. For not without being, to which it is betrothed, will you find thinking (τα τ ν δ’ στ νοε ν τε κα
ο νεκεν στι νόημα. ο γ ρ νευ το όντος, ν ι πεφατισμένον στιν, ε ρήσεις τ νοε ν).”
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but the forms that characterize them and that can be grasped in thought. 82 The complete
being of the forms is what renders them completely knowable. 83
Sensible things, on the other hand, are less than completely real because they are
constituted as multiple appearances of singular forms—apprehended not by knowledge,
but by belief. As appearances or ‘images’ of forms (476c5), sensible things are said to lie
in between that which completely is and that which completely is not, so that “if something
should appear such as at once to be and not be, this will lie in between that which purely is
and that which wholly is not, and neither knowledge nor ignorance will be about it, but
again what appears between ignorance and knowledge” (478d8)—namely, belief. For
example, the form of beauty would be grasped by knowledge, while the many beautiful
things—sensible particulars like Socrates, Glaucon and Alcibiades—would be grasped by
belief (479a1). Although Glaucon might be beautiful when compared to Socrates, he is
certainly not beautiful when compared to Alcibiades. Glaucon is thus at once both beautiful
and not beautiful.84
Now it is worth noting that—much as in the Protagoras—belief remains a fallible
cognitive power in the Republic, while knowledge remains an infallible cognitive power
(477e4).85 It is also worth noting that the various degrees of being are perfectly correlated
to the degrees of cognitive apprehension: knowledge is of forms and is infallible because

Aristotle is even more explicit on this point. Knowledge, he repeatedly insists, is identical to that which is
known. See especially De Anima 430a20 and Metaphysics 1072b20–23, 1075a1–4
83 This claim recurs throughout the Platonic corpus. Cf. Phaedo 78d ff.; Republic 477a ff., 525b ff.;
Theaetetus 170a ff., 183a ff.; Parmenides 132b ff., 135b ff.; Sophist 258b ff.; Timaeus 29c ff., 51a ff.
84 See Fine (2003) for a sustained rejection of the ‘Two Worlds’ reading I am advancing here.
85 Republic 477e4: “How could a person with any understanding think that a fallible power (τ
μ
ἀναμαρτήτ ) is the same as an infallible (ἀναμάρτητον) one?” Cf. Gorgias 454d9: “Well now, is there such
a thing as true and false knowledge ( πιστήμη στ ν ψευδ ς κα ἀληθής)? Not at all (Ο δαμ ς).” See also
Republic 508d4.
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forms are stable beings and do not change (479e6–7), belief is of sensible things and is
fallible because sensible things are forever in flux: they are constantly changing, or
becoming (478d6, 480a1). Ignorance, of course, is of nothing (477a2).86
Many of these same points are echoed in the Phaedo, where Socrates claims that
“if we are ever to really have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe
things in themselves” (66e1). As we saw in the previous chapter, sensible things are
grasped through the body, while intelligible forms are grasped through the soul.87 This
point is made even more clear when Socrates explicitly contrasts the ontological status of
forms with the ontological status of sensible particulars:
[A]re they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another;
can the equal itself, the beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real (τ ν), ever be affected
by any change (μεταβολήν) whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform
itself by itself ( ἀε α τ ν καστον στι, μονοειδ ς ν α τ καθ’ α τό), remain the same
and never in any way tolerate any change whatever? […] What of the many beautiful
particulars […] Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one
might say, never remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other? […] These
latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always
remain the same can be grasped only by rational thought (τ τ ς διανοίας λογισμ )?
(78d2–79a2)88

See especially Kahn (1981). As he notes, Aristotle (Metaphysics 1017a31) lists truth as one of the four
philosophically relevant senses or uses of the verb ‘to be.’
87 Cf. Phaedo 79c4–d2: “for to investigate something through the body is to do it through the senses—it is
dragged by the body to the things that are never the same… But when the soul investigates itself by itself
(α τ καθ’ α τ ν σκοπ ) it passes into the realm of what is pure, eternal, immortal, and unchanging ( κε σε
ο χεται ε ς τ καθαρόν τε κα ἀε ν κα ἀθάνατον κα σαύτως χον).”
88 πότερον σαύτως ἀε χει κατ τα τ
λλοτ’ λλως; α τ τ σον, α τ τ καλόν, α τ καστον στιν,
τ ν, μή ποτε μεταβολ ν κα ντινο ν νδέχεται; ἀε α τ ν καστον στι, μονοειδ ς ν α τ καθ’ α τό,
σαύτως κατ τα τ χει κα ο δέποτε ο δαμ ο δαμ ς ἀλλοίωσιν ο δεμίαν νδέχεται; […] Τί δ τ ν
πολλ ν καλ ν […] ρα κατ τα τ χει, π ν το ναντίον κείνοις ο τε α τ α το ς ο τε ἀλλήλοις
ο δέποτε ς πος ε πε ν ο δαμ ς κατ τα τά; […] Ο κο ν τούτων μ ν κ ν ψαιο κ ν δοις κ ν τα ς λλαις
α σθήσεσιν α σθοιο, τ ν δ κατ τα τ χόντων ο κ στιν τ ποτ’ ν λλ πιλάβοιο τ τ ς διανοίας
λογισμ
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As we will now see, these very same distinctions are also operative in the Timaeus.89

1.1 A Consistent Account
The Timaeus is a work that offers an account of the formation of the cosmos, and
an elaborate explanation of its order and goodness. Before launching into that explanation,
however, Timaeus first offers up a brief ‘overture’ (27d5–29d2). In this overture, he takes
pains to mark the very same distinctions which are now familiar from both the Phaedo and
Republic. Namely, the distinction between “that which always is and has no becoming”
and “that which becomes but never is” (28a1). He unpacks the distinction between being
and becoming as follows:
The former is grasped by intellect, which involves an account (τ μ ν δ νοήσει μετ λόγου
περιληπτόν). It always is (ἀε κατ τα τ ν). The latter is grasped by belief, which
involves unreasoning sense perception (τ δ’ α δόξ μετ’ α σθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν).
It comes to be and passes away but never really is (γιγνόμενον κα ἀπολλύμενον, ντως δ
ο δέποτε ν). (28a1–3)90

Timaeus claims that the cosmos has come to be. This is because “it is both visible and
tangible and it has a body—and all things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we have
shown, perceptible things are grasped by belief, which involves sense perception. As such,
they are things that have come to be” (28b10).91

Cf. Republic 507b10: “And we say that the many beautiful things and the rest are visible but not intelligible
( ρ σθαί φαμεν, νοε σθαι δ’ ο ), while the forms are intelligible but not visible ( δέας νοε σθαι μέν, ρ σθαι
δ’ ο ).” See also Gorgias 474d5, where Socrates references the lovers of sights and sounds.
90 τ μ ν δ νοήσει μετ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀε κατ τα τ
ν, τ δ’ α δόξ μετ’ α σθήσεως ἀλόγου
δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον κα ἀπολλύμενον, ντως δ ο δέποτε ν.
91 Cf. Timaeus 52a1: “[W]e must agree that that which possesses form (ε δος χον), which has not been
brought into being and is not destroyed (ἀγέννητον κα ἀνώλεθρον), which neither receives into itself
anything else from anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, is one thing. It is invisible—
it cannot be perceived by the senses at all—and it is the role of understanding to study it (το το δ νόησις
ε ληχεν πισκοπε ν). The second thing is that which shares the other’s name and resembles it. This thing can
be perceived, and it has been begotten. It is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place and
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Since the sensible cosmos has come to be, this implies that it was made. Timaeus
claims that it was made by a god whom he characterizes as a “craftsman (δημιουργός)”
(29a3). Rather than immediately launching into an examination this divine craftsman,
however, Timaeus suggests that they first examine the “paradigm’ (παραδείγματος)”
(29b4) on which the sensible cosmos was modeled, and to which the divine craftsman was
looking when it was produced. However, Timaeus is careful to note that the account of the
eternal paradigm and the account of the sensible cosmos formed in its likeness will differ
in the following respects:
Accounts of what is stable and fixed and transparent to intellect (μετ νο καταφανο ς)
are themselves stable and unshifting (μονίμους κα ἀμεταπτώτους). We must do our very
best to make these accounts as irrefutable (ἀνελέγκτοις) and invincible (ἀνικήτοις) as any
account may be. On the other hand, accounts we give of that which has been formed to be
a likeness of that reality (πρ ς μ ν κε νο ἀπεικασθέντος), since they are accounts of what
is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts, i.e.
what being is to becoming, truth is to belief ( τιπερ πρ ς γένεσιν ο σία, το το πρ ς πίστιν
ἀλήθεια). (29b6–c4)92

The account of the paradigm, because it is stable and fixed, will be as irrefutable and
invincible as any account may be. But the account of what has only been crafted in its
likeness—the sensible cosmos—will itself only be likely. This leads Timaeus to make a
related point about value:
Whenever the craftsman looks at what is eternal ( δημιουργ ς πρ ς τ κατ τα τ χον
βλέπων ἀεί) and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and power
(τοιούτ τιν προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τ ν δέαν κα δύναμιν α το ἀπεργάζηται),
then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were he to look at a thing that
has come to be and use as his model something that has been begotten, his work will lack
then perishing out of it. It is apprehended by opinion, which involves sense perception (δόξ μετ’ α σθήσεως
περιληπτόν).”
92 το μ ν ο ν μονίμου κα βεβαίου κα μετ νο καταφανο ς μονίμους κα ἀμεταπτώτους, καθ’ σον ο όν
τε κα ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις ε ναι κα ἀνικήτοις, τούτου δε μηδ ν λλείπειν, το ς δ το πρ ς μ ν
κε νο ἀπεικασθέντος, ντος δ ε κόνος ε κότας ἀν λόγον τε κείνων ντας· τιπερ πρ ς γένεσιν ο σία,
το το πρ ς πίστιν ἀλήθεια.
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beauty. […] Now surely it is clear to all that it was the eternal model that he looked at, for,
of all the things that have come to be, our cosmos is the most beautiful, and of causes the
craftsman is the most excellent. This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft,
modeled after that which is changeless and is apprehended by reason and thought (τ λόγ
κα φρονήσει περιληπτόν). (28a6–29b1)93

Before turning our attention to the various facets of the divine craftsman’s work, however,
it will be useful to examine Plato’s general account of craftsmanship. 94

1.2 Craftsmanship
Craftsmanship for Plato is generally distinguished from other modes of production,
such as mechanical causation or biological procreation, in that the craftsman works
intelligently, arranging material according to an order or paradigm that is grasped in
thought. So, for example, in the Republic, Socrates depicts the philosopher as a “craftsman
(δημιουργός)” who looks to the “divine paradigm (τ θεί παραδείγματι)” (500d6–e3) in
creating the ideal state. The philosopher is said to “look (ἀποβλέποιεν) often in each
direction, toward the forms of justice, beauty, moderation and the like on the one hand, and
towards those they are producing in ( μποιο εν) human beings on the other” (501b1–4).95
More mundanely, the craftsman of a simple table or bed is said by Socrates to make
each “by looking (βλέπων) to the form ( δέαν) of each” (596b6).96 In a word, craftsmanship

του μ ν ο ν ν δημιουργ ς πρ ς τ κατ τα τ χον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτ τιν προσχρώμενος
παραδείγματι, τ ν δέαν κα δύναμιν α το ἀπεργάζηται, καλ ν ξ ἀνάγκης ο τως ἀποτελε σθαι π ν· ο δ’
ν ε ς γεγονός, γεννητ παραδείγματι προσχρώμενος, ο καλόν. […] παντ δ σαφ ς τι πρ ς τ ἀίδιον·
μ ν γ ρ κάλλιστος τ ν γεγονότων, δ’ ριστος τ ν α τίων. ο τω δ γεγενημένος πρ ς τ λόγ κα φρονήσει
περιληπτ ν κα κατ τα τ χον δεδημιούργηται
94 Although the Timaeus is the only dialogue in which Plato offers anything like a detailed account of the
production of the cosmos, it is certainly not the only dialogue in which a divine and craftsman-like
intelligence appears. Cf. Republic 507c7–8, 530a3; Sophist, 265b4–6, 265c1–5, 265e2; Phaedo 97c1–2
95 These passages describing philosophers as craftsmen looking to a divine paradigm occur shortly after
Socrates’ graphic account of their souls ‘coupling with’ and being ‘nourished by’ real being (490a8–b7). In
his characterization of philosophers as craftsmen, Plato has Socrates take great pains to indicate that their
souls are in communion ( μιλ α) with the intelligible paradigm to which they are looking.
96 Cf. Republic 389a6
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is simply a matter of looking to an intelligible paradigm and subsequently ordering the
production so that the product becomes an image or likeness of it. To say, then, that the
sensible cosmos is a work of divine craftsmanship is to say that it expresses, or is an image
of, the intelligible paradigm to which the divine craftsman looks—just as a work of human
craftmanship expresses, or is an image of, the intelligible paradigm to which the human
craftsman looks. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what we find in the Timaeus:
This, then, is how it [the cosmos] has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that
which is changeless and is apprehended by reason and thought (τ λόγ κα φρονήσει
περιληπτόν). These things being the case, again, there is every necessity that this cosmos
is an image of something (π σα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τ ν κόσμον ε κόνα τιν ς ε ναι). (29a6–b2)97

What is unique about the account found in the Timaeus, however, is that—whereas other
dialogues typically treat sensible particulars as images of particular forms—the entirety of
the sensible cosmos, taken all together as a whole, is presented as an image of intelligible
reality taken all together as a whole. Thus, to say that the sensible cosmos reflects the
totality of intelligible reality—the totality of forms—is to say that the sensible cosmos is
simply an image or likeness of that totality. 98 As we will see in the next section, the totality
of intelligible reality to which the divine craftsman is said to look is also explicitly
described as what ‘νο ς’ contemplates (39e7–9).99

ο τω δ γεγενημένος πρ ς τ λόγ κα φρονήσει περιληπτ ν κα κατ τα τ χον δεδημιούργηται· τούτων
παρχόντων α π σα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τ ν κόσμον ε κόνα τιν ς ε ναι.
98 In the Republic, the condition of the soul wherein intelligible reality is grasped in such a way as to make
use of nothing visible, “but only of forms themselves, moving on from forms to forms and ending in forms
(ἀλλ’ ε δεσιν α το ς δι’ α τ ν ε ς α τά, κα τελευτ ε ς ε δη)” (511b9) is the paradigm of knowledge.
99 Cf. Gerson (2017) p. 9: “intellect, being cognitively identical with all the forms, is the paradigm of all
intelligibility […] That intellect thinks these forms means that it is cognitively identical with them.”
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§2 NOUS AS INTELLECT
What exactly is νο ς? Timaeus characterizes it in a number of ways. He first refers
to it as the “living thing” in which all other living things partake (30c3–6). He later tells us
that the cosmos was crafted by it (47e4) and that it produces by looking to “that which is
changeless and is apprehended by reason and wisdom (τ λόγ κα φρονήσει περιληπτόν)”
(29a6–b1). Indeed, the very paradigm to which this craftsman looks is itself described as
an eternal living thing (37c6–d1).100 Timaeus also tells us that the divine craftsman “wanted
all things to come to be as like itself (παραπλήσια αυτ ) as possible” (29e3). Taken all
together, these passages strongly suggest that the forms, the divine craftsman and the
intelligible living thing are simply three different ways of characterizing ‘νο ς.’101 We will
return this point more fully below—but first, a word on translation.
The term ‘νο ς’ is sometimes translated as ‘mind,’ but the most common translation
seems to be ‘reason.’ Not primarily ‘reason’ in the sense of a cause (α τία), or in the sense
of an argument or account (λόγος), but rather in the sense of knowledge ( πιστήμη). Some
philologists have tried to determine exactly what sort of knowledge Plato has in mind by
comparing the noun ‘νο ς’ with its cognate verb ‘νοε ν.’102 This verb is not primarily used
to indicate the act of reasoning from premises to conclusion, or the act of discursive thought

ς δ κινηθ ν α τ κα ζ ν νόησεν τ ν ἀιδίων θε ν γεγον ς γαλμα γεννήσας πατήρ, γάσθη τε κα
ε φρανθε ς τι δ μ λλον μοιον πρ ς τ παράδειγμα πενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. καθάπερ ο ν α τ τυγχάνει
ζ ον ἀίδιον ν
101 Cf. Philebus 28c6–e6, 30d1–e1; Many recent commentators do not wish to identify the demiurge with the
paradigm to which it looks—preferring instead to identify it with the world-soul. Cornford (1935) and
Cherniss (1965) are representative of this sort of interpretation. See Menn (1995) p. 7 for an excellent
discussion of their respective interpretive approaches. Such interpretations are problematic, however, since,
as Menn forcefully puts it: “nothing authorizes us to override Plato’s contrast between the world-soul, ‘which
has become the best of the generated things,’ and the god who has made it such, ‘the best of the intelligible
and eternally existing things’ (Timaeus 37a1–2).” See also Perl (1998) and Gerson (2006) for sustained and
convincing defenses of the traditional view.
102 See especially Kurt von Fritz (1994) as well as Claus (1983)
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more generally, which is better captured by such terms as ‘διάνοια’ or ‘λογισμός.’103
Rather, it usually indicates a more synoptic, intellectual grasp. It is a term that is often
reserved in both Plato and Aristotle for describing a direct and immediate intellectual
apprehension.104
One of Plato’s most frequent and basic expressions that involves this term is ‘νο ν
χειν’ (to have or possess νο ς). From this we get ‘νο ν κτ σθαι’ (to acquire or to cometo-possess νο ς). In the perfect tense this is rendered ‘νο ν κεκτ σθαι,’ which is more-orless equivalent to ‘νο ν χειν.’105 While these expressions can have the colloquial sense of
being reasonable, they tend to indicate—in the works of Plato, at any rate—the possession
of reason, intellect, or knowledge. Plato arguably takes up this conception of νο ς in the
Timaeus when he contrasts it with true belief, claiming that everyone “shares (μεταχε ν) in
the former, but in νο ς the gods share, and human beings just a little” (51e5–6).106 Finally,
it is worth noting that Plato uses the word ‘νο ς’ some 350–400 times (depending on how
many texts are authentic), but never once uses it in the plural.107
Taking all of this into account, I suggest that ‘νο ς’ is best translated as intellect,
since this term can variously indicate not only the faculty of reason (the possession of
which renders human beings capable of rational thought), but also a divine intelligence,

Cf. Republic 509d1–511e3
Cf. Menn (1995) p. 14 and Emilsson (2011) p. 146
105 See Menn (1995) p. 15 for an even richer analysis.
106 As this example shows, it is possible to substitute ‘νο ν χειν’ for ‘νο μετέχειν’ (to participate or share
in νο ς). Menn (1995) p. 15 also points to Heraclitus’ claim that “learning many things does not teach ‘νο ν
χειν’” (frag. 41). He takes Heraclitus’ point to be that learned people might nevertheless “fail to grasp the
unitary logos behind the phenomena, the perception of which constitutes wisdom.” Cf. Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics 1177b26–30
107 I am indebted to Menn (1995) for this observation.
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with which νο ς seems to be primarily identified. Yet in order to more fully flesh this out,
it will be necessary to draw on one further passage, found in the Sophist.

2.1 The Motion of Intellect
That the Timaeus bears some relation to the Sophist is borne out by its reference to
the sensible cosmos as the product of a “demiurgic god (θεο δημιουργο ντος)” (265c5)
who produces “according to reason and divine knowledge (μετ λόγου τε κα πιστήμης
Θείας)” (265e2). As we’ve already seen, knowledge is the infallible cognitive power which
grasps or apprehends the forms. Yet Plato’s ‘forms’ are such a popular philosophic trope
that it will here be necessary to first address and subsequently clear up a possible
misrepresentation of them—a possible misrepresentation that even Plato himself seemed
to have been sensitive to.
The forms are often characterized (if not caricatured) as inert, lifeless objects that
remain eternally fixed in some intelligible realm. In the Sophist, however, Plato has a
visitor from Elea problematize this sort of characterization. This visitor is made to respond
to certain ‘friends of the forms’ (το ς τ ν ε δ ν φίλους) who want to insist that ‘real being’
(τ ν ντως ο σίαν) is entirely fixed and immovable (248a4, 248a11). These friends claim
that “by the body through sensation we have dealings with becoming, but we deal with real
being by our souls and through reasoning,” and that “being always stays the same and in
the same state, but becoming is different at different times” (248a10–13).108 These passages
make perfectly clear the way in which such people are ‘friends’ of the forms—broadly
sympathetic to Platonic ontology.

108

Note that, much as in the Phaedo, the contrast here is between body and soul—not between soul parts.
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Yet there is a problem if the supposed ‘changelessness’ and fixity of intelligible
reality means, as it does for these friends, that it neither does (δρ ν, 248c5; ποιε ν, 248c8)
nor undergoes (π σχειν, 248c8) anything at all. For if knowing and being known are things
done and undergone (248d4–e4), these would thereby be excluded from intelligible reality.
Such a position, the visitor thinks, would be entirely untenable:
Shall we easily be persuaded that, truly, motion and life and soul and wisdom (κίνησιν κα
ζω ν κα ψυχ ν κα φρόνησιν) are not present in that which completely is (τ παντελ ς
ντι), that it neither lives nor thinks (μηδ ζ ν α τ μηδ φρονε ν), but, solemn and holy,
without intellect (νο ν ο κ χον), it is standing unchanged (ἀκίνητον)? (248e6–249a2)109

This, it is concluded, would be a “terrible (δεινόν) thing to say” (249a3). To avoid such a
result, motion and life and soul and wisdom must somehow be attributed to the forms.110
Given that knowledge is of forms, it follows that the forms are ‘being known.’
When human beings know the forms, they are the ones doing the ‘knowing.’ But here in
the Sophist, the forms themselves are also said to be ‘knowing.’ That is, they are described
as both the subject and the object of knowledge. Intelligible reality considered as the object
of knowledge is usually referred to as ‘form.’ But what this passage from the Sophist
strongly suggests is that intelligible reality considered as the subject of knowledge is
‘intellect’ (νο ς). Intelligible reality is thus described both as the (knowing) subject and as
the (known) object.111 As the subject of knowledge—as intellect—intelligible reality is
described as possessing a kind of motion and life. 112

ς ἀληθ ς κίνησιν κα ζω ν κα ψυχ ν κα φρόνησιν
δίως πεισθησόμεθα τ παντελ ς ντι μ
παρε ναι, μηδ ζ ν α τ μηδ φρονε ν, ἀλλ σεμν ν κα γιον, νο ν ο κ χον, ἀκίνητον στ ς ε ναι;
110 Cf. Laws 897d2–898b3 for a geometric analogy with the motion of intellect. Intellect’s motion is like a
circle because it self-contained (i.e. what it knows is not extrinsic to itself; its knowledge is self-reflexive).
111 See Perl (1998, 2014) for excellent treatments and defenses of this interpretation.
112 Plato’s term for the activity of thinking is ‘intellect’s motion’ (κίνησις νο ). Aristotle introduced the
technical term νέργεια (activity) and distinguished it from κίνησις (motion). For Aristotle, the latter implies
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Note that the attribution of motion, life, soul, and wisdom to the forms in the Sophist
accords extremely well—not only with the account of the paradigm of the cosmos as the
“intelligible living thing” (39e1) in the Timaeus, but also with Plato’s many descriptions
throughout the Phaedo (68a6, 81c5, 83e3), Republic (490a8–b6, 585b9–586b4), Timaeus
(52a1) and Sophist (248d4–e4) of knowledge as the ‘συνουσία’ of knower and known. The
intelligible living thing is simply the act of thinking the forms with which it is identified. 113
In other words, it is intellect (νο ς).114 In the next section, we will turn to a more thorough
examination of the way in which life and soul are said to be present in intellect.

§3 THE SOUL
Perhaps the closest we approach to a definition of ‘soul’ anywhere in Plato’s corpus
is at the end of the Phaedo, where Socrates tells us that the soul is such that “whenever it
comes to be ( γγένηται) in a body,” that is what causes the body “to be alive (ζ ν σται)”
(105c9–10).115 Only a few lines later, we are told that “whatever the soul occupies, it
always brings life to it (ψυχ

ρα τι ν α τ κατάσχ , ἀε κει π’ κε νο φέρουσα ζωήν)”

(105d2).116 This is corroborated in the Republic, where the soul is likewise described as

a degree of potency inherent in change whereas the former does not. Aristotle describes the thinking of the
Prime Mover as νέργεια νο and identifies its activity with the best life (Cf. Metaphysics 1072b31–1073a2).
113 Compare Kahn (1985) 327n24: “Reflexion must be reflexion on something which is not itself reflexion
[…] Hence nous is determined or defined by the essences which are its objects […] The counter-objection,
that the divine mind would be less perfect if it knew anything other than itself, is spurious, just because in
actual n i the knowing subject is identical with its object. Drastically put, the Prime Mover [or, as we
might say here: the ‘intelligible living thing’] is simply the formal-noetic structure of the cosmos as conscious
of itself.” Although Kahn is here discussing Aristotle, this works equally well as an exegesis of Plato’s νο ς.
114 As Gerson (2017) p. 298 puts it, since the sort of motion attributed to the forms “is just the activity of
intellect, form and intellect are inseparable. Cf. Timaeus, 41c–d, 61c7, 65a5, 69c8–d1, 72d4, 89d–90d; See
also Republic, 611b9–612a6
115 Except, perhaps, if one includes the (likely spurious) Definitions, where ‘soul’ is defined as ‘that which
moves itself (τ α τ κινο ν)’ and ‘the principle of motion in living creatures’ (α τία κινήσεως ζωτικ ς
ζ ων)’ (411c7).
116 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 415b8: “The soul is the cause and principle (α τία κα ἀρχή) of the living body.”
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“the very thing by which we live” (445a5).117 In the Phaedo, the “soul does not admit
death” (105e4) and so is essentially alive. 118 Or, as Socrates himself puts it, the soul is
“immortal (ἀθάνατος)” (106b1). These claims, taken together with the arguments for the
immortality of the soul in which they are embedded, suggest that for the soul to die is not
a practical but a logical or a metaphysical impossibility. 119 It is arguably in this sense that
Socrates understands the soul to be “indestructible (ἀνώλεθρος)” (106b2).120
Socrates also claims that our souls “existed apart from the body before they took
on human form, and they had wisdom (φρόνησιν)” (76c10–11). But Socrates goes even
further—yoking together the necessary existence of the reality constituted by forms with
the necessity of the immortality of the soul (76d5). 121 Just as the forms exist eternally, we
are told, so too do our souls, which possess them. Given that this intelligible reality is “ours
( μετέραν)” (76e1), “there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls
to exist before we came to be” (76e4).122 Indeed, as it will turn out, even “when death
comes to humans, the mortal part of them dies, it seems, but the immortal part goes away
safe and indestructible” (106e3). The ‘being’ or real reality possessed by our souls reveals

Cf. Republic 353d3: “Is there some function of a soul that you couldn’t perform with anything else, for
example, taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to which
you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar function? No, none of them. What of living?
Isn’t that a function of a soul? It certainly is.”
118 Cf. Sedley (2009) p. 147; He seems to accept that the definition of soul is simply ‘life,’ or perhaps, ‘that
in virtue of which something is alive.’ He suggests as much in the following remark, p. 150: “were it to pass
out of existence, it would thereby become that contradiction in terms, a dead soul. For a soul to die is as
impossible as for a trio to come to be an even trio, or for snow to become hot snow.”
119 See Sedley (2009) p. 152
120 See Sedley (2009) pp. 146–52 for a very useful discussion of the immortality arguments.
121 Cf. Phaedo 92d7–e2: “our soul was said to exist also before it came into the body, just as the reality does
that is of the kind that we qualify by the words ‘what it is,’ and I convinced myself that I was quite correct to
accept it.”
122 κα ση ἀνάγκη τα τά τε ε ναι κα τ ς μετέρας ψυχ ς πρ ν κα
μ ς γεγονέναι
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the sort of immortality it must possess: not merely everlastingness—a (temporal)
sempiternality—but, like the forms themselves, a full-fledged (atemporal) eternality.123
Turning now to the Timaeus, we are told that intellect is the very paradigm of life. 124
It is, as Timaeus says, “the perfect and intelligible living thing ( τ
ζ

τελέ

κα νοητ

)” (39e1), which is responsible for endowing the cosmos itself and all that it contains

with soul and life:
Accordingly, the god reasoned and concluded that in the realm of things naturally visible
no unintelligent thing could as a whole be better than anything which does possess
intelligence as a whole (το νο ν χοντος λον), and he further concluded that it is
impossible for anything to come to possess intelligence apart from soul (νο ν δ’ α χωρ ς
ψυχ ς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τ ). Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul,
and soul in body (νο ν μ ν ν ψυχ , ψυχ ν δ’ ν σώματι) and so constructed the cosmos.
He wanted to produce a work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would
allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine providence
brought the cosmos into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence
(ο τως ο ν δ κατ λόγον τ ν ε κότα δε λέγειν τόνδε τ ν κόσμον ζ ον μψυχον ννουν
τε τ ἀληθεί δι τ ν το θεο γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν). (30b2–c2)125

Recall that Socrates had claimed in the Phaedo that the soul is what causes the body “to be
alive (ζ ν σται)” (105c9).126 Here, one might say, is that very same claim writ-large: the
body of the sensible cosmos is endowed with soul and life. Given that Timaeus insists that
anything “which comes to be must have a body and be both visible and tangible” (31b6) it

See Wilberding (2016) for an excellent discussion of this distinction. Cf. Timaeus 41b4
Cf. Timaeus 37d1
125 λογισάμενος ο ν η ρισκεν κ τ ν κατ φύσιν ρατ ν ο δ ν ἀνόητον το νο ν χοντος λον λου κάλλιον
σεσθαί ποτε ργον, νο ν δ’ α χωρ ς ψυχ ς ἀδύνατον παραγενέσθαι τ . δι δ τ ν λογισμ ν τόνδε νο ν
μ ν ν ψυχ , ψυχ ν δ’ ν σώματι συνιστ ς τ π ν συνετεκταίνετο, πως τι κάλλιστον ε η κατ φύσιν
ριστόν τε ργον ἀπειργασμένος. ο τως ο ν δ κατ λόγον τ ν ε κότα δε λέγειν τόνδε τ ν κόσμον ζ ον
μψυχον ννουν τε τ ἀληθεί δι τ ν το θεο γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.
126 This passage has been used by some commentators (e.g. Cornford and Cherniss) to argue that since νο ς
cannot exist apart from soul, then it must be identified with the world-soul. But this interpretation cannot be
sustained, since the demiurge is explicitly said to form not just the body, but the soul of the cosmos. I take
Menn (1995) to give the decisive blow when he cites 37a1–2, where Timaeus contrasts the world-soul as the
best of the ‘generated things’ and the demiurge who is the best of the ‘intelligible and eternal things.’
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follows that the sensible cosmos, which has come to be as a living thing, is ensouled. 127 Its
soul is what scholars commonly refer to as the world-soul.
Now, although the world-soul is embodied, the divine craftsman gave it “priority
and seniority” in order that it might “be the body’s master and to rule over it as its subject”
(34c5).128 Just insofar as the world-soul animates the entire sensible cosmos, it most closely
resembles the perfect, intelligible paradigm of life, which is intellect (30d3, 39e1): “the
[world] soul came to be as the most excellent of all the things begotten by the most
excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal (τ ν νοητ ν ἀεί τε ντων)” (36e6).129 As we
will shortly come to see, the divine part of the human soul turns out to be, much like the
world-soul, an embodied manifestation of this immortal intellect.130

3.1 The Human Soul
Following his description of the generation of the world-soul, Timaeus proceeds to
offer an elaborate treatment of the generation of the human soul. The divine craftsman, we
are told, subcontracts the job of our creation out to various “auxiliary causes” (α τίαις

Or, alternatively, the world-soul is embodied. As we discover, the “body of the cosmos” (31b9) is
constructed out of the four elements (32b5). The “eternal god” (34b2) then endows it with soul (34b4).
128 Cf. Phaedo 80a1–6: “When the soul and the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to
be ruled (δουλεύειν κα ρχεσθαι), and the other to rule and be master ( ρχειν κα δεσπόζειν). Then again,
which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine
is to rule and to lead ( ρχειν τε κα γεμονεύειν), whereas that of the mortal is to be ruled and be subject
( ρχεσθαί τε κα δουλεύειν)?”
129 Now if, as many scholars have supposed, the Timaeus is Plato’s attempt to make good on Anaxagoras’
claim that νο ς is the cause of all things, then one should also note that Anaxagoras himself seems to identify
νο ς with soul. Pace Menn (1995) p. 18, who claims that “it is enough to see that Plato is not identifying soul
and nous, and that he says different things about them.” I agree with Gerson (2017) p. 6: “It seems reasonable
that […] the intelligible reality of […] Soul just is […] the Living Animal.” This is corroborated by Aristotle,
De Anima 404a25–b6; Democritus also identifies soul with νο ς.
130 Gerson (2006) p. 298 correctly claims that is unnecessary to “suppose that the soul that is introduced into
the really real is other than the immortal part of the soul, that is, the soul that does not need to be embodied.”
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πηρετούσαις, 68e5) which are also described as the craftsman’s divine progeny. The
divine craftsman instructs these auxiliary causes as follows:
O gods, works whose maker and father I am ( ν γ δημιουργ ς πατήρ τε ργων) […] you
must turn yourselves to the task of fashioning these living things […] And to the extent
that it is fitting for them to possess something that shares the name immortal, something
described as divine and ruling within those of them who always consent to follow after
justice and after you (κα καθ’ σον μ ν α τ ν ἀθανάτοις μώνυμον ε ναι προσήκει, θε ον
λεγόμενον γεμονο ν τε ν α το ς τ ν ἀε δίκ κα μ ν θελόντων πεσθαι), I shall begin
by sowing that seed, and then hand it over to you. The rest of the task is yours. Weave what
is mortal to what is immortal, fashion and beget living things. (41a7–d3)131

Note that we receive our immortality directly from the divine craftsman, while the rest is
left to the auxiliary causes. Since we are fashioned both from what is immortal and what is
mortal, it turns out that we possess a double-nature. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that
of our two natures, “the superior (κρε ττον) kind should be such as would from then on be
called ‘man’ (ἀνήρ).”132 So it is our immortal, rather than our mortal nature which is most
properly called human.
As surprising as such a claim might at first appear, it is not without precedent.
Socrates had referred to the rational part of the soul in the Republic as the “human being

“Θεο θε ν, ν γ δημιουργ ς πατήρ τε ργων […] τρέπεσθε κατ φύσιν με ς π τ ν τ ν ζ ων
δημιουργίαν […] κα καθ’ σον μ ν α τ ν ἀθανάτοις μώνυμον ε ναι προσήκει, θε ον λεγόμενον γεμονο ν
τε ν α το ς τ ν ἀε δίκ κα μ ν θελόντων πεσθαι, σπείρας κα παρξάμενος γ παραδώσω· τ δ λοιπ ν
με ς, ἀθανάτ θνητ ν προςυφαίνοντες
132 Timaeus 42a2; Johansen (2008) pp. 109–10, also notes the similarity between the text here and the Glaucus
passage from the Republic, though his stress is on a reading that doesn’t view the accretions as ‘monstrous.’
I am inclined to agree with him, though my stress is on the rational soul, which is said to be our ‘original
nature.’ (Cf. Republic 611d2; Timaeus 90d5 and 42d2). Compare also with Aristotle, who reaches the same
conclusion in the Nicomachean Ethics: granted that “intellect is divine (θε ον νο ς)” (1177b30), we still
must not concern ourselves with merely mortal, human concerns, “but must, so far as we can, make ourselves
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us (ἀλλ’ φ’ σον νδέχεται
ἀθανατίζειν κα πάντα ποιε ν πρ ς τ ζ ν κατ τ κράτιστον τ ν ν α τ )” (1177b33–34). In fact, this would
seem “to be each person himself (δόξειε δ’ ν κα ε ναι καστος το το), since it is the authoritative and better
part (ε περ τ κύριον κα μεινον) of us.” (1178a2). So “the life according to intellect [is best and pleasantest]
for man, since intellect more than anything else is man (κα τ ἀνθρώπ δ
κατ τ ν νο ν βίος, ε περ
το το μάλιστα νθρωπος)” (1178a8).
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within the human being” (589a8). Expanding on his metaphor of human beings as creatures
comprised of a savage beast (appetites), a lion (spirit) and a human (reason), Socrates
secures agreement that the beautiful (καλόν) is anything that “subordinates the beastlike
parts of our nature to the human—or better, perhaps, to the divine” (589d1). Given our
twofold nature—irrational and rational, mortal and immortal—Plato seems to consistently
maintain that our ‘superior’ and ‘human’ nature is the rational and immortal one.
Following an exposition of how our souls came to be implanted in bodies, Timaeus
outlines the way in which the embodied soul displays its various capacities. Our very first
(innate) capacity is for sense perception (42a6). This is followed by the acquisition of
simple and complex desires and emotions (42a7–b2). Last in this temporal sequence is the
acquisition of reason, whose job it is to come to rule the entire person.
The ascension of reason to power is cast as nothing less than the defining activity
of our lives: “if they [humans] could master (κρατήσοιεν) these emotions, their lives would
be just, whereas if they were mastered (κρατηθέντες) by them, they would be unjust”
(42b2). Indeed, Timaeus goes on to tell us that those who live a just life under the rule of
reason will, upon death, return to a disembodied state and, in this state, “live a life of
happiness” (42b6). It is worth pointing out that, just as we saw in the previous chapter, selfmastery is again cast in terms of a struggle between bodily appetites and reason:
And he would have no rest from these toilsome transformations until he had dragged that
massive accretion (προσφύντα) of fire-water-air-earth into conformity with the revolution
of the same and uniform within him and so mastered (κρατήσας) that turbulent, irrational
mass by means of reason. This would return him to his original and best condition (λόγ
κρατήσας ε ς τ τ ς πρώτης κα ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο ε δος ξεως). (42c4–d2)133

ἀλλάττων τε ο πρότερον πόνων λήξοι, πρ ν τ τα το κα μοίου περιόδ τ ν α τ συνεπισπώμενος
τ ν πολ ν χλον κα στερον προσφύντα κ πυρ ς κα δατος κα ἀέρος κα γ ς, θορυβώδη κα λογον ντα,
λόγ κρατήσας ε ς τ τ ς πρώτης κα ἀρίστης ἀφίκοιτο ε δος ξεως.
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This passage, down to its very wording, recalls the Glaucus passage from the Republic.
The original nature of the sea-god Glaucus was hard to discern because of the various
accretions that attached themselves (προσπεφυκέναι) to him while he was submerged under
the sea, and which made him “look more like a wild animal than his natural self” (611d5).
In the present context, it turns out that only by subduing a mass of irrational, bodily
accretions can human beings hope to be restored to their original and best condition. 134
Later in the dialogue, Timaeus returns to a discussion of the soul’s embodiment,
but he is now concerned to distinguish the immortal soul from the mortal:
[H]aving taken the immortal principle of the soul (παραλαβόντες ἀρχ ν ψυχ ς ἀθάνατον),
they proceeded next to encase it (περιετόρνευσαν) within a round mortal body [the head],
and to give it the entire body as its chariot ( χημά).135 And within the body they built
another kind of soul as well, the mortal (τ θνητόν), which contains within it those dreadful
but necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then pains, that
make us run away from what is good; besides these, boldness also and fear, foolish
counselors both; then also the spirit of anger hard to assuage, and expectation easily led
astray. These they fused with unreasoning (ἀλόγ ) sense perception and all-venturing lust,
and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of soul. In the face of these
disturbances they scrupled to stain the divine soul only to the extent that this was absolutely

Cf. Symposium 192e9, where humans are also enjoined to return to their ‘original nature’ (ἀρχαία φύσις)
Cf. Phaedrus 246b1–247c2, where the same image of a ‘chariot’ ( χήματα) is deployed. There, the chariot
is comprised of two horses—one representing the spirited part of the soul, and the other representing the
appetitive part of the soul. The ‘charioteer’ ( νίοχος) represents the rational part of the soul. See also 41e1,
where the demiurge “mounted each soul in a chariot ( χημα)” and showed it the nature of the cosmos. It
would be rather surprising if Plato’s choice of language were anything less than a direct and deliberate
reference to Phaedrus 247c6–e5: “What is in this place is without color and without shape and without
solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intellect (μόν
θεατ ν ), the soul’s steersman (κυβερνήτ ). Now a god’s mind is nourished by intelligence and pure
knowledge (ο ν θεο διάνοια ν τε κα πιστήμ ἀκηράτ τρεφομένη), as is the mind of any soul that is
concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, and so it is delighted at last to be seeing what is real and
watching what is true, feeding on all this and feeling wonderful, until the circular motion brings it around (
περιφορ ε ς τα τ ν περιενέγκ ) to where it started. On the way around it has a view of justice itself by itself;
it has a view of moderartion (σωφροσύνην); it has a view of knowledge—not the knowledge that is close to
change, that becomes different as it knows the different things which we consider real down here. No, it is
the knowledge of what really is what it is (ἀλλ τ ν ν τ
στιν ν ντως πιστήμην ο σαν). And when
the soul has seen all the things that are as they are and feasted on them, it sinks back inside heaven and goes
home. On its arrival, the charioteer ( νίοχος) stables the horses by the manger, throws in ambrosia, and gives
them nectar to drink besides.”
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necessary, and so they provided a home for the mortal soul in another place in the body.
(69c6–e2, my emphases)136

The mortal soul is constructed by the auxiliary causes, and all of the usual passions and
affections are attributed to it. The immortal soul, though it is affected by its embodiment,
is supposed to remain as pure and ‘unstained’ as possible—just as it was in the Phaedo
(79d1–5). We will focus on the way in which the immortal embodied soul returns to its
purest state below.
First, however, it is worth briefly examining what Timaeus goes on to say about the
body’s relation to the soul. Timaeus immediately goes on to explain how both the body
and the soul were expertly and providentially arranged so that “the best part among them
all can rule” (70b9). For example, our intestines are elongated and coiled because this
prevents food from passing through the body too quickly. If we required constant
nourishment, this would render us altogether “incapable of philosophy” and “incapable of
heeding the most divine part within us” (73a7). The body is thus organized in such a way
as to allow the soul to maintain its (hierarchical) structure, with reason firmly in command.
Timaeus thus presents human beings as a kind of psychosomatic whole, naturally
structured in such a way as to allow us to most effectively pursue a good embodied life
under the rule of reason.137
παραλαβόντες ἀρχ ν ψυχ ς ἀθάνατον, τ μετ το το θνητ ν σ μα α τ περιετόρνευσαν χημά τε π ν
τ σ μα δοσαν λλο τε ε δος ν α τ ψυχ ς προσ κοδόμουν τ θνητόν, δειν κα ἀναγκα α ν αυτ
παθήματα χον, πρ τον μ ν δονήν, μέγιστον κακο δέλεαρ, πειτα λύπας, ἀγαθ ν φυγάς, τι δ’ α θάρρος
κα φόβον, φρονε συμβούλω, θυμ ν δ δυσπαραμύθητον, λπίδα δ’ ε παράγωγον· α σθήσει δ ἀλόγ κα
πιχειρητ παντ ς ρωτι συγκερασάμενοι τα τα, ἀναγκαίως τ θνητ ν γένος συνέθεσαν. κα δι τα τα δ
σεβόμενοι μιαίνειν τ θε ον, τι μ π σα ν ἀνάγκη, χωρ ς κείνου κατοικίζουσιν ε ς λλην το σώματος
ο κησιν τ θνητόν
137 As such, we are encouraged to maintain good proportion between soul and body, since the lack of such
proportion is the main cause of disease—both psychic and physical (87e1). Timaeus here pivots away from
a discussion of three types of soul, or three soul-parts, and instead begins to contrast the rational soul with
the irrational body, much as we saw in the Phaedo: “given that human beings have two sets of natural
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Yet embodiment also carries with it inherent risks. In expounding the sorts of
diseases to which the soul is subject during its embodiment, Timaeus tells us that the
gravest of all involves succumbing to excessive pleasures and pains. In moments of
extreme ecstasy or blinding pain, people become “raving mad” and are in “that moment
least capable of rational thought” (86c2). These pleasures and pains come “through the
body” but they nevertheless make the “soul diseased and witless” (86d1). When the
pleasures and pains of the body render someone witless, people unfortunately don’t
consider them sick, but rather willfully evil. In fact, as Timaeus points out, “just about
every type of succumbing to pleasure is talked about as something reproachable, as though
the evils are willfully done” (86d6). Yet this, he says, is the furthest thing from the truth.
When it comes to those who succumb to pleasure:
[I]t is not right to reproach people, for no one is bad willingly (ο κ ρθ ς νειδίζεται·
κακ ς μ ν γ ρ κ ν ο δείς). The bad become bad as a result of one or another corrupt
conditions of their body and an uneducated upbringing (ἀπαίδευτον τροφήν). (86e1–3)138

Now, anyone who has read the Protagoras should recognize that this is simply a
restatement of the Socratic claim that no one does wrong willingly. 139 Yet here it is:
affirmed in a dialogue universally acknowledged to be later than the Republic and placed
in the mouth, not of Socrates, but of Timaeus.140 What is especially striking (aside from
the fact that it is embedded within an extended discussion of pleasures and pains, just as it

desires—desires of the body for food and desires of the most divine part of us for wisdom—the motions of
the stronger part will predominate, and amplify their own interests.” (88b1; Cf. Republic 431a3, 589a1). But
even when the soul and body are naturally well proportioned, Timaeus tells us in a passage that recalls the
Republic (411e3), that such ailments are prevented by exercising both body and soul proportionately (88b5).
138 ο κ ρθ ς νειδίζεται· κακ ς μ ν γ ρ κ ν ο δείς, δι δ πονηρ ν ξιν τιν το σώματος κα ἀπαίδευτον
τροφ ν κακ ς γίγνεται κακός
139 Cf. Protagoras 358d1 and Republic 589c4
140 Cf. Meyer (2014) pp. 55–69 and Kamtekar (2018) pp. 155–157
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had been in the Protagoras) is that both the preceding and ensuing discussions furnish us
with an account that renders such a statement not at all paradoxical in the context of this
work: for it has been established that the cosmos and all within it—including human
beings—are naturally and necessarily oriented toward the good. Not only human beings,
but the cosmos itself, has been providentially constructed in such a way that a supremely
good intellect may come to rule “one and all” (71a2).

§4 BECOMING LIKE GOD
David Sedley has noted that although ‘becoming like god’ ( μο ωσις θε ) was
universally acknowledged in antiquity to be the Platonic goal in life—in “modern studies
of Plato, μο ωσις θε is rarely even to be found in the index.”141 Yet given its normative
force, it can hardly fail to be a pivotal feature of Plato’s ethics, or indeed of his thought
more generally. It is perhaps best understood in connection with Timaeus’ remark that the
divine craftsman “wanted all things to come to be, as much as possible, like itself” (29e3).
This final section of the chapter will focus on the way in which human beings, in particular,
are called to assimilate themselves to this divine intellect.
The Timaeus retains a version of the tripartite psychology familiar from the
Republic, although now the appetitive and spirited parts (or ‘types’) of soul are explicitly
said to be mortal (69c6–7). The spatial distribution of the mortal soul within the body gains
some salience toward the end of the dialogue, when the discussion turns to the possibility
of moral progress. Moral defects and their remedies are first given a purely physiological

Sedley (1997) p. 327. If Sedley is too polite to take aim at any particular author, Gerson (2017) p. 13n65
is not: “See Irwin (1977, 1995) for nearly 800 pages of analysis of Plato’s ethics which nowhere discusses
the meaning and significance of ‘assimilation to the divine.’”
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explanation (86b1–89d2): imbalances between soul and body are to be remedied by the
appropriate sorts of physical and cultural training that are familiar from the Republic. As
for the various kinds of soul-imbalances, these must be remedied by ensuring that each
type of soul retains its own proper motions (89e4). These proper motions are retained by
means of the sort of educational program also familiar from the Republic. But while the
discussion of education in the Republic had culminated in an analysis of the moral virtues,
what Timaeus goes on to offer (90a3–d8) is an account of purely intellectual virtue, which
places the so-called moral virtues on the back burner.142
Timaeus explains that the rational soul has been implanted in the head. Since it is
divine, and only temporarily housed within the body, he thinks it is no exaggeration to call
it our resident divinity (δαίμονα):
Now we ought to think of the most sovereign (κυριωτάτου) part of our soul as god’s gift
to us, given to be our guiding spirit (δαίμονα). This, of course, is the type of soul that, as
we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies (ο κε ν μ ν μ ν π’ κρ τ σώματι).
It raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven, as though we
are plants grown not from the earth but from heaven. In saying this, we speak absolutely
correctly. For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls were originally born, that
the divine part suspends our head—our root—and so keeps our whole body upright
( κε θεν γάρ, θεν πρώτη τ ς ψυχ ς γένεσις φυ, τ θε ον τ ν κεφαλ ν κα ίζαν μ ν
ἀνακρεμανν ν ρθο π ν τ σ μα.). (90a3–b1)143

Timaeus immediately goes on to contrast the sort of people who devote their lives to the
cultivation of this immortal and sovereign part of themselves with those who instead
nurture the various mortal aspects of themselves:

In antiquity, this was perhaps the single most celebrated passage on the subject of ‘ μο ωσις θε ’ in all
of Plato—along with Theaetetus 176b ff. and Symposium 207d ff.
143 τ δ δ περ το κυριωτάτου παρ’ μ ν ψυχ ς ε δους διανοε σθαι δε τ δε, ς ρα α τ δαίμονα θε ς
κάστ δέδωκεν, το το δή φαμεν ο κε ν μ ν μ ν π’ κρ τ σώματι, πρ ς δ τ ν ν ο ραν συγγένειαν
ἀπ γ ς μ ς α ρειν ς ντας φυτ ν ο κ γγειον ἀλλ ο ράνιον, ρθότατα λέγοντες· κε θεν γάρ, θεν
πρώτη τ ς ψυχ ς γένεσις φυ, τ θε ον τ ν κεφαλ ν κα ίζαν μ ν ἀνακρεμανν ν ρθο π ν τ σ μα.
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So if someone has become absorbed in their appetites ( πιθυμίας) or their love of victory
(φιλονικίας) and takes great pains to further them, all their thoughts are bound to become
mortal. And so far as it is at all possible for someone to become thoroughly mortal, they
cannot help but fully succeed in this, seeing that they have cultivated mortality all along.
On the other hand, if they have seriously devoted themselves to the love of learning and to
true wisdom (τ δ περ φιλομαθίαν κα περ τ ς ἀληθε ς φρονήσεις σπουδακότι), if they
have exercised these aspects of themselves above all, then there is absolutely no way that
their thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine (ἀθάνατα κα θε α), should truth come
within their grasp. And to the extent that human nature can partake of immortality
(μετασχε ν ἀνθρωπίν φύσει ἀθανασίας νδέχεται), they can in no way fail to achieve this:
constantly caring for their divine part, keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives
within them, they must indeed be supremely happy ( τε δ ἀε θεραπεύοντα τ θε ον
χοντά τε α τ ν ε κεκοσμημένον τ ν δαίμονα σύνοικον αυτ , διαφερόντως ε δαίμονα
ε ναι). (90b1–c6)144

Supreme happiness lies in the well-being of that ‘divinity’ in us which is just the immortal
and rational part of the soul.145
Should someone wholly devote themselves to the love of learning and to true
wisdom, they would then be nurturing the immortal (and divine) part of themselves, and
thus come to share in a divine life. In that sense, one who pursues (and perhaps even attains)
true wisdom is achieving immortality to the extent that this is possible for embodied human
beings.146 One should of course be able to detect more than mere echoes here of discussions

τ μ ν ο ν περ τ ς πιθυμίας περ φιλονικίας τετευτακότι κα τα τα διαπονο ντι σφόδρα πάντα τ
δόγματα ἀνάγκη θνητ γγεγονέναι, κα παντάπασιν καθ’ σον μάλιστα δυνατ ν θνητ γίγνεσθαι, τούτου
μηδ σμικρ ν λλείπειν, τε τ τοιο τον η ξηκότι· τ δ περ φιλομαθίαν κα περ τ ς ἀληθε ς φρονήσεις
σπουδακότι κα τα τα μάλιστα τ ν α το γεγυμνασμέν φρονε ν μ ν ἀθάνατα κα θε α, νπερ ἀληθείας
φάπτηται, π σα ἀνάγκη που, καθ’ σον δ’ α μετασχε ν ἀνθρωπίν φύσει ἀθανασίας νδέχεται, τούτου
μηδ ν μέρος ἀπολείπειν, τε δ ἀε θεραπεύοντα τ θε ον χοντά τε α τ ν ε κεκοσμημένον τ ν δαίμονα
σύνοικον αυτ , διαφερόντως ε δαίμονα ε ναι.
145 Cf. Republic 589a1
146 Sedley (1998) p. 332: “If you concentrate your concerns on one or the other mortal part of the soul, by
devoting your life either to acquisitive or to competitive pursuits, you will be making your mortal soul your
true self.”
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familiar from both the Phaedo (106e3, 107d7)147 and the Republic (500c2).148 But the
Timaeus goes further, telling us how we are to assimilate ourselves to the divine:
Now there is but one way to care for anything, and that is to provide for it the nourishment
and the motions that are proper to it. And the motions that have an affinity to the divine
part within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the cosmos (τ δ’ ν μ ν θεί συγγενε ς
ε σιν κινήσεις α το παντ ς διανοήσεις κα περιφοραί). These, surely, are the ones which
each of us should follow. We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown
off course at our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the cosmos,
and so bring into conformity with its objects our faculty of intellect, as it was in its original
nature (τ κατανοουμέν τ κατανοο ν ξομοι σαι κατ τ ν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν). And when
this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life
offered to humankind by the gods ( μοιώσαντα δ τέλος χειν το προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις
π θε ν ἀρίστου βίου), both now and forevermore. (90c6–d7)149

Becoming like god is said to be the return of the divine part of the soul to its original nature.
This is achieved by assimilating one’s thoughts to the thoughts and motions of the cosmos.
For the rational soul, we are told, is constructed from the very same ingredients as the
world-soul. Indeed, the revolutions of the world-soul are said to be made visible as stellar
and planetary motions in order that human beings might come to learn mathematics (39b3).
Human beings, in turn, are endowed with sight primarily in order to study the heavenly
revolutions (47a2). So not only our physiology, but the very structure of the cosmos itself,

Phaedo 106e3–107d7: “Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his
deathless part goes away safe and indestructible […] But now that the soul appears to be immortal, there is
no escape from evil or salvation for it except by becoming as good and wise as possible (βελτίστην τε κα
φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι).”
148 Republic 500c2–d1: “Or do you suppose there is any way in which someone can consort ( μιλε ) with
what he admires without becoming like it? […] Then the philosopher, consorting with what is divine and
orderly, becomes as orderly and divine as is possible for a man (Θεί δ κα κοσμί
γε φιλόσοφος μιλ ν
κόσμιός τε κα θε ος ε ς τ δυνατ ν ἀνθρώπ γίγνεται).”
149 θεραπεία δ δ παντ παντ ς μία, τ ς ο κείας κάστ τροφ ς κα κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τ δ’ ν μ ν θεί
συγγενε ς ε σιν κινήσεις α το παντ ς διανοήσεις κα περιφοραί· ταύταις δ συνεπόμενον καστον δε , τ ς
περ τ ν γένεσιν ν τ κεφαλ διεφθαρμένας μ ν περιόδους ξορθο ντα δι τ καταμανθάνειν τ ς το
παντ ς ρμονίας τε κα περιφοράς, τ κατανοουμέν τ κατανοο ν ξομοι σαι κατ τ ν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν,
μοιώσαντα δ τέλος χειν το προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις π θε ν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τ ν παρόντα κα τ ν
πειτα χρόνον.
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has been providentially arranged so as to allow human beings to assimilate themselves to
the divine as far as possible.150
Yet there is a potentially devastating problem lurking for the sort of reading that I
am advancing—for the text seems to suggest that we follow the thoughts and motions of
the world-soul, and not of intellect (νο ς). This could be problematic because the soul of
the sensible cosmos is explicitly said to think, not only about being, but also about
becoming (37a4–c5). So it would seem that human beings, even in their rational or
intellectual assimilation to the divine, cannot altogether transcend the sensible world of
change or becoming.
Yet the solution to this problem is rather simple: for the text strongly suggests that
the whole purpose of assimilating our thoughts to the revolutions of the world-soul is
precisely to get us away from thoughts about the sensible world. As Timaeus puts the point:
“we should correct the corrupted revolutions in our head concerned with becoming”
(90d1). The text seems suggest that by focusing our thoughts on becoming rather than
being, we have distorted our intellect’s naturally circular motions. Indeed, it is specifically
the mathematical principles of the cyclical celestial motions that Timaeus advises us to
internalize. The study of astronomy in the Timaeus, just as in the Republic (530a3), is
valued solely for its ability to turn our thoughts away from becoming and toward being. 151
There is thus good textual warrant for reading the ideal of μο ωσις θε as being focused
strictly on our intellectual assimilation to the thoughts and motions of intellect.

Sedley (1998) pp. 328–9; Cf. Burnyeat (2008)
It is notable, too, that, according to Socrates in the Republic, when ‘real’ astronomers observe the motions
of the stars, they will “believe that the craftsman of the heavens (τ το ο ρανο δημιουργ ) arranged them
and all that is in them in the finest way possible for such things” (530a3).
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On this sort of reading, the moral virtues of justice, moderation and courage—as
well as the kind of self-mastery required to possess them—turn out to be merely secondary
considerations in the Timaeus (44a5–c4).152 Although moral virtue is recommended and
briefly treated in passing, the emphasis is on that supreme happiness which is identified
with the god-like state of the rational soul released from bodily concerns in its ascent to
intelligible reality.153 An embodied life, during which reason rules, ultimately allows for a
disembodied life that, as Socrates had suggested at the end of the Republic, is the ultimate
ideal of happiness.154 For if we truly realized what the soul “grasps and longs to have
intercourse with, because it is akin to the divine and immortal and what always is,” then
we would also “realize what it would become if it followed this longing with its whole
being” (611e1–4). If Socrates was somewhat vague and speculative at the end of the
Republic, the account offered in the Timaeus is far less so: the soul would become intellect.
In the next chapter, we will turn to a discussion of self-mastery in Plato’s last work,
the Laws. Much as we have already seen, self-mastery is again glossed as the rule of reason
or knowledge, and it is again said to issue in virtue. But the ensuing discussion of selfmastery reveals that it actually comes in two varieties, which broadly tracks the difference
between the kind of self-mastery exhibited by those who are in the process of acquiring the
moral virtues, and the kind of self-mastery exhibited by the those who have acquired
wisdom and so have become like god. I then examine an additional set of arguments that

Cf. Phaedo 82b1; Republic 500d8, 518d9–e2
As Gerson (2006) p. 14 writes: “The ‘popular and political virtue’ of Phaedo is not vice. But it is not
philosophical virtue either. It is […] the social virtue of a human being. We are not, however, primarily
human beings. We are intellects. The valorization of human virtue without the recognition of this truth is not
the solution to any important philosophical problem; it is the problem itself.” Cf. Vasiliou (2014)
154 Cf. Kahn (1985) pp. 327n24: “The more completely a human being engages in noetic contemplation, the
more fully he grasps the formal structure of the cosmos. If the divine represents the goal to which human
thought at its best aspires, surely the divine must grasp the whole of this structure rather than none of it!”
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seek to establish the superiority of soul to body—as natural ruler to natural subject. These
arguments further bolster the suggestion I have made here that knowledge, intellect, and
soul are simply three different ways of characterizing intelligible reality. Finally, I return
to an account of the human soul, where we find the clearest statement of all that the
immortal soul is who we really are.
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CHAPTER THREE
SELF-MASTERY & MODERATION IN THE LAWS
INTRODUCTION
We began with an interpretive problem centering on Socrates’ seemingly
incompatible positions regarding the possibility of psychic conflict. I claimed that this
apparent inconsistency could be resolved through a better understanding of Plato’s view of
the soul. My strategy has been to examine self-mastery, a concept central to virtually all
discussions putatively concerned with psychic conflict. Chapter one examined the
Protagoras, the Phaedo, and the Republic, and demonstrated that self-mastery was
consistently glossed as the rule of reason or knowledge. Although the account of selfmastery in the Republic led more-or-less directly to the argument for soul-partitioning,
something which had not been explicitly countenanced in either the Protagoras or the
Phaedo, I went on to show that Plato had Socrates correct, in the final book of the Republic,
what might have been an easy misconception of his earlier discussion of the soul’s tripartite
structure. The account of various ‘parts’ was only perspicuous when the soul was analyzed
in its embodied state (612a6). What Socrates strongly suggested was that the human soul
in its pure, disembodied state was both immortal and rational (611e1–3).
In the second chapter, I focused on the Timaeus, where the tantalizing suggestion
from the final book of the Republic—namely, that the disembodied immortal soul is simply
the rational part of the embodied soul—is taken up and further developed. The two lower
parts of the embodied soul are now explicitly said to be mortal, while the rational part alone
is said to be both divine and immortal (69c6–70b9). I proceeded to unpack the way in
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which Plato went on to identify the immortal rational soul with a divine intellect (νο ς).
This intellect was not only said to rule the entire cosmos, but also turned out to be our own
‘superior’ nature (42a2): the divine and immortal thing that should rule in each of us. I
subsequently outlined the way in which human beings are called to assimilate themselves
to this divine intellect and so become self-mastered.
In the present chapter, I aim to bring the analysis of the previous two chapters to
bear on Plato’s final work, the Laws. I argue that the account of self-mastery and the
account of the soul that Plato develops in this final work are consistent with his earlier
treatments. The plan for the first part of the chapter is as follows. After examining the
passages where self-mastery is foregrounded in the first book of the Laws (§1), I discuss a
particularly challenging stretch of text known as the ‘puppets passage’ (644d7–645b1),
which promises to illuminate the concept of self-mastery (§2). Much as elsewhere, selfmastery is glossed as the rule of reason, and it is said to issue in virtue. After discussing a
related dilemma about virtue that has exercised recent commentators, I provide a novel
resolution to it (§3). I argue that Plato is operating with two distinct conceptions of selfmastery in view, which in turn reveals that Plato is operating with two distinct conceptions
of virtue (§4).
In the second part of the chapter, I examine the arguments that seek to establish that
knowledge, intellect and soul are natural rulers (§5). When these arguments are coupled
with an extended argument for the superiority of soul to body—as natural ruler to natural
subject (896c2)—it becomes clear that knowledge, intellect, and soul are simply three ways
of characterizing intelligible reality.155 Finally, I turn to an analysis of the human soul (§6),

155

While the Phaedo and Timaeus emphasize that “it is intellect (νο ς) that orders and is the cause of
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where we discover in no uncertain terms that the immortal soul is who we really are
(959a4). Armed with this account, we will be furnished with a unified interpretation of the
soul that will allow us, in the next and final chapter, to return to some of the interpretive
problems with which we began (§7).

§1 SELF-MASTERY & CONFLICT
A striking feature of the Laws is that it begins with a sustained and careful treatment
of self-mastery, which structures much of the ensuing discussion (627a3). No sooner have
an unnamed Athenian and his two interlocutors, Clinias and Megillus, agreed to examine
“constitutions and laws” (625a6) than they seek to identify the primary aim of a legislator.
Clinias proposes that the primary aim of a legislator is to ensure victory in war (626a4).
This initial proposal is then subjected to sustained examination. When Clinias is asked to
specify the scope of the war he has mind, he is first led by the Athenian to acknowledge—
and then to enthusiastically maintain—that wars exist not just between states, but also
between villages within states, households within villages, and individuals within
households (626c3).
The most pervasive sort of conflict, however, is discovered to be the one waged
within each of us. Each person, we learn, “is pitted against themselves” (626d8). The
victory one achieves in such cases is agreed to be the “first and best (πρώτη τε κα ἀρίστη)”
of all victories (626e2). This is the sort of struggle that will later be taken up in the puppets
passage.156 Initially, however, no consideration is given to the parties involved in what I

everything” (97c1–2, 47e4), the Laws emphasizes instead that it is “the best soul (ἀρίστην ψυχήν) that cares
for the entire cosmos and leads it along the best path” (897c3).
156 Clinias initially speaks of achieving “victory over oneself” (τ
νικ ν α τ ν αυτόν). However, the
Athenian immediately interprets him as meaning that “each of us, a single individual, is either master of or
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will henceforth call intrapersonal cases of conflict. Instead, the Athenian and his
interlocutors focus on some interpersonal cases—those of familial and political conflict.
A crucial feature of such conflicts, the interlocutors agree, is that they are waged
between a better and a worse party. 157 Self-mastery is thus initially glossed as the victory
of the better party over the worse, while self-defeat is glossed as the victory of the worse
party over the better (627b2). 158 Although it may initially seem strange to use the locutions
‘self-mastery’ and ‘self-defeat’ to describe cases of interpersonal conflict, the Athenian
makes it clear that he is unconcerned with common linguistic usage (627d3–5). It is the
underlying phenomenon that he is most interested in, and his strategy seems to be to extend
the notion of self-mastery beyond its clearest application to individuals (626e–628e). The
Athenian deploys an example in order to help illustrate its expanded meaning: in a family
comprising several brothers—the majority of whom we are to suppose are unjust—the
family as whole would rightly be called ‘self-defeated’ if the unjust brothers prevail in
conflict, and ‘self-mastered’ if instead the just minority prevail. So too for the state:
“whenever the better people are victorious over the inferior masses, the state would
correctly be called self-mastered” (627a7).159
In all such cases of conflict, the Athenian maintains that it would be far better to
reconcile the conflicting parties than to forcibly subordinate the inferior party to the
superior one:
The best is neither war nor faction (one should pray to be spared the necessity of either)
but rather peace and friendship. Victory of a city over itself, it would seem, is not best, but
defeated by himself ( μ ν κρείττων α το , δ ττων)” (626e8). Clinias is made to both repeat and explicitly
accept the Athenian’s reformulation (627a3).
157 Note that this excludes the possibility of conflict between equal parties.
158 Cf. Republic 430e7
159 ρθ ς ν α τη κρείττων τε αυτ ς λέγοιθ’
πόλις.
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a necessity (ο κ ν τ ν ἀρίστων ἀλλ τ ν ἀναγκαίων). To think otherwise is like
supposing that a disease-ridden body is performing at its best after being flushed out by a
purgative—with no thought to the case of a body that needs no such treatment. For the
same reason, no proper statesman will assess the happiness of either a city or an individual
( κα διώτου) solely and primarily with a view to war against external enemies, and no
lawgiver is any good unless they regulate military matters for the sake of peace, rather than
regulating peacetime for the sake of war. (628c9–e1)160

Far better than a recovering body is one that was never sick, and far better than a state
recovering from civil war is one in which the citizens have all along enjoyed peace and
friendship.161 Indeed, peace and friendship seem to be preferred to faction—not only in the
state, but also in the individual. 162 This, as we will see in the next section, seems to stand
in stark contrast to what we find in the puppets passage.

§2 THE PUPPETS PASSAGE
The Athenian first undertakes an analysis of the parties involved in cases of
intrapersonal conflict toward the end of the first book of the Laws. Reminding his
interlocutors of their earlier discussion, the Athenian now wishes to clarify his thoughts on
self-mastery in the intrapersonal case by means of an illustration (644c3). We are each a
single individual, he says, but we have within us various forces that pull in opposing
directions, like so many ‘strings’ or ‘cords’ (644c5). We are in this respect like puppets:

Τό γε μ ν ριστον ο τε πόλεμος ο τε στάσις, ἀπευκτ ν δ τ δεηθ ναι τούτων, ε ρήνη δ πρ ς
ἀλλήλους μα κα φιλοφροσύνη, κα δ κα τ νικ ν, ς οικεν, α τ ν α τ ν πόλιν ο κ ν τ ν ἀρίστων
ἀλλ τ ν ἀναγκαίων· μοιον ς ε κάμνον σ μα ατρικ ς καθάρσεως τυχ ν γο τό τις ριστα πράττειν τότε,
τ δ μηδ τ παράπαν δεηθέντι σώματι μηδ προσέχοι τ ν νο ν, σαύτως δ κα πρ ς πόλεως ε δαιμονίαν
κα διώτου διανοούμενος ο τω τις ο τ’ ν ποτε πολιτικ ς γένοιτο ρθ ς, πρ ς τ ξωθεν πολεμικ
ἀποβλέπων μόνον κα πρ τον, ο τ’ ν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, ε μ χάριν ε ρήνης τ πολέμου νομοθετο μ λλον
τ ν πολεμικ ν νεκα τ τ ς ε ρήνης.
161 The Athenian’s endorsement of friendship over faction coheres well with the account from the Republic.
There, psychic harmony is likened both to a city that is free of conflict (441e9–442d3), and to a body that is
free of disease (444c3–445b4). These, of course, are the very same analogies that the Athenian deploys here.
162 While the Athenian indicates that his conclusion applies to both an individual and a city (628d4), many
commentators are quick to point out that he fails to state explicitly that this means the individual must have
internally harmonious relations.
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Consider each of us, living beings that we are, to be a puppet of the gods—whether
constituted as the gods’ plaything, or for some serious purpose, we have no idea. What we
do know is that these passions in us (τ πάθη ν μ ν) are like cords or strings that tug at
us and oppose each other. They pull against each other (ἀνθέλκουσιν) towards opposing
actions ( ναντίας πράξεις) across the field where virtue is marked off from vice. Our
account singles out one of these pulls ( λξεων) and says that each of us must follow it and
pull against (ἀνθέλκειν) the other cords, never loosening our grip on it. This is the sacred
and golden guidance (ἀγωγήν) of reasoning (λογισμο ), also called the city’s common law
[...] One must always pitch in (συλλαμβάνειν) with the noblest guidance, that of law, since
reasoning—although it is noble—is gentle rather than violent, so its guidance requires
helpers if our golden element is to be victorious (νικ ) over the other cords. (644d7–
645b1)163

We are pulled toward vice by ‘iron’ cords associated with feelings (πάθη) of pleasure and
pain, and we are pulled toward virtue by a ‘golden’ cord associated with reasoning
(λογισμός) and law (644c7).164 If the golden cord is to emerge victorious in this tug-of-war
battle across the field where virtue is marked off from vice, then it is necessary for us to
‘pitch in’ with it. The Athenian now concludes:
Here is how we may vindicate this tale of virtue (μ θος ἀρετ ς) that likens us to puppets.
It makes clearer, in a way (τρόπον τινά), what is meant by ‘self-mastery’ and ‘self-defeat’
(τ κρείττω αυτο κα ττω ε ναι), as well as the manner in which a city and an individual
ought to live. (645b1–4)165

Given that the point of this illustration is to help clarify the meaning of ‘self-mastery,’ and
that the Athenian has now identified the salient parties in cases of intrapersonal conflict,

Περ δ τούτων διανοηθ μεν ο τωσί. θα μα μ ν καστον μ ν γησώμεθα τ ν ζ ων θε ον, ε τε ς
παίγνιον κείνων ε τε ς σπουδ τινι συνεστηκός· ο γ ρ δ το τό γε γιγνώσκομεν, τόδε δ σμεν, τι τα τα
τ πάθη ν μ ν ο ον νε ρα σμήρινθοί τινες νο σαι σπ σίν τε μ ς κα ἀλλήλαις ἀνθέλκουσιν ναντίαι
ο σαι π’ ναντίας πράξεις, ο δ διωρισμένη ἀρετ κα κακία κε ται. μι γάρ φησιν λόγος δε ν τ ν λξεων
συνεπόμενον ἀε κα μηδαμ ἀπολειπόμενον κείνης, ἀνθέλκειν το ς λλοις νεύροις καστον, ταύτην δ’ ε ναι
τ ν το λογισμο ἀγωγ ν χρυσ ν κα εράν, τ ς πόλεως κοιν ν νόμον πικαλουμένην [...] δε ν δ τ
καλλίστ ἀγωγ τ το νόμου ἀε συλλαμβάνειν· τε γ ρ το λογισμο καλο μ ν ντος, πρ ου δ κα ο
βιαίου, δε σθαι πηρετ ν α το τ ν ἀγωγήν, πως ν ν μ ν τ χρυσο ν γένος νικ τ λλα γένη.
164 Cf. Republic 611c3
165 κα ο τω δ περ θαυμάτων ς ντων μ ν μ θος ἀρετ ς σεσωμένος ν ε η, κα τ κρείττω αυτο κα
ττω ε ναι τρόπον τιν φανερ ν ν γίγνοιτο μ λλον νοε , κα τι πόλιν κα διώτην, τ ν μ ν λόγον ἀληθ
λαβόντα ν αυτ περ τ ν λξεων τούτων, τούτ πόμενον δε ζ ν
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he would finally seem to be in a position to assert—just as he had when discussing the
interpersonal cases—that a condition of harmony or friendship is to be greatly preferred to
the mere victory of the golden cord in its struggle against the iron cords. But surprisingly,
the Athenian makes no such claim. 166
Has he simply forgotten his earlier assertion that victory over obstinate resistance
is to be strongly dis-preferred to reconciliation and harmony (628d1)? Or is the Athenian
now highlighting an important dis-analogy between interpersonal relations on the one hand
(where harmony is the goal) and intrapersonal relations on the other hand (where victory
is the goal)? The most straightforward reading of the puppets passage seems to suggest that
the Athenian construes virtue in the intrapersonal case (for he calls this a tale of virtue) as
the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords. That there is absolutely no mention here
of a better condition involving harmony or friendship thus seems strange—and cries out
for explanation.167

2.1 Conflict & Harmony: Interpretive Horns
Many commentators have tried to make sense of the rather conspicuous absence of
any mention of harmony or friendship in the puppets passage. I here canvas the two most
prominent interpretive strategies. The first (and perhaps most straightforward) way to
explain this absence is to simply take the passage at its word: virtue in the intrapersonal
case does not preclude conflict.168 On this straightforward reading, virtue as described in

Cf. Laws 803c5 and 804b3, where talk of ‘puppets’ is resumed.
It is not just strange given what is said in the Laws, but also given the more familiar account that is found
in the Republic (442c9).
168 Both Belfiore (1986) pp. 428–433, 429 and Bobonich (2002) pp. 289, 350, 546n122 have advanced such
interpretations.
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the puppets passage consists in the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords, just as
the Athenian seems to assert. I will label this the CONFLICT model of virtue, as virtue is to
be understood as the victory of a better party over a worse in cases of conflict. 169
One problem for those who read the puppets passage as endorsing the

CONFLICT

model of virtue, however, is that it is hard to square with the earlier account of virtue
endorsed by the Athenian, where harmony had been greatly preferred to victory. It is also
hard to square with the account of virtue that the Athenian soon recommends. In the very
opening lines of the second book of the Laws, he endorses an account of intrapersonal
virtue that explicitly takes harmony as the goal:
If pleasure and liking and pain and hatred develop correctly in our souls when we are not
yet able to grasp the account (τ ν λόγον), and when we do grasp the account they
harmonize (συμφωνήσωσι) with it because they have been correctly trained by the
appropriate habits, this harmony is virtue in its entirety ( συμφωνία σύμπασα μ ν ἀρετή).
(653b2–6)170

The Athenian maintains this account of intrapersonal virtue for the duration of the Laws.
So those who read the puppets passage as straightforwardly endorsing an account of virtue
according to which a better party subordinates an inferior one have some explaining to do.
First, why would the Athenian endorse this sort of account in the puppets passage when he
had already endorsed harmony over victory, even before the puppets passage (628c9–e1)?
Second, why would the Athenian endorse this sort of account in the puppets passage only
to cast it aside in the opening lines of the very next book?

In labeling this the CONFLICT model, I am following Meyer (2018).
δον δ κα φιλία κα λύπη κα μ σος ν ρθ ς ν ψυχα ς γγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγ λαμβάνειν,
λαβόντων δ τ ν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τ λόγ ρθ ς ε θίσθαι π τ ν προσηκόντων θ ν, α τη ‘σθ’
συμφωνία σύμπασα μ ν ἀρετή
77
169
170

Another common interpretive strategy is to deny that the victory of the golden cord
over the iron cords is really an instance of conflict at all. Commentators who advance this
sort of reading offer interpretations according to which the puppets passage is not actually
describing a case of conflict amongst the cords, but rather a case of harmony.171 I will label
this competing account the HARMONY model of virtue, as virtue is to be understood as the
harmonious relations between better and worse parties.172 On this sort of interpretation, the
Athenian and his interlocutors have already agreed, by the time we reach the puppets
passage, that the HARMONY model of virtue is, in all cases, superior to the CONFLICT model
of virtue.173 The appeal of this sort of interpretation is that it faces none of the difficulties
presented by the more straightforward reading of the puppets passage described above,
since it maintains that the Athenian consistently endorses the

HARMONY

model of virtue

throughout the Laws.
The problem for this interpretative strategy, however, is that it must somehow
explain away the many explicit references to conflict in the puppets passage—where
pleasure, pain and reasoning are all described as distinct ‘pulls’ ( λξεων) that “draw against
each other (ἀνθέλκουσιν) towards opposing actions ( ναντίας πράξεις)” (644e3). 174 The
golden cord emerges victorious (νικ ), it would seem, not by harmonizing or reconciling
with the other cords, but by overpowering them. Indeed, the passage explicitly “singles out
one of these pulls ( λξεων)” as the golden cord and says that each of us must help it “pull

Annas (1999) pp. 142–44, Frede (2010) pp. 217–20, Schofield (2016) pp. 146–48 and Wilburn (2012) pp.
29–35 have all advanced such interpretations.
172 In labeling this the HARMONY model, I am again following Meyer (2018).
173 We may suppose that this earlier endorsement is what the Athenian is referring to when he asks his
interlocutors to recall their previous agreement that those who rule themselves are good at 644b6.
174 Cf. Meyer (2018). The verb ἀνθέλκειν is repeated at 644e6. The pull of reason is also referred to as
‘guidance’ (ἀγωγήν) at 645a1 and 645a7, which suggests that it is a sort of ‘pull.’ Plato often uses this word
when describing the non-rational pull of appetites and emotions; Cf. Republic 604b1 and Phaedrus 238c3
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against (ἀνθέλκειν) the other cords.” Now, if such textual hurdles are not simply
insurmountable, they at least stretch the plausibility of this sort of interpretative strategy.

2.2 Conflict & Harmony: Splitting the Horns
So there remain serious difficulties for those who opt for either interpretive horn.
But there is a third interpretive strategy that seeks to split them. According to this third
interpretative strategy, when the Athenian takes up and develops Clinias’ initial suggestion
that victory in war is the primary aim of a legislator (626a4), he is developing an account
of virtue (one modeled on conflict) that he does not himself endorse, but which he knows
he can use as a stepping-stone to arrive at his own more fully developed account of virtue
(one modeled on harmony).175 Such an interpretation not only has the benefit of being able
to read the puppets passage as straightforwardly endorsing the CONFLICT model of virtue,
but it can do so without thereby committing the Athenian to it. It is thus able to avoid the
difficulties faced by the previous two interpretive strategies, while preserving what is most
plausible in each.
Unfortunately, this interpretative strategy is not without its own set of difficulties.
According to the view it advances, on the most natural reading of the stretch of text we are
concerned with, the Athenian and his two interlocutors jointly accept the following three
claims:
(a) Virtue is to be understood as self-rule ( ρχειν α τ ν)176
(b) Self-rule is to be understood as self-mastery (τ κρείττω αυτο )
(c) Self-mastery is to be understood as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords

175
176

Meyer (2018) p. 108
Cf. Laws 645b2; Meyer (2018) p. 98
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The problem for this interpretation is that (a)–(c) collectively commit the Athenian to the
CONFLICT

model of virtue.177 In order to better appreciate why this is a problem, consider

the sort of argument that this interpretive strategy relies on in order to motivate the nowfamiliar dilemma about virtue:
(1) If virtue is to be understood as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords in the
puppets passage, then virtue entails conflict
(2) If virtue entails conflict, then the puppets passage supports the CONFLICT model of
virtue
(3) Virtue is to be understood as the victory of the golden cord over the iron cords in the
puppets passage (by a–c)
(4) Therefore, virtue entails conflict (by 1 and 3)
(5) Therefore, the puppets passage supports the CONFLICT model of virtue (by 2 and 4)
(6) CONFLICT is inconsistent with HARMONY as an account or model of virtue (implicit)
(7) If the Athenian endorses HARMONY, then he cannot consistently endorse CONFLICT
(8) The Athenian endorses HARMONY
(9) Therefore, the Athenian cannot consistently endorse CONFLICT (by 6, 7 and 8)

This argument formalizes the dilemma: since the CONFLICT and HARMONY models of virtue
are inconsistent with one another, the Athenian can only endorse one of them. This
interpretation maintains that the Athenian endorses the

HARMONY

model of virtue. But it

also recognizes that the Athenian endorses (a)–(c), which collectively commit him to the
CONFLICT

model of virtue. Since the Athenian appears to endorse both models of virtue,

this interpretation is forced to conclude that there is simply “no satisfactory resolution” to
the dilemma.178 The best it can do is psychologize: even granted that the Athenian explicitly

177
178

Meyer (2018) pp. 99, 107–8
Meyer (2018) p. 108
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endorses claims that commit him to both models of virtue, he does not actually endorse the
claims that commit him to the CONFLICT model of virtue. He only endorses those claims in
order to prepare his interlocutors to eventually accept the HARMONY model of virtue.179

2.3 Toward a Satisfactory Resolution
At this juncture, it is worth reemphasizing that the stated aim of the puppets passage
is to help clarify the notion of self-mastery (644c1, 645b2)—not virtue.180 The nearexclusive focus on virtue by commentators is therefore somewhat distracting. Such a focus
has meant, more often than not, that self-mastery is either downplayed or altogether
sidelined in their accounts.
This, I will now argue, is a mistake. By focusing on self-mastery rather than virtue,
I uncover an overlooked distinction between two kinds of self-mastery: one that is
compatible with the
HARMONY

CONFLICT

model of virtue, and one that is compatible with the

model of virtue. This distinction allows for a more straightforward reading of

the text in that it permits the Athenian to consistently (and genuinely) endorse both models
of virtue. By focusing on self-mastery rather than virtue, my interpretation is able to
eventually dissolve the dilemma. It thus avoids all of the problems faced by the three
interpretive strategies canvased above. It also brings to light latent philosophical resources
that have not been previously noted or appreciated. In order to advance my interpretation,
it will be necessary to return to the text of the Laws.

This is Meyer’s parting suggestion (2018) p. 109. But it could also be that the Athenian (or Plato, however
unlikely) is simply unaware that (a)–(c) collectively entail the CONFLICT model of virtue (if they do
collectively entail it).
180 The Athenian also claims that “the tale gives us a more lucid articulation of virtue and vice” (645c1). But
the payoff of this “greater clarity” is that it will help to shed light on education and other practices like
drinking parties.
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§3 SELF-MASTERY & MODERATION
In the third book of the Laws, the Athenian details the history of three Greek states:
Argos, Messene and Sparta. The upshot in doing so is that it will allow the Athenian to
examine some actual legislation without needing to engage “in idle speculation, but
investigating what has actually and truly happened” (684a1). As it turns out, these three
states were ruled by kings that just so happened to be brothers (685d4). These brothers
initially exchanged oaths in accordance with mutually binding laws so that their kingdoms
were ultimately “brought under the control of a single family” (686a4). Unfortunately, their
alliance quickly evaporated: two of the three kingdoms overstepped the established laws
(691a4).181 Only the Spartan kingdom continued to honor the common oath which had
originally bound and united all three of them.
Now, if it were not already clear that this is meant to recall the familial case of
conflict from the first book of the Laws, the Athenian loses any pretense to subtlety when
he again reminds his interlocutors—not even twelve lines later—that these kings are
brothers (686a4). Consistent with his earlier assessment, the Athenian now claims that it
would have been best if these brothers had remained in harmony with one another (693a7).
Unfortunately, their “lack of harmony” (691a7) resulted in conflict, which eventually led
to the dissolution of their empire.
The point in recounting these events, the Athenian now informs his interlocutors,
is that if they can determine the cause of this unfortunate dissolution, then they will be in
a much better position to avoid similar pitfalls when enacting their own legislation. He here
reminds them that their legislation should be constructed with a view to virtue (693b2). But

181

Plato tends to reserve τ πλεονεκτε ν for those ruled by their appetitive desires.
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he now adds that legislation constructed with a view to “moderation […] wisdom or
friendship (τ σωφρονε ν […] φρόνησιν

φιλίαν) (693c3) are all equally acceptable ways

of stating this same aim or goal. Indeed, he is careful to note that “all these aims are the
same, not different” (693c3). If we think they are different, he tells us, then we must also
take pains to figure out in what respect they are the same (693c3). In the next two subsections, I explore the respects in which the legislative aim of moderation is both different
from and the same as the legislative aim of virtue. My reason for doing so is simple:
moderation turns out to be a kind of self-mastery.

3.1 Moderation: Necessary or Sufficient for Virtue?
In the ensuing discussion, the Athenian applauds Sparta for refusing to confer civic
distinction or office on the basis of such superficialities as wealth, good looks, or even the
possession some particular virtue (like courage) if that virtue is not also accompanied by
moderation (σωφροσύνη) (696b5).182 He explains that even though courage is “one part of
virtue” (696b7) no one would want to have someone who is courageous but immoderate
(ἀκόλαστον) living in their home or in their community. 183 Without moderation, it seems,
no other virtue is much to speak of:
But surely, in the absence of moderation, justice will never spring up [...] Nor will the wise
person we just now mentioned, whose pleasures and pains are in harmony with right reason
and follow it (συμφώνους το ς ρθο ς λόγοις κα πομένας). (696c5–10)184
Cf. Laws 630b1; Sparta was the only kingdom which honored its agreement with Argos and Messene.
Moderation is one of Plato’s four canonical virtues—along with wisdom, justice, and courage. These are
what the Athenian also refers to as ‘divine goods’ (631b7). Unlike the other three virtues however, there is
still no standardly accepted translation of the virtue I am calling ‘moderation.’ This virtue is just as often
rendered ‘temperance,’ ‘prudence,’ or ‘soundness of mind.’ It is even sometimes rendered ‘self-control,’ or
‘self-mastery.’ This is especially true in the Saunders and Schofield translations of the Laws. Cf. Meyer’s
review of Schofield (2018)
184
λλ μ ν τό γε δίκαιον ο φύεται χωρ ς το σωφρονε ν [...] Ο δ μ ν ν γε σοφ ν με ς νυνδ
προυθέμεθα, τ ν τ ς δον ς κα λύπας κεκτημένον συμφώνους το ς ρθο ς λόγοις κα πομένας.
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So moderation is at least necessary for virtue.185 But is it sufficient for virtue? Or, as the
Athenian himself puts it:
If we found moderation (σωφροσύνη) existing in the soul without the rest of virtue ( νευ
πάσης τ ς λλης ἀρετ ς), should we be justified in admiring it, or not? (696d4–5)186

Megillus demurs—he doesn’t know whether they would be justified in admiring it. But the
Athenian approves of this non-answer: “a very proper reply, for if you had opted for either
alternative ( ποτερονο ν) it would have struck an odd note, I think” (696d7). The reason
it would have struck an odd note is because moderation on its own is not entirely unworthy
of admiration, but neither is it all that valuable when separated from the preeminent virtue
of wisdom. Without wisdom, moderation turns out to be a mere “adjunct that isn’t worth
saying much about” (696d11).

3.2 Two Kinds of Moderation
While moderation without wisdom isn’t worth saying much about, it is still
apparently worth saying a little about, which is what the Athenian goes on to do in the
fourth book of the Laws. When describing the conditions under which a legislator could
most effectively enact laws, the Athenian maintains that it would be in a state ruled by a
tyrant (709e7). This tyrant would ideally be young, have a good memory, a quick wit, and
a character of natural elevation.187 Yet if these qualities are to be at all useful to the
Justice will never spring up without moderation because justice is the conjunction of wisdom, moderation
and courage (631c5): “wisdom itself is the leading ‘divine’ good; second comes the habitual moderation of
a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get justice; courage lies in fourth place.”
186 Σωφροσύνη νευ πάσης τ ς λλης ἀρετ ς ν ψυχ τινι μεμονωμένη τίμιον
τιμον γίγνοιτ’ ν κατ
δίκην;
187 Cf. Republic 474b2, where these are the qualities that pick out a philosophic nature.
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legislator, the soul of this young tyrant should also possess “that quality which in our earlier
discussion we said must accompany all the parts of virtue” (710a2). This quality, of course,
was moderation. Now, however, the Athenian distinguishes between two different kinds of
moderation:
I mean the popular kind (τ ν δημώδη), Clinias, not the exalted kind (σεμνύνων) one might
invoke when insisting that moderation is also wisdom (φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων ε ναι τ
σωφρονε ν). I have in mind the quality that naturally develops in children and animals—
some of whom are akratically disposed with respect to pleasures (το ς μ ν ἀκρατ ς χειν
πρ ς τ ς δονάς), others enkratically (το ς δ γκρατ ς). We said that if this quality existed
in isolation from the many other so-called goods we are discussing, it was not worthy of
mention. (710a5–b2)188

It is clear that the popular kind of moderation is the quality that the Athenian had earlier
referred to as a mere ‘adjunct.’ This kind of moderation naturally develops in children and
animals. It is described as a kind of self-control or restraint with respect to pleasure. Some
children and some animals are naturally more enkratic—naturally better able to control or
restrain the pull of pleasure—than others.189 One could think here of children faced with
the prospect of unlimited candy, or puppies faced with the prospect of unlimited kibble:
some children and some puppies will eat themselves sick, while others will not.190

κα ο χ ν τις σεμνύνων ν λέγοι, φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων ε ναι τ σωφρονε ν, ἀλλ’ περ ε θ ς παισ ν
κα θηρίοις, το ς μ ν ἀκρατ ς χειν πρ ς τ ς δονάς, σύμφυτον πανθε , το ς δ γκρατ ς· κα μονούμενον
φαμεν τ ν πολλ ν ἀγαθ ν λεγομένων ο κ ξιον ε ναι λόγου.
189 When discussing what it means to be ‘self-defeated’ in the first book of the Laws, Clinias claims that “we
are all much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasure than by pains” (633e4). This suggests that
the popular meaning of self-mastery will likely be more concerned with pleasure than pain, which is exactly
what we find. (Cf. Republic 389d7, 430e6)
190 One might here object that children (and a fortiori, animals) do not possess reason—at least not in any
robust sense. It would thus be strange to describe the sort of moderation they possess as reason ‘controlling’
or ‘mastering’ appetitive desires. It is worth noting, however, that the Athenian is prepared to call animals
and children naturally enkratic (710a5). Moreover, it is clear that the Athenian thinks that this natural sort of
control or restraint, at least in the case of children, eventually can (and should) be informed by reason. (Cf.
Laws 963e3 for a parallel discussion about courage.) So perhaps it is better to think of the sort of control over
pleasure that some children and animals exhibit as a kind of proto-control or proto-victory over pleasure.
This kind of natural control is the sort of thing capable of being directed by reason in humans. Actualizing
this capacity is arguably the role of education and habituation. Cf. Laws 645e ff. for a discussion of drinking,
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Indeed, the Athenian seemed to allow for this popular kind of moderation as far
back as the first book of the Laws. Even before the puppets passage, he had invoked the
“moderate disposition of soul” (631c7) that must be combined with wisdom in order to be
counted among the ‘divine’ goods, or virtues.191 When discussing this moderate disposition
of soul in separation from wisdom, the Athenian consistently described it as a natural
tendency to restraint in the face of pleasure (634a–b, 635e–636e, 636c7). Not only this, but
the Athenian had also suggested that moderation is perfected only after repeatedly
practicing such restraint:
So will anyone become perfect (τελέως) in moderation if they haven’t done battle against
the many pleasures and desires that urge them to commit shameless and unjust actions—if
they haven’t defeated (νενικηκώς) them by means of reason (μετ λόγου), effort, and skill,
in play and in earnest? (647d5–7)192

The language here is that of battle, and victory in this battle is construed as effectively
resisting the pull of pleasure. This is exactly how self-mastery was described in the puppets
passage.
Now, recall that the puppets passage was a tale of virtue, which promised to help
make the meaning of self-mastery clearer (645b2). The kind of self-mastery it seemed to
model was the sort according to which reason emerges victorious over the opposing pulls
of pleasure and pain. Here, a popular kind of moderation turns out to model this same sort
of self-mastery: the kind that is exhibited by those who are naturally disposed to achieve a

which is said to return us to the state of young children. When drunk, our cognitive abilities are said to
‘entirely’ abandon us and we are then said to be ‘least in control’ of ourselves. (See also Statesman 307e ff.)
Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1151a15–19, where Aristotle draws a distinction between natural and habituated
character virtue. (See also Historia Animalium 588b ff.)
191 See Meyer (2019) for an excellent discussion of how these divine goods combine with one another.
192 Σώφρων δ
ρα τελέως σται μ πολλα ς δονα ς κα πιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντε ν κα ἀδικε ν
διαμεμαχημένος κα νενικηκ ς μετ λόγου κα ργου κα τέχνης ν τε παιδια ς κα ν σπουδα ς
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kind of victory over pleasure. For this reason, the popular kind of moderation seems to
conform nicely to the CONFLICT model of virtue.
What about the exalted kind of moderation: the kind that is “also wisdom”
(710a6)?193 Does it, too, model a sort of self-mastery? My suggestion is that the exalted
kind of moderation models the perfected kind of self-mastery exhibited by those rare, wise
individuals who attain harmony between reason and feelings of pleasure and pain. Such
harmony, recall, is the defining mark of the wise person (653b2, 696c5).194 If this
suggestion is correct, then it would also explain why the Athenian had paired moderation
with wisdom or friendship and claimed that they all equally well captured the same
legislative aim as virtue (693c3). The exalted kind of moderation or self-mastery thus
seems to conform nicely to the HARMONY model of virtue.

§4 TWO KINDS OF VIRTUE
So we are now armed with an account of two kinds of moderation or self-mastery:
a popular kind that seems to conform to the CONFLICT model of virtue, and an exalted kind
that seems to conform to the HARMONY model of virtue. Indeed, it is this distinction
between two kinds of moderation that explains why ‘opting for either alternative’ would
have struck an odd note when deciding whether or not moderation was sufficient for virtue.
In order to bolster this account, I now want to return to the first book of the Laws, where
moderation was originally introduced. Moderation places second, after wisdom, among the

It is clear that the Athenian is appealing to the connection between σωφρονε ν and φρόνησις. This
connection is evident both in their common etymology, and in their ordinary usage, where σωφρονε ν (the
verb cognate with σωφροσύνη) regularly means “to be wise.” Hence “know thyself” is a dictum of
σωφροσύνη. The account of moderation as a divine good at Laws 631c7 also fits this picture. I am indebted
to Meyer (2015) for this point.
194 Cf. Laws 689d4: “Without harmony ( νευ συμφωνίας), how could there be wisdom (φρονήσεως) of even
the smallest degree (τ σμικρότατον ε δος)? There is no way (ο κ στιν).”
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four divine goods or virtues (631c6). 195 Once the survey of these virtues is complete, the
Athenian informs his interlocutors that—after enacting laws that seek to promote them—
the legislator will appoint guardians charged with their protection. It turns out that these
guardians come in two varieties:
Some of whom possess wisdom (το ς μ ν δι φρονήσεως), others of whom possess true
opinion (το ς δ δι’ ἀληθο ς δόξης όντας), so that intellect ( νο ς) will bind everything
together to follow moderation and justice (σωφροσύν κα δικαιοσύν ) rather than wealth
and ambition. (632c5–d1)196

Two sorts of guardians will be appointed: some will possess wisdom, and some will not. 197
Now, we saw in the previous section that the kind of moderation that is separated from
wisdom is barely worth mentioning—let alone praising (696d11, 710a5). So at this
juncture, it is worth asking the following question: what sort of moderation will be
possessed by those guardians who are said to lack wisdom?
Before answering this question, it is worth briefly pointing out some other dialogues
where the virtue of moderation is discussed in separation from wisdom. In the Phaedo, for
instance, the sort of moderation exhibited by those without wisdom is referred to as mere
“popular and political virtue (τ ν δημοτικ ν κα πολιτικ ν ἀρετήν)” (82b1)—the sort of
virtue “instilled by habituation and practice without philosophy and without intellect ( ξ
θους τε κα μελέτης γεγονυ αν νευ φιλοσοφίας τε κα νο )” (82b2). In the Republic, too,
the sort of moderation possessed by non-philosophers is counted among the “popular

Cf. Laws 696e3, 727b2–728d5
το ς μ ν δι φρονήσεως, το ς δ δι’ ἀληθο ς δόξης όντας, πως πάντα τα τα συνδήσας νο ς πόμενα
σωφροσύν κα δικαιοσύν ἀποφήν , ἀλλ μ πλούτ μηδ φιλοτιμί .
197 Cf. Republic 506c6–9: “Haven’t you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly
things? The best of them are blind—or do you think that those who express a true opinion without
understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?”
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virtues” (τ ς δημοτικ ς ἀρετ ς)” (500d8).198 A bit later on, Socrates claims that the person
who forcibly holds their appetites in check:
Would not be entirely free from internal civil war […] though generally their better desires
are in control (κρατούσας) of their worse desires […] For this reason, they would be more
respectable than many, but the true virtue (ἀληθ ς ἀρετή) of a single-minded and
harmonious ( μονοητικ ς δ κα ρμοσμένης) soul far escapes them. (554d8–e4)199

I point out these passages because I now want to suggest that the two accounts of
moderation (popular and exalted) not only track a distinction between two types of selfmastery—but also track a distinction between two types of virtue. If we apply this
distinction to the two sorts of guardians above, it quickly becomes clear that those who
possess wisdom will possess exalted virtue, while those guardians who only possess true
opinion will possess popular virtue.200 But note that all of the guardians will possess some
kind of ‘virtue’ on my account. 201 This, I take it, is a welcome result. For surely those
tasked with protecting the laws enacted by the legislator—laws that are ultimately
constructed with a view to virtue (693b2)—should themselves be virtuous.
On the interpretation I am advancing, then, the puppets passage remains a ‘tale of
virtue.’ It illuminates the popular kind of virtue, which issues from the popular kind of
moderation or self-mastery.202 This would explain why the Athenian explicitly qualifies
what he takes the puppets passage to reveal about self-mastery: it only makes the meaning

Cf. Statesman 309c6 ff.
Ο κ ρ’ ν ε η ἀστασίαστος τοιο τος ν αυτ […] πιθυμίας δ πιθυμι ν ς τ πολ κρατούσας ν
χοι βελτίους χειρόνων […] Δι τα τα δ ο μαι ε σχημονέστερος ν πολλ ν τοιο τος ε η· μονοητικ ς
δ κα ρμοσμένης τ ς ψυχ ς ἀληθ ς ἀρετ πόρρω ποι κφεύγοι ν α τόν. Cf. Republic 430e9
200 Cf. Vasiliou (2014) p. 21. Guardians who lack wisdom will be akin to Vasiliou’s Phd-philosophers.
201 Contra Meyer (2018), who argues that only one model can ultimately be the correct account of virtue.
202 Cf. Meno 98b1–c1 and Republic 506c6–9, where knowledge and true opinion have the same practical
effects on behavior.
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clear ‘in a way’ (τρόπον τινά).203 My reading also explains why the Athenian encourages
his interlocutors to think of virtue as self-mastery: because (in a way) he thinks it is.
So while I accept the rather elegant suggestion of the third interpretive strategy that
the CONFLICT model of virtue represents a developmental stage on the way to the HARMONY
model of virtue, I reject the assumption—common to all three interpretive strategies—that
these two models of virtue are incompatible with one another, so that we must ultimately
choose between them.204 On my account, the CONFLICT model captures the popular kind of
virtue and the HARMONY model captures the exalted kind of virtue. Indeed, this should not
be surprising given that the puppets passage takes its inspiration from Clinias’ initial thesis
that self-mastery is a kind of victory (626e2). This is the popular self-mastery ultimately
captured by the

CONFLICT

model of virtue, which, at best, renders someone enkratically

disposed toward pleasure. It is not until much later that we receive an account of exalted
virtue—and the exalted kind of moderation or self-mastery exhibited by those who possess
it. The Athenian was thus not wrong when he suggested that an upshot of his ‘tale of virtue’
was that it would eventuate in a clearer understanding of virtue and vice (645c1). He was
also not wrong to suggest that the meaning of ‘self-mastery’ would eventually become
clearer. Exalted moderation is perfected self-mastery.

4.1 A Tantalizing Suggestion
When the Athenian and his two interlocutors finally begin to enact legislation for
Indeed, the treatment of self-mastery in the puppets passage coheres well with the way that self-mastery
it is treated in other dialogues, most notably the Republic, where both moderation and self-mastery are
initially glossed as a sort of control over pleasure (430e6). When analyzed more deeply, however, their
meanings are refined—just as in the Laws (633e3). See also Gorgias (491d11–e1), where Socrates defines
moderation as the state in which a person “rules the pleasures and appetites within himself.”
204 Meyer (2018) p. 108: “repeated success at resisting the pull of opposing desires and fears will ultimately
result in retraining those desires and fears so that they agree with rather than oppose the golden cord.”
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their own state, the first order of business is to determine what sort of political system
should be imposed (712b9). Clinias and Megillus seek clarification: does the Athenian have
something like democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy in mind (712c2)? The Athenian
answers their question with one of his own: which of these political systems is operative in
their home states of Sparta and Crete? Megillus finds it impossible to give a straight answer,
since Sparta seems to have some democratic institutions, while other institutions are more
aristocratic or even despotic in nature. Clinias thinks much the same about Crete (712e6).
The Athenian proceeds to diagnose their puzzlement as follows:
My excellent friends, that is because you belong to genuine constitutions, while those we
just now enumerated are not constitutions (ο κ ε σ ν πολιτε αι), but forms of government
in which one part of a city is ruling and another part is enslaved (δεσποζομένων τε κα
δουλευουσ ν), with each labelled according to the strength of the part that is in charge. If
one has to give a name to this sort of thing in a city, one should cite the name of the god
that truly rules those who possess intellect (τ το ἀληθ ς τ ν τ ν νο ν χόντων
δεσπόζοντος θεο νομα λέγεσθαι). (712e9–713a4)205

When asked to name this god, the Athenian demurs and turns to a story that promises to
make his meaning clearer. Yet it is not the story with which I am now concerned, but with
the moral he draws from it:
Even today it is said with some truth that a city ruled not by a god but by a mortal ( σων
ν πόλεων μ θε ς ἀλλά τις ρχ θνητός) has no escape from evils and toils. [...] To the
extent that we have anything of immortality inside ourselves ( σον ν μ ν ἀθανασίας
νεστι), we must heed it in our public and private life, as we administer our households and
our cities, giving the title ‘law’ to the governance by intellect (τ ν το νο διανομ ν
πονομάζοντας νόμον). (713e4–714a2)206

πολιτει ν μετέχετε· ς δ νομάκαμεν ν ν, ο κ ε σ ν πολιτε αι, πόλεων δ ο κήσεις δεσποζομένων τε κα
δουλευουσ ν μέρεσιν αυτ ν τισι, τ το δεσπότου δ κάστη προσαγορεύεται κράτος. χρ ν δ’ ε περ του
τοιούτου τ ν πόλιν δει πονομάζεσθαι, τ το ἀληθ ς τ ν τ ν νο ν χόντων δεσπόζοντος θεο νομα
λέγεσθαι.
206 Λέγει δ κα ν ν ο τος
λόγος, ἀληθεί χρώμενος, ς σων ν πόλεων μ θε ς ἀλλά τις ρχ θνητός,
ο κ στιν κακ ν α το ς ο δ πόνων ἀνάφυξις […] κα σον ν μ ν ἀθανασίας νεστι, τούτ πειθομένους
δημοσί κα δί τάς τ’ ο κήσεις κα τ ς πόλεις διοικε ν, τ ν το νο διανομ ν πονομάζοντας νόμον.
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The alliterative play on the words ‘intellect’ (νο ς) and ‘law’ (νόμος) in the lines above are
lost in translation—but the Athenian has played on them constantly.207 The divine ‘ruler’
( ρχ ) of states, houses, and even individuals is intellect (νο ς), and the deliverances of
this immortal god are most properly called law (νόμος). Indeed, those who follow the
deliverances of intellect are themselves said to possess it (τ ν τ ν νο ν χόντων). They are
thus obedient to whatever there is of immortality in them. So, just as we saw in the Timeaus,
that god who should come to rule in us—and indeed over everything—is intellect (νο ς).

§5 NATURAL RULERS: KNOWLEDGE, INTELLECT & SOUL
In the course of his extended discussion of rule, the Athenian claims that the soul
is preeminently valuable (726a1) and contrasts two elements within it:
There are two elements that make up the whole. One is stronger and superior, and acts as
master (κρείττω κα ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα); the other, which is weaker and inferior, is a slave
(τ δ ττω κα χείρω δο λα); and so a person must always honor the master in them in
preference to the slave (δεσπόζοντα ἀε προτιμητέον τ ν δουλευόντων). (726a4–10)208

While everyone should honor the master in them (and most people think that they do),
almost no one actually does. Rather, they honor the weaker and inferior element in
themselves by pursuing pleasure.209 The Athenian then makes a (by now familiar) point:
Most of us agree that some people are master of pleasure and feelings of anger, while others

See England (1921) for further discussion of this point. Cf. Laws 957c3, where this connection is made
explicit: “It can’t be an accident that the name of this god-given and wonderful institution, law (νόμος), is so
suggestive of intellect (νο ς).”
208 τ δ’ α το διττ πάντ’ στ π σιν. τ μ ν ο ν κρείττω κα ἀμείνω δεσπόζοντα, τ δ
ττω κα χείρω
δο λα· τ ν ο ν α το τ δεσπόζοντα ἀε προτιμητέον τ ν δουλευόντων.
209 The proper order in which honor is to be conferred, the Athenian tells his interlocutors is: first, the gods
(727b4); second, the soul (728d2); and third, the body (728d5). Cf. Laws 631c6, where this threefold division
broadly tracks the divine and human goods.
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are defeated by them ( μ ν κρείττων μ ν,

δ

ττων στίν). (863d7–8)210

He notes that pleasure, pain and anger are all sources of wrong-doing whenever one is
defeated by them, and that they “often prompt every person to take the opposite course to
the one which attracts them and which they really wish to take” (863e2).211 Laws should
therefore be crafted with a view to helping people resist this kind of wrong-doing and so
become self-mastered.
Yet even for the person who reliably honors the master in them in preference to the
slave, the Athenian doubts that such a person could remain self-mastered should they ever
attain absolute power in a state (875b3). The weakness of the mortal human condition
would eventually corrupt them; this is in part what makes legislation so important.
However, the Athenian is prepared to grant that if some perfectly virtuous and
knowledgeable person had the opportunity to assume absolute power in a state, that person
alone would have no need of the laws to master them (875c4). This is because:
Knowledge ( πιστήμης) is stronger (κρείττων) than any law or regulation; it is not right
that intellect (νο ν) should be under the control ( πήκοον) of anything else, as though it
were some sort of slave (δο λον), but should rule all things (πάντων ρχοντα), if it is
genuine (ἀληθινός) and really enjoys its natural freedom. (875d1–3)212

Recall that the Athenian had earlier claimed that intellect was stronger than any law or
legislation (713e4). Now he makes the same claim about knowledge, and even seems to
equate the two: both knowledge and intellect turn out to be the natural rulers of everything.

δον ς μ ν τοίνυν κα θυμο λέγομεν σχεδ ν παντες ς μ ν κρείττων μ ν, δ ττων στίν· κα
χει ταύτ .
211 By pleasure, by anger, and by ignorance (863b6). These track the three parts of the soul from the Republic.
212 πιστήμης γ ρ ο τε νόμος ο τε τάξις ο δεμία κρείττων, ο δ θέμις στ ν νο ν ο δεν ς πήκοον ο δ
δο λον ἀλλ πάντων ρχοντα ε ναι, άνπερ ἀληθιν ς λεύθερός τε ντως κατ φύσιν.
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Given that ‘intellect’ and ‘knowledge’ are the natural rulers of both states and individuals
(713e4, 875d1) and that ‘soul’ is also said to be a natural ruler (726a1), we might now
reasonably ask: what is the relationship, if any, between soul, knowledge, and intellect?

5.1 Soul as Ruler
An answer to this question suggest itself in the tenth book of the Laws, where the
Athenian seeks to address a “form of ignorance that causes no end of trouble, but which
passes for the height of wisdom” (886b7). Namely, the belief in a thoroughgoing naturalism
(888e4). Those who falsely believe that a purely naturalistic account can be offered to
explain everything think that the gods, who are typically invoked as causes or explanations,
are simply fictions—conventions meant to enshrine certain moral and legal rules that are
themselves purely conventional (889e6). Armed with such a naturalistic account of both
morality and law, these people think themselves above such seemingly arbitrary rules and
standards (890a3).
This “vicious doctrine” (890b1) must therefore be countered by the legislator—not
only because it is a positive hindrance to proper legislation and a source of injustice in the
state, but also because it is simply false. Rather than immediately threatening punishment
for those who endorse such a vicious doctrine, however, the Athenian thinks it would be
better to persuade them that the gods do in fact exist and that laws and legislation are not
solely a matter of convention. In particular, the legislator “should defend the law itself and
craft as either part of nature or existing by reason of something no less powerful, being
creations of intellect (ε περ νο γέ στιν γεννήματα) in accordance with right reason (κατ
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λόγον ρθόν)” (890d5).213 The Athenian proceeds to more carefully outline and examine
the sort of beliefs held by those who endorse this vicious doctrine:
I assume the upholder of this doctrine thinks of fire and water, earth and air as being first
of all substances, and this is precisely what they mean by ‘nature’ (τ ν φύσιν). Soul, they
think, was derived from them at a later stage. No, I do more than assume; I’d say they argue
the point explicitly (ἀλλ ντως σημαίνειν τα τα μ ν τ λόγ ). (891c2–6)214

This belief, says the Athenian, is the “fountainhead, so to speak, of the senseless beliefs of
all those who have ever undertaken investigation into nature” (891c8). Such people possess
an entirely inverted view of causal priority. In actual fact, soul is the cause of everything
(892a2). The truth of this can be discovered by tracing efficient causes back to their
ultimate source:
But when something which has set itself moving effects an alteration in something, and
that in turn effects something else, so that the motion is transmitted to thousands upon
thousands of things one after another, the entire sequence of their movements must surely
spring from some initial principle (μ ν ἀρχή), which can hardly be anything except the
change effected by self-generating motion ( τ ς α τ ς α τ ν κινησάσης μεταβολή).
(894e8–895a3)215

Whenever a causal chain is initiated by something that moves itself, we trace the entire
causal chain back to that thing. Indeed, whenever things move themselves, we call those
things “alive (ζ ν)” (895c8). The Athenian now points out that “when we see that a thing
has a soul, the situation is exactly the same […] we have to admit that it is alive” (895c7).

κα δ κα νόμ α τ βοηθ σαι κα τέχν , ς στ ν φύσει φύσεως ο χ ττον, ε περ νο γέ στιν
γεννήματα κατ λόγον ρθόν
214 κινδυνεύει γ ρ
λέγων τα τα π ρ κα δωρ κα γ ν κα ἀέρα πρ τα γε σθαι τ ν πάντων ε ναι, κα τ ν
φύσιν νομάζειν τα τα α τά, ψυχ ν δ κ τούτων στερον. οικεν δ ο κινδυνεύειν ἀλλ ντως σημαίνειν
τα τα μ ν τ λόγ .
215 ἀλλ’ ταν ρα α τ α τ κιν σαν τερον ἀλλοιώσ , τ δ’ τερον λλο, κα ο τω δ χίλια π μυρίοις
γίγνηται τ κινηθέντα, μ ν ἀρχή τις α τ ν σται τ ς κινήσεως πάσης λλη πλ ν τ ς α τ ς α τ ν
κινησάσης μεταβολή;
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He then points out that whether something is referred to (1) by its name, (2) by its essential
nature, or (3) by the definition of its essential nature, we are in all three cases referring to
one and the same thing (895d6). So whether we refer to a particular soul, to soul in general,
or to the definition of soul as “motion capable of moving itself” (896a1), we are in all three
cases simply referring to the same thing (896a2). Since the motion capable of moving itself
has been shown to be the ultimate source of all motion, the Athenian now concludes:
Haven’t we been given a sufficient proof ( καν ς δεδε χθαι) that soul is the same thing as
the original coming to be (ψυχ ν τα τ ν ν κα τ ν πρώτην γένεσιν) and motion of all past,
present, and future things, and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause
of all change and motion in everything. (896a6–b1)216

With this, the naturalists have been refuted. As it turns out: “soul, being the source of
motion, is the most ancient thing there is” (896b3).217
That soul is the source of motion should sound familiar. Recall the attribution of
motion, life and intellect to the forms in the Sophist in the previous chapter. We saw that
this attribution accorded extremely well with the account of the paradigm of the cosmos as
an “intelligible living thing” (39e1) in the Timaeus, which also turned out to be the motion
of intellect. This, too, had been described as motion moving itself. But we now also have
the claim, familiar from both the Phaedo (80a1) and the Laws (726a1), that soul is the
natural ruler and master of the body. Not just particular bodies, but body in general—which
includes the entire sensible cosmos:
So it was an equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth, when we said that
soul is prior to body (ψυχ ν μ ν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος μ ν), and that body came
ρα τι ποθο μεν μ καν ς δεδε χθαι ψυχ ν τα τ ν ν κα τ ν πρώτην γένεσιν κα κίνησιν τ ν τε ντων
κα γεγονότων κα σομένων κα πάντων α τ ν ναντίων τούτοις, πειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολ ς τε κα
κινήσεως πάσης α τία πασιν;
217 Cf. Phaedrus 245c ff.
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later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and body its natural subject (ψυχ ς
ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατ φύσιν). (896b10–3)218

We are back, then, to the priority of soul over body.219 That treatment, however, has now
been significantly expanded. We now have a general definition of soul, which applies not
only to humans, but to all living things, including the cosmos itself: “And surely it’s
necessary to assert that soul resides and keeps control anywhere where anything is moved,
it controls the heavens as well” (896e1).220 Not only this, but soul is said to be “wise and
supremely virtuous (τ φρόνιμον κα ἀρετ ς πλ ρες)” (897b6).
Indeed, the “soul cleaves to intellect (ψυχ χρωμένη νο ν)” and “always truly
grasps the divine (προσλαβο σα ἀε θε ν ρθ ς θεο ς)” (897b1). Not only is the soul said
to grasp the divine intellect, but the divine intellect is also said to grasp the soul. (898e1).
So while the discussions in the Phaedo and the Timaeus had emphasized that “it is intellect
(νο ς) that orders and is the cause of everything” (97c1–2, 47e4), the discussion here in
the Laws emphasizes that it is “the best soul (ἀρίστην ψυχήν) that cares for the entire
cosmos and leads it along the best path” (897c3). Intellect, knowledge, and soul thus seem
to be three different ways to characterize one and the same thing.

§6 WHO ARE WE?
In the final book of the Laws, the Athenian concludes his expansive treatment of

ρθ ς ρα κα κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε κα τελεώτατα ε ρηκότες ν ε μεν ψυχ ν μ ν προτέραν γεγονέναι
σώματος μ ν, σ μα δ δεύτερόν τε κα στερον, ψυχ ς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατ φύσιν.
219 Cf. Phaedo 80a1: “When the soul and body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and ruled
(δουλεύειν κα ρχεσθαι), and the other to rule and be master ( ρχειν κα δεσπόζειν). Then again, which do
you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule
and to lead ( ρχειν τε κα γεμονεύειν), whereas that of the mortal is to be ruled and be subject?”
220 Ψυχ ν δ διοικο σαν κα νοικο σαν ν πασιν το ς πάντ κινουμένοις μ ν ο κα τ ν ο ραν ν ἀνάγκη
διοικε ν φάναι;
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legislation in exactly the way he said he would (632c2): with a discussion of funeral rites.
Unsurprising for a context in which death is at the fore, the Athenian once again turns to a
discussion of the soul and the body:
We should pay particular attention to the legislator when they say that the soul is wholly
superior to the body (ψυχ ν σώματος ε ναι τ π ν διαφέρουσαν), and that in life itself it is
nothing but the soul that makes each of us what we are ( ν α τ τε τ βί τ παρεχόμενον
μ ν καστον το τ’ ε ναι μηδ ν ἀλλ’ τ ν ψυχήν); the body is just is a lookalike which
in each case keeps us company (τ δ σ μα νδαλλόμενον μ ν κάστοις πεσθαι). This
is why it is correct to say that corpses are images of the deceased. Who we really are, which
goes by the name of our immortal soul (τ ν δ ντα μ ν καστον ντως, ἀθάνατον ε ναι
ψυχ ν πονομαζόμενον) departs, as the ancestral law declares, to the gods to give an
account of itself. To the good this is a source of comfort, to the bad a source of fear. (959a4–
b5)221

Here, then, in the final book of Plato’s final work, we have what is perhaps the most explicit
statement of all concerning who we really are (τ ν ντα μ ν καστον ντως).222 As had
been suggested in the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Timaeus, what we really are is the
immortal soul.

§7 Looking Ahead: Unity of the Virtues
At the conclusion of the Laws (963a), the Athenian Stranger recalls the original
account of virtue that had been sketched in book one. He once again reminds his
interlocutors that the primary aim of the legislator is virtue (963a3). Although there are

πείθεσθαι δ’ στ τ νομοθέτ χρε ν τά τε λλα κα λέγοντι ψυχ ν σώματος ε ναι τ π ν διαφέρουσαν,
ν α τ τε τ βί τ παρεχόμενον μ ν καστον το τ’ ε ναι μηδ ν ἀλλ’ τ ν ψυχήν, τ δ σ μα
νδαλλόμενον μ ν κάστοις πεσθαι, κα τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλ ς ε δωλα ε ναι τ τ ν νεκρ ν
σώματα, τ ν δ ντα μ ν καστον ντως, ἀθάνατον ε ναι ψυχ ν πονομαζόμενον, παρ θεο ς λλους
ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, καθάπερ νόμος πάτριος λέγει – τ μ ν γ ρ ἀγαθ θαρραλέον, τ δ κακ μάλα
φοβερόν.
222 Schöpsdau (1994) p. 574 points to the first Alcibiades 130c1–3, Phaedo 115c–d, and Republic 469d as
parallel passages. He also notes that this seems to be an inversion of the Homeric analogy of the soul as a
shadowy image of the body in Hades (Odyssey 11.476, 10.495): “Fur Platon ist gerade umgekehrt der Körper
nur äußere Erscheinung des Lebenden und Abbild des Verstorbenen, dessen wahres Selbt die Seele ist...”
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four virtues, he now reminds them that the leading one to which “everything else should
be oriented, is intellect” (963a8). In recounting this claim, the Athenian points out a
problem familiar from the Protagoras. Namely, a problem about the unity of the virtues:
When we said there were four kinds of virtue, we must have been saying that each of them
was one, making four in all. Yet we call them all by a single name. We say courage is
virtue, wisdom is virtue, and the other two similarly (ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετ ν ε ναι, κα
τ ν φρόνησιν ἀρετήν, κα τ δύο τ λλα), as if in reality there were not several things but
just one: virtue ( ς ντως ντα ο πολλ ἀλλ’ ν το το μόνον, ἀρετήν). It is not hard to
explain how these two virtues and the rest differ from each other and how each has acquired
a different name. The real problem is this: why, precisely, have we described both of them,
as well as the others, by a single name. (963c8–d6)223

He illustrates the way in which the virtues of courage and wisdom differ from each other.
It is notable, of course, that these were the two virtues that had proven especially
troublesome in the Protagoras. Yet perhaps surprisingly, they pose no great difficulty here.
In fact, we learn that the way in which courage differs from wisdom is precisely the way
in which moderation differs from wisdom. 224 In language directly recalling his discussion
of popular moderation (710a5), we now learn that there is also a popular kind of courage:
Why is it that after calling both by a single term, virtue (ἀρετήν), in the next breath we
speak of two virtues: courage and wisdom (τ μ ν ἀνδρείαν, τ δ φρόνησιν)? I’ll tell you
why. One of them, courage (τ ς ἀνδρείας), concerns fear, and is found in wild animals (τ
θηρία) as well as in the characters of very young children (τ ν παίδων θη τ ν πάνυ νέων).
The soul can become naturally courageous, without the aid of reason ( νευ γ ρ λόγου κα
φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή). By contrast, without reason a wise and intelligent soul ( νευ
δ α λόγου ψυχ φρόνιμός τε κα νο ν) is out of the question. That is true now, has always
been, and always will be; the two processes are fundamentally different. (963e1–9)225
Ο ον τε τέτταρα φήσαμεν ἀρετ ς ε δη γεγονέναι, δ λον ς ν καστον ἀνάγκη φάναι, τεττάρων γε
ντων. Κα μ ν ν γε παντα τα τα προσαγορεύομεν. ἀνδρείαν γάρ φαμεν ἀρετ ν ε ναι, κα τ ν φρόνησιν
ἀρετήν, κα τ δύο τ λλα, ς ντως ντα ο πολλ ἀλλ’ ν το το μόνον, ἀρετήν. ι μ ν τοίνυν διαφέρετον
α το ν τούτω τ δύο κα δύ’ νόματα λαβέτην κα τ λλα, ο δ ν χαλεπ ν ε πε ν·
δ ν ἀμφο ν
πωνομάσαμεν, ἀρετήν, κα το ς λλοις, ο κ ε πετ ς τι.
224 Cf. Laws 791b–c; Cf. Statesman 306a–309e, where Plato also discusses popular courage and moderation.
225 ποτε ν προσαγορεύοντες ἀρετ ν ἀμφότερα, δύο πάλιν α τ προσείπομεν, τ μ ν ἀνδρείαν, τ δ
φρόνησιν.τ μέν στιν περ φόβον, ο κα τ θηρία μετέχει, τ ς ἀνδρείας, κα τά γε τ ν παίδων θη τ ν
πάνυ νέων· νευ γ ρ λόγου κα φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή, νευ δ α λόγου ψυχ φρόνιμός τε κα νο ν
χουσα ο τ’ γένετο πώποτε ο τ’ στιν ο δ’ α θίς ποτε γενήσεται, ς ντος τέρου.
99
223

The Athenian immediately points out that the guardians (specifically, those guardians who
are members of the ‘Nocturnal Council’) 226 should be able to understand the way in which
all of the virtues form a unity and the way in which each particular virtue differs from the
others. For knowledge requires that one not only grasp the names of the virtues, but also
their essential definitions, and the way in which those definitions relate to one another
(964a7). The Athenian puts it thus:
Didn’t we say that a really skilled craftsman or guardian (δημιουργόν τε κα φύλακα) must
be able not merely to grasp the many (μ μόνον δε ν πρ ς τ πολλ βλέπειν δυνατ ν ε ναι),
but also to win through to a knowledge of the one (πρ ς δ τ ν πείγεσθαι γν ναί τε),
and when they have understood that, put the whole in order (κα γνόντα πρ ς κε νο
συντάξασθαι πάντα συνορ ντα)? What better tool for a penetrating investigation of a
concept than an ability to look beyond the many dissimilar instances to a single form (τ
πρ ς μίαν δέαν κ τ ν πολλ ν κα ἀνομοίων δυνατ ν ε ναι βλέπειν)? […] So it looks as
if we have to compel the guardians of our divine foundation to get an exact idea of the
common element in all the four virtues (ἀκριβ ς δε ν πρ τον τί ποτε δι πάντων τ ν
τεττάρων τα τ ν τυγχάνει)—that factor which, though single, is to be found in courage,
moderation, justice and wisdom (ἀνδρεί κα σωφροσύν κα δικαιοσύν κα ν
φρονήσει), and thus in our view deserves the general title ‘virtue’ (ἀρετήν). (965b7–d4)227

That single factor found in all of the virtues, the Athenian seems to suggest, is wisdom. He
makes clear that, on all such serious questions, the doctrine is firm: “If our guardians are
going to be genuine guardians of the law, they must have genuine knowledge of the reality

These are the ten eldest guardians of the laws. For an excellent treatment of the Nocturnal Council—
including its members, functions, and activities—see Morrow (1960) pp. 500–18.
227 Ο κο ν λέγομεν τόν γε πρ ς καστα κρον δημιουργόν τε κα φύλακα μ μόνον δε ν πρ ς τ πολλ
βλέπειν δυνατ ν ε ναι, πρ ς δ τ ν πείγεσθαι γν ναί τε, κα γνόντα πρ ς κε νο συντάξασθαι πάντα
συνορ ντα; ρ’ ο ν ἀκριβεστέρα σκέψις θέα τε ν περ τουο ν τ ο ν γίγνοιτο τ πρ ς μίαν δέαν κ
τ ν πολλ ν κα ἀνομοίων δυνατ ν ε ναι βλέπειν; […] ναγκαστέον ρ’, ς οικεν, κα το ς τ ς θείας
πολιτείας μ ν φύλακας ἀκριβ ς δε ν πρ τον τί ποτε δι πάντων τ ν τεττάρων τα τ ν τυγχάνει, δή φαμεν
ν τε ἀνδρεί κα σωφροσύν κα δικαιοσύν κα ν φρονήσει ν ν, ἀρετ ν ν δικαίως ν νόματι
προσαγορεύεσθαι.
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of those things; they must be articulate enough to explain the real difference between good
actions and bad, and capable of sticking to the distinction in practice” (966b5).228
With all of this in place, we can now return to some of the interpretive problems
with which we began. Specifically, we will return to the Protagoras in order to more fully
examine the following claims: that knowledge rules, that virtue is knowledge, and that selfmastery is nothing other than wisdom. We will then be in a position to answer the
interpretive question with which we began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras
concerned to reinterpret putative cases of psychic conflict as cases of ignorance?

The Athenian is careful to single out theology as one of the finest fields of knowledge (966c1) and point
out that anyone who has failed to study it cannot be a member of the Nocturnal Council. He also points out
that no one can attain a truly religious outlook unless they grasp two doctrines: (1) That the soul is far older
than any created thing and that it is immortal and controls all becoming (967d ff.), and (2) that reason or
intellect is the supreme power (967d ff.).
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CHAPTER FOUR
SELF-MASTERY, SELF-KNOWLEDGE & VIRTUE
INTRODUCTION
Armed with a developed account of the nature of the soul, made possible through
an extended analysis of self-mastery, we now return to the Protagoras. The discussion of
moderation and wisdom in the Laws, treated at some length in the previous chapter, helps
to illuminate many of the issues related to the discussion of virtue in the Protagoras. In
particular, it helps to shed light on why courage remains the primary stumbling block to
the unity of the virtues, and why the difficulties Protagoras raises ultimately occasion an
argument that knowledge is sufficient for virtue, as well as Socrates’ puzzling rejection of
the possibility of psychic conflict.
The plan for this chapter is as follows. After first outlining the disagreement
between Socrates and Protagoras vis-à-vis the teachability of virtue (§1), I turn to Socrates’
initial attempt to demonstrate the unity of the virtues—focusing on moderation and wisdom
(§2). I then explore the distinction that Socrates draws between the process of becoming
virtuous and the state of being virtuous (§3). Given Socrates’ staunch insistence that only
someone with knowledge can be virtuous, I explore what this knowledge must ultimately
amount to (§4). Then, after briefly outlining and diagnosing Socrates’ failed attempt to
convince Protagoras that courage, too, is wisdom (§5), I return to his defense of the claim
that knowledge is sufficient for virtue (§6). The dialogue concludes with an explicit,
unresolved dilemma about the teachability of virtue—but we now have the resources to
meet it (§7). We will then be in a position to answer the interpretive question with which
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we began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras concerned to reinterpret putative cases of
psychic conflict as cases of ignorance?

§1 VIRTUE IN THE PROTAGORAS
Protagoras claims to teach civic virtue, or the “craft of citizenship” (319a5), but
Socrates is skeptical that such a thing can be taught (319b3).229 He grants that if citizenship
were a craft, then it would be teachable—but he points out that Athenians do not seem to
regard it as such. As evidence of this, he points out that when it comes to civic matters
involving some particular craft, Athenians only seem to entertain counsel from a small
cadre of experts, and summarily reject the advice of anyone thought to lack the relevant
expertise. Yet no citizen is barred from offering advice on general political matters, such
as city management (319d1). This seems to suggest that city management is not thought of
as a craft.230 Socrates also points out that even the very best citizens, those who possess the
greatest reputation for virtue, are unable to reliably teach it to others. 231 Indeed, such
distinguished citizens seem to be utterly incapable of teaching virtue even to their own
children, on whom no expense is spared.
Protagoras attempts to address this set of concerns in a stretch of text known as the
‘Great Speech’ (320c–328d). In this speech, Protagoras argues that citizenship is indeed a
craft, and therefore something teachable. He begins on a conciliatory note; he grants that
Socrates’ skepticism is not entirely unwarranted, as citizenship does differ from all other
Protagoras claims to teach sound deliberation in public and private affairs and how to be successful in
political debate and action (318e6), which Socrates quickly re-characterizes as the craft of citizenship.
Protagoras explicitly accepts this re-characterization: “This is exactly what I claim, Socrates” (319a7).
230 Cf. Gorgias 455b1–c2
231 Pericles and Themistocles are the usual examples. Cf. Alcibiades 118d ff.; Gorgias 455e2, 503c1, 515d1–
516d7, 519a6; Menexenus 235e6; Meno 93d2–94e2, 99b4; Phaedrus 269e1; Protagoras 320a1, 329a2;
Republic 329e6
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crafts in just the respect that Socrates had identified. Namely, in that it is practiced by
everyone (323c4). The reason for this, Protagoras claims, is that human beings would be
unable to form communities if citizenship were, like other crafts, practiced only by a small
group of experts (323a3).232 Protagoras even goes so far as to claim that one cannot be
entirely devoid of the craft of citizenship—entirely devoid of civic virtue—and still be
considered human (323c2).233
Since every human being must possesses some share of civic virtue, one might
reasonably believe that it is a natural endowment, in which case there would still be no
need to teach it. Protagoras is careful to head off this worry. He maintains that people “do
not regard this virtue as natural or self-generated, but as something taught and carefully
developed in those in whom it is developed” (323c7). As evidence of this, he points out
that no one reproves people for natural deficiencies. For example, no one is reproved for
lacking beauty (323d5). But people are reproved when it comes to deficiencies involving
“things that accrue to them through practice and training and teaching” (323d8). The fact
that Athenians punish people for injustice or impiety is good evidence that they believe
“virtue is learned” (324c2). For as Protagoras is careful to note: “reasonable punishment is
not vengeance for a past wrong,” but rather serves as a deterrent to future wrong (324b5). 234
Punishment is thus a form of teaching. Protagoras takes this to be strong evidence that
virtue is generally regarded as teachable; otherwise, punishing someone for lacking virtue
would be as absurd as punishing someone for lacking beauty.

Humans are given a share of virtue by divine dispensation (322a5).
Cf. Protagoras 349a2, where Socrates calls him a teacher of virtue. This also resonates with Aristotle’s
famous assertion that “man is by nature a political animal” (Politics 1253a1–18).
234 This is also the view of punishment endorsed by the Athenian in the Laws (863d ff.).
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In response to Socrates’ final worry—that those who have exhibited the greatest
virtue in public and private life fail to reliably transmit it—Protagoras canvases the myriad
ways that such people do, in fact, seek to instill virtue in their children (325c6–326c2).235
This is yet another indication, he takes it, that virtue is generally regarded as teachable. If
it were not so regarded, then it would not be the case that so many people expend significant
effort and resources seeking to impart it. 236 But Protagoras is also careful to point out that
this does not imply that everyone is equally capable of learning, or acquiring virtue.
Suppose that everyone were required to practice the craft of flute-playing. It would
not be at all surprising, Protagoras insists, if some people turned out to be naturally better
flutists than others (327c1). Indeed, it would be inordinately surprising if the children of
excellent flute-players turned out on the whole to be anywhere near as gifted as their
parents, or if children from wealthy families turned out on the whole to be any more gifted
at flute-playing than children from poorer families (327c2). When it comes to making
progress in any particular craft, natural endowment and disposition are far more important
than wealth or pedigree (327b5–c4).
Nevertheless, Protagoras notes that even the worst flutists in such a society would
still be far more skilled at flute-playing than those who have had no exposure to this craft
(327c5). Protagoras uses this point in order to draw a distinction between ignorance,
competence, and expertise (327c4–e2). He thinks that Socrates has “affected delicate
sensibilities” (327e2) in refusing to distinguish the layman from someone who possesses a
low degree of competence on the one hand—and in refusing to identify the expert with

The resemblance of the education outlined by Protagoras to the education that the guardians receive in the
Republic is particularly striking. This resemblance is discussed more fully in the final section of this chapter.
236 Witness Hippocrates at the beginning of the dialogue (310e1).
105
235

someone who possesses a high degree of competence on the other hand. Socrates would be
more prepared to admit that virtue is teachable if he were to encounter wholly ignorant
people—those who have not been “reared in human society under law” (327d1). If he were
to encounter such people, Socrates would readily grant that the sort of basic competence in
virtue exhibited by the average Athenian is a genuine accomplishment: one that would not
be possible unless everyone were more-or-less competent to teach it. 237
Protagoras is also careful to add that it is no knock on a distinguished teacher if
their students (or even their own children) fail to attain a comparable level of distinction.
More often than not, students are simply less gifted than their teachers. Fortunately,
Protagoras does not believe that one needs a distinguished teacher (or even a good one) in
order to make progress. Sufficient progress can be made so long as one is taught by
someone more advanced than oneself (328a1). According to Protagoras, “it is the same
with virtue and everything else. If there is someone who is the least bit more advanced in
virtue than ourselves, they are to be cherished” (328a8). Protagoras thus secures his place
as a teacher of virtue, worth his exorbitant fee, simply by maintaining that he is more
competent in virtue than most (328b1). He merely teaches virtue to those less advanced
than himself. So much for Protagoras’ defense. In the next section, we will examine the
way that Socrates challenges Protagoras to unpack his views about virtue.

§2 MODERATION & WISDOM
Socrates expresses his admiration for both Protagoras and his speech, but claims
that there is still “one little thing” that is bothering him (329b7). Protagoras has repeatedly

Protagoras also draws a useful analogy with language here (328a1): if the contrast is simply between
ignorance and expertise, then Socrates would have to grant that there are no teachers of Greek.
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claimed “that justice and moderation and piety and all these things were somehow
collectively one thing: virtue” (329c3). Socrates now wants to know why Protagoras thinks
that all of these particular virtues can be collected under a single heading. Is it because he
thinks that virtue is (1) a whole, “with justice and moderation and piety its parts” (329d1),
or (2) a unit, with justice and moderation and piety serving as different “names for a single
entity” (329d2)?
Protagoras thinks that virtue is (1) a whole composed of parts, so Socrates now
seeks additional clarification: does he think that the various parts of virtue are (1a)
heterogenous, as parts of a face are to the face, or (1b) homogenous, as parts of gold are to
gold? Protagoras maintains that they are (1a) heterogenous, at which point Socrates seeks
still further clarification: how do these heterogenous parts of virtue relate to the whole of
virtue? Are each of the parts (1a1) separable from the whole, so that it is possible to possess
some part of virtue without necessarily possessing the whole of it, or are they (1a2)
inseparable from the whole, so that it is impossible to possess any part of virtue without
necessarily possessing the whole of it? 238
Protagoras opts for (1a1): he thinks that it is possible to possess one heterogenous
part of virtue without necessarily possessing the whole of it. He supports this claim by
pointing out that “many are courageous but unjust, and many again are just but not wise”
(329e6). Since Protagoras had not previously mentioned courage or wisdom, Socrates
seeks and obtains explicit confirmation that these, too, are parts of virtue (330a1). 239 But
This last dilemma is seeking to clarify the dependence relation of the parts of virtue to the whole of virtue:
do the parts depend on the whole or does the whole depend on the parts? Socrates mereological commitments
in this dialogue are largely consistent with his mereological commitments in other dialogues. See Harte
(2002) for an especially clear and illuminating treatment of parts and wholes in Plato.
239 So, to “justice (δικαιοσύνη), moderation (σωφροσύνη) and piety ( σιότης)” (329c7) are added “wisdom
(σοφία) and courage (ἀνδρεία)” (330a1). He adds that “wisdom is the greatest part” of virtue (330a1).
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the view that the various heterogenous parts of virtue can be possessed independently of
the whole implies that each of them must somehow be distinct—both from the whole and
from the other parts. So Socrates now wants to know in what respect each part of virtue is
distinct. Does Protagoras think that, just as each of the parts of the face have a distinct
power (δύναμις), so too each of the parts of virtue have a distinct power (330a4)?
Protagoras confirms that this is his view, at which point Socrates makes explicit what this
commits him to:
Then, none of the other parts of virtue is like knowledge ( πιστήμη), or like justice
(δικαιοσύνη), or like courage (ἀνδρεία), or like moderation (σωφροσύνη), or like piety
( σιότης)? (330b4–5)240

Protagoras is prepared to accept this entailment, but Socrates now works to undermine it.
He first attempts to show that two parts of virtue, justice and piety, are either very similar
( μοιότατον) or the same (τα τόν) as one another (331b4).241 But Protagoras resists in
precisely the way one would expect of a consummate relativist: he points out that any two
things can be shown to be very similar, or perhaps even the same, in some respect (331d1).
Socrates therefore changes tack. He now attempts to argue that moderation and
wisdom are not just very similar, or even the same in some respect, but identical.242 He
does this by first securing Protagoras’ agreement that folly (ἀφροσύνην) is the opposite of

Ο δ ν ρα στ ν τ ν τ ς ἀρετ ς μορίων λλο ο ον πιστήμη, ο δ’ ο ον δικαιοσύνη, ο δ’ ο ον ἀνδρεία,
ο δ’ ο ον σωφροσύνη, ο δ’ ο ον σιότης. It is worth noting that the virtue of ‘wisdom’ (σοφία) is recast as
the virtue of ‘knowledge’ ( πιστήμη). For the rest of the dialogue, these two terms are used interchangeably.
241 The discussion of moderation and wisdom runs from 332a3–333b6.
242 If each thing has only one opposite, then the implication is not merely that moderation and wisdom are
very similar ( μοιότατον). Neither is it merely that moderation and wisdom are the same (τα τόν) in some
respect. The implication is that they are identical—numerically one ( ν). Indeed, Socrates explicitly draws
attention to this at 333b5. I take it that, for Plato, sameness requires a specifying predicate (i.e. a and b are
the same F), whereas identity requires no such specifying predicate (i.e. a = b).
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both moderation (σωφροσύνη) and wisdom (σοφία). He then secures agreement that each
thing has only one opposite. The following three claims are thus explicitly endorsed by
Protagoras:
1) Folly is opposite of wisdom (332a6)
2) Folly is the opposite of moderation (332b5)
3) Each thing has only one opposite (332d1)

These claims form an inconsistent triad, so Protagoras must abandon at least one of them.
Socrates offers him a choice: he can either abandon (3), or collapse (1) into (2) by
abandoning his commitment to the view that wisdom and moderation are each
heterogenous parts of virtue that have distinct powers.243
Now, it is here worth recalling the discussion of wisdom and moderation from the
Laws, which was treated at length in the previous chapter. There, the kind of moderation
that was distinct from wisdom had been labeled popular, while the kind of moderation that
was identified with wisdom had been labeled exalted. Recall, too, that popular moderation
had been described as a quality that naturally develops in children and animals, but was
not much to speak of when separated from wisdom. What should become clear in the
present context is that Protagoras is defending something like the popular kind of
moderation: the kind of moderation that is distinct from wisdom. What should also become
clear is that Socrates is arguing for something like the exalted kind of moderation: the kind
of moderation that is identified with wisdom. We will return to these points in greater detail
below.

243

Of course, Protagoras could also abandon (1) or (2). Tellingly, Socrates does not give him that option.
109

§3 BEING & BECOMING VIRTUOUS
After Protagoras reluctantly acknowledges that he must abandon his earlier
commitment to the view that wisdom and moderation are each heterogenous parts of virtue,
Socrates quickly points out what this entails: “wouldn’t that make wisdom and moderation
one thing” (333b4)?244 Without waiting for an answer, Socrates quickly attempts to show
that moderation is also identical to justice, but he meets with stiff resistance while
attempting to flesh out his account of moderation (333e3).245 Protagoras filibusters, at
which point Socrates is prepared to conclude the discussion (334a4–336b2). When
Protagoras is finally compelled to resume, he changes tack (338e5). Rather than answering
questions, he will now be asking them. His new “line of questioning will still concern the
subject of the present discussion, namely virtue, but translated into the sphere of poetry”
(339a5). He begins with certain lines of Simonides, and aims to show that the poet
contradicts himself on the subject of virtue:
First, he asserts himself that is hard for a man truly to become good, and then, a little further
on in his poem he forgets and criticizes Pittacus for saying the same thing as he did, that it
is hard for a man to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same thing he himself
said. (339d2–6)246

Socrates attempts to save Simonides from the charge of hypocrisy by drawing a distinction
between being good and becoming good (340c5): he interprets Simonides as claiming, in

Ο κο ν ν ν ε η σωφροσύνη κα σοφία.
Protagoras once again resists in the way one would expect of a consummate relativist: he points out that
anything can be shown to be good for someone (or something) in some respect (334a4).
246 ς γε τ μ ν πρ τον α τ ς πέθετο χαλεπ ν ε ναι νδρα ἀγαθ ν γενέσθαι ἀλαθεί , λίγον δ το
ποιήματος ε ς τ πρόσθεν προελθ ν πελάθετο, κα Πιττακ ν τ ν τα τ λέγοντα αυτ , τι χαλεπ ν σθλ ν
μμεναι το τον μέμφεταί τε κα ο φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι α το τ α τ αυτ λέγοντος
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contrast to Pittacus, that only becoming good is hard.247 Protagoras resists this
interpretation, however, explaining that Simonides’ “ignorance would be monumental if
he says the possession of virtue is so trivial when everyone agrees it is the hardest thing in
the word” (340e2).248
Now, it is worth noting how strange it is for Protagoras to be worried about making
the possession of virtue trivial, given the position he had staked out in his ‘Great Speech.’249
Recall that Protagoras had accused Socrates of “affecting delicate sensibilities” (327e2) in
refusing to admit that there are any teachers of virtue. Protagoras, by contrast, had argued
at length that “everyone is a teacher of virtue” (327e2) precisely because he maintained
that every (civilized) person possesses a share of it and so displays some basic degree of
competence. One would be hard-pressed to make the possession of virtue any more trivial
than that. In his effort to resist Socrates, then, Protagoras seems to have significantly
backpedaled: virtue is no longer the common possession of all human beings, but the
hardest thing in the world to acquire.
Socrates appears to notice this (likely unintended) reversal by Protagoras, and picks
up on it in his own exegetical treatment of Simonides’ poem. He does so by reviving the
distinction that Protagoras had introduced in his ‘Great Speech’ between ignorance,
competence, and expertise (327c4–e2). This, recall, was the threefold distinction that had
allowed Protagoras to maintain that everyone is a teacher of virtue: everyone reared within

Cf. Protagoras 344a3; Socrates utilizes lines from Hesiod’s Works and Days (289, 291–92) in his
interpretation of Simonides. The word translating ‘goodness’ in these lines of Hesiod is ‘virtue.’
248 Note that Prodicus is made to distinguish between two senses of ‘hard.’ However, this distinction does no
work. (Prodicus chooses the wrong sense, anyway.) This can be seen as a jab at sophistry, but it can also be
seen as highlighting a benefit of sophistic training for philosophers. Prodicus was Socrates’ teacher (341a4).
249 Cf. Republic 539b1: “I don’t suppose that it has escaped your notice that... people misuse [arguments] by
treating it as a kind of game of contradiction. They imitate those who’ve refuted them by refuting others
themselves, and, like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments.”
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human society is competent to teach virtue to anyone less advanced than themselves. He
had also insisted that “no one can be a layman” (327a1), or wholly ignorant, when it comes
to virtue. Not only this, but he had claimed that the sort of expertise in virtue that Socrates
had envisioned was a pipedream (328a1). Forget ignorance and expertise: there are only
varying degrees of competence. Socrates now challenges this view. He does so, in part, by
systematically applying the distinction between being and becoming good to the craft of
medicine.
According to Socrates, a medical student is someone “learning how to cure the
sick” (345a2). Although medical students have initiated the process of becoming doctors,
they are not yet doctors: they are still laymen. Once these medical students complete their
training, however, they are no longer becoming doctors. They now are doctors. But are we
prepared to call these newly-minted graduates good doctors? Socrates gets at this question
by asking a slightly different one: who could, properly speaking, become a bad doctor
(345a3)? As it turns out, it is only someone who is “first, a doctor and, second, a good
doctor” (345a4).250 But what, exactly, is the difference between what I will call a mere
doctor and a good doctor?
The answer will be forthcoming, I suggest, if we flesh out his example in a slightly
more modern way. We can grant, with Socrates, that medical students are laymen: they are
in the process of learning the medical knowledge that they do not yet possess. For this
reason, they are not legally permitted to practice the craft of medicine. Medical interns, by
contrast, display a basic degree of competence: they are newly-minted doctors and so are

Indeed, this distinction also seems to be deployed in the Phaedrus (268b ff.), where Socrates points out
that someone can know “the preliminaries of medicine, but not medicine itself” (269a3). Such a person
(though they may know the preliminaries) is in not a competent practitioner, but remains ignorant of the craft.
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legally permitted to practice the craft of medicine. However, they must be supervised.
Medical residents display an even higher degree of competence than their first-year
counterparts: they are more seasoned than the interns they supervise. But these residents
are themselves supervised by attendings: veteran doctors who are only tapped for the most
difficult diagnoses and challenging procedures. It is the attending doctor alone whom
Socrates seems to be prepared to call both an ‘expert’ and ‘good.’251
If this suggestion is correct, then Socrates is not only prepared to countenance
Protagoras’ threefold distinction between ignorance, competence and expertise—but he
appears to grant, with Protagoras, that competence comes in degrees.252 Where Socrates
seems to fundamentally disagree with Protagoras, however, concerns the threshold at
which ignorance can properly be said to give way to competence, and competence, in turn,
to expertise.
On the one hand, Protagoras had set the bar so low for ignorance that only those
who are literally uncivilized (327d1) would qualify. On the other hand, Protagoras had set
the bar so high for expertise that it is unclear if anyone would qualify (328a1). On his view,
nearly everyone displays some degree of competence, such that anyone more advanced is
capable of teaching anyone less advanced (328a8). For Protagoras, then, medical students
would surely count as competent teachers of medicine; indeed, they exhibit a much higher
degree of competence than the average person. For Socrates, however, medical students
are no teachers of medicine: they are ignorant. While they have certainly initiated the

The Athenian makes much the same point in the Laws at 719a1, where he quotes the very same lines of
Hesiod that are cited here in the Protagoras at 340d5. In fact, the Athenian there draws a distinction between
doctors and doctors’ assistants. The doctors are said to have systematic knowledge, while the doctors’
assistants pick up the skill empirically and so lack any sort of systematic knowledge (720b2).
252 This is likely tracking the cognitive distinction between ignorance, belief and knowledge.
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process of becoming doctors, they are not yet doctors and so not competent to practice
medicine.253 It is the mere doctor (the intern or resident) who displays some degree of
competence, while it is the good doctor alone who qualifies as the expert. 254 It appears that
Simonides was right—becoming good is hard!
In putting a fine point on all of this, Socrates adds a final, intriguing suggestion
about the way in which the good doctor might become bad:
[B]ut we who are medical laymen could never by faring ill become doctors or carpenters
or any kind of craftsman. And if one cannot become a doctor by faring ill, clearly one
cannot become a bad one either. In the same way a good man (ἀγαθ ς ἀνήρ) may eventually
become bad with the passage of time, or through hardship, disease, or some other
circumstance that involves the only real kind of faring ill, which is the loss of knowledge
( πιστήμης στερηθ ναι). But the bad man can never become bad, for he is so all the time.
If he is to become bad, he must first become good (ε μέλλει κακ ς γενέσθαι, δε α τ ν
πρότερον ἀγαθ ν γενέσθαι). (345a6–c1, my emphasis)255

Only those who are already good are capable of becoming bad. Since most people never
reach the state of being good, they cannot strictly speaking become bad. As Socrates is
made to put the point: you simply “can’t knock down someone already supine; you can
only knock down someone standing up and render them supine” (344d1).The way in which
good and upright people become bad, however, is through the loss of knowledge. 256 But

Cf. Statesman 299b ff. where the same analogies are deployed.
Socrates summarizes his position as follows: it is knowledge that renders craftsmen capable of practicing
their crafts. Laymen, by contrast, lack the requisite knowledge, and their ignorance renders them incapable.
Since only craftsmen possesses knowledge, they alone can be dispossessed of it. Properly speaking, laymen
cannot be dispossessed of knowledge that they never possessed in the first place. That is: they cannot be
incapacitated because their chronic ignorance has rendered them “chronically incapable” (344d4).
255 με ς δ ο ατρικ ς δι ται ο κ ν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακ ς πράξαντες ο τε ατρο ο τε τέκτονες ο τε λλο
ο δ ν τ ν τοιούτων· στις δ μ ατρ ς ν γένοιτο κακ ς πράξας, δ λον τι ο δ κακ ς ατρός. ο τω κα
μ ν ἀγαθ ς ἀν ρ γένοιτ’ ν ποτε κα κακ ς
π χρόνου
π πόνου
π νόσου
π λλου τιν ς
περιπτώματος α τη γ ρ μόνη στ κακ πρ ξις, πιστήμης στερηθ ναι δ κακ ς ἀν ρ ο κ ν ποτε γένοιτο
κακός στιν γ ρ ἀεί. ἀλλ’ ε μέλλει κακ ς γενέσθαι, δε α τ ν πρότερον ἀγαθ ν γενέσθαι.
256 Humans will inevitably be “thrown down” (334c6), if for no other reason than that they will die. Those
who persist in this state for the longest are “those whom the gods love” (345c5).
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while it is easy to determine what would constitute ‘faring ill’ for the good doctor (i.e. the
loss of medical knowledge), it is not at all easy to surmise what would constitute ‘faring
ill’ for the good person. What sort of knowledge would they lose?

§4 SELF-KNOWLEDGE & MODERATION
The answer to this question suggests itself in a lengthy preamble that Socrates offers
to his exegetical treatment of Simonides’ poem.257 In this preamble, Socrates attributes the
political dominance of Crete and Sparta, not (as is popularly thought) to the superior
courage displayed by their citizens, but rather to their wisdom and superior education in
philosophy (342d5).258 The high caliber of their education, and a distinctive mark of their
wisdom, is displayed in their ability to form pithy maxims (342e3, 343a6). Chief among
these maxims, Socrates tells us, are the two inscribed at Delphi:
(1) Know Thyself (343b3)
(2) Nothing in Excess (343b4)

Socrates quickly adds to these a third: “It is hard to be good” (343c1). This, of course, is
the maxim attributed to Pittacus‚ and challenged by Simonides. 259 As we saw in the
previous section, Socrates tries to save Simonides from the charge of hypocrisy by
distinguishing between being and becoming good. According to Socrates, Simonides only

Why does Socrates: (1) Spend more than a full Stephanus page gushing about Spartan wisdom (342a6–
d4)? (2) Note their superior education in philosophy (342d4–343b1)? (3) Attribute to them (somewhat
tenuously) the famous maxims inscribed at Delphi (343b1–4)? (4) Link those maxims to the disputed adage
of Pittacus targeted by Simonides (343b5–c6)? I answer all of these questions in the main text below.
258 It is notable that the Laws features a discussion with Clinias (from Crete) and Megillus (from Sparta).
259 Socrates says that this line was “privately circulated with approval among the sages” (343c2). The seven
sages—Pittacus was one of them—approved of this maxim because they all understood the spirit of it.
Simonides is challenging the letter “in order to score a takedown” (343c3) and so win fame for himself.
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believes that becoming good is hard; he is therefore criticizing Pittacus for falsely claiming
that being good is hard.
What does Simonides say about being good? Well, he claims that even the rare
person who wins through to this coveted state can only persist in it “for a short period of
time” (344c1). Remaining in such a state is just not “humanly possible” (344c3). On
Socrates’ reading: “God alone can have this privilege” (344c3). So how does this rare
person who is good or virtuous (however briefly) eventually become bad? It is through the
loss of knowledge. Now, we saw in the previous section that the good doctor becomes bad
through the loss of medical knowledge. But it still remains to determine what sort of
knowledge the good person loses.
It is telling, of course, that one of these Delphic maxims concerns a particular kind
of knowledge. Namely, self-knowledge. References to this maxim abound in the Platonic
corpus, but it is perhaps nowhere discussed more directly, or treated in greater detail, than
in the Charmides.260 In the Charmides, this maxim is notably discussed in connection with
the virtue of moderation (164c8–165b5). This is fortuitous, since it is also an examination
of moderation that triggers the lengthy discussion of poetry in the Protagoras (333d4–
334a4). It is therefore worth examining the way that both moderation and the Delphic
maxims are treated in the Charmides, as this will help to explain why they also show up
together at precisely this juncture in the Protagoras.
In the Charmides, one of Socrates’ interlocutors, Critias, suggests that both of the
Delphic maxims are imperatival and essentially command the same thing: be moderate

Cf. Alcibiades 124b1, 129a2, 130e6, 132c8, 133b6; Apology 21a4; Charmides 164d5, 165c8; Epinomis
988a4, 988b6; Hipparchus 228e1; Phaedrus 150d, 230a; Philebus 48c11; Protagoras 343b3; Theaetetus
150d7, 210b–c
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(165a2).261 He thus proposes a definition of moderation in terms of the first of these
maxims: “moderation is to know oneself” (165b5).262 Socrates wants to think through this
definition more carefully. He supposes that “if knowing is what moderation is, then it
clearly must be some kind of knowledge and must be of something” (165c5). Critias very
quickly fills in the blank: moderation is knowledge of oneself (165c8).
Socrates points out that the subject of any particular kind of knowledge (i.e. what
that knowledge is of) always seems to be “distinct from the knowledge itself” (166a5). For
example, calculation is the kind of knowledge that is of odd and even—it is not of
calculation. But Critias maintains that moderation is unique in just this way: it is the only
sort of knowledge that is ‘of’ itself—the only sort of knowledge that is self-reflexive
(166c2). Socrates proceeds to raise a host of concerns about this—concerns which
eventually prove too much for Critias and stall the discussion (166c7–169c4). In an attempt
to restart the discussion, Socrates suggests that they simply proceed on the assumption that
self-reflexive knowledge is, in fact, possible. Here is what is said to follow from that
supposition:
[I]f someone has knowledge which knows itself (τις χει πιστήμην
α τ α τ ν
γιγνώσκει), they would be identical with the knowledge they possess (τοιο τος ν α τ ς
ε η ο όνπερ στ ν χει). For example: when a person has speed they are swift, and when
they have beauty they are beautiful, and when they have knowledge they are knowing. So
when someone has knowledge which knows itself ( ταν δ δ γν σιν α τ ν α τ ς τις χ ),
then I imagine they will be someone who knows themselves (γιγνώσκων που α τ ς αυτ ν
τότε σται.). (169e1–7)263

Critias suggest that the second maxim is redundant; it was added later by those who misunderstood the
true meaning of the first maxim.
262 Note that ‘σωφρονε ν’ (the verb cognate with ‘σωφροσύνη’) regularly means “to be wise.” Hence “know
thyself” is a dictum of σωφροσύνη.
263 ε γάρ τις χει πιστήμην
α τ α τ ν γιγνώσκει, τοιο τος ν α τ ς ε η ο όνπερ στ ν χει· σπερ ταν
τάχος τις χ , ταχύς, κα ταν κάλλος, καλός, κα ταν γν σιν, γιγνώσκων, ταν δ δ γν σιν α τ ν α τ ς
τις χ , γιγνώσκων που α τ ς αυτ ν τότε σται.
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That both Critias and Socrates—assuming the truth of the antecedent—are prepared to
accept the consequent is worth flagging (169e8).
It is worth flagging, in part, because this is not the only place that self-reflexive
knowledge has put in an appearance. Recall that, in chapter two, intellect (νο ς) had been
described as the activity of ‘knowing’ the forms, taken all together as a unified whole.
While the forms had been described as the object of knowledge—as what was ‘being
known’ by intellect—the forms were also described as the subject of knowledge, as what
was doing the ‘knowing.’ Intellect and form were thus simply two sides of the same coin. 264
More technically, the terms ‘intellect’ and ‘form’ have the same reference, but different
senses: ‘intellect’ most properly denotes the subject that is (actively) knowing, while ‘form’
most properly denotes the object that is (passively) being known. 265 But the subject and
object are one and the same.
Self-reflexive knowledge thus turns out to be the knowledge of what is both
impersonal and most truly real: it is the knowing of the forms by the forms, or the knowing
of intellect by intellect.266 Anyone, then, who possesses intellect or knowledge of the forms
would thereby “be identical with the knowledge they possess” (169e1).267 Self-knowledge

Plato’s term for the activity of thinking is “intellect’s motion” (κίνησις νο ). Aristotle introduced the
technical term νέργεια (activity) and distinguished it from κίνησις (motion).
265 Gerson (2006) p. 298; Timaeus 41c–d, 61c7, 65a5, 69c8–d1, 72d4–e1, 89d–90d; Republic 611b9–612a6
266 Cf. Kahn (1985) p. 327n24: “Reflexion must be reflexion on something which is not itself reflexion […]
Hence nous is determined or defined by the essences which are its objects […] The counter-objection, that
the divine mind would be less perfect if it knew anything other than itself, is spurious, just because in actual
noēsis the knowing subject is identical with its object. Drastically put, the Prime Mover is simply the formalnoetic structure of the cosmos as conscious of itself.” Kahn’s explanation seems to work equally well as an
exegesis of Plato’s νο ς.
267 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 430a3: “For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what
is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and its object are identical.”
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would thus consist in the knowledge that the self is the knowing intellect (νο ς). The self
would then be, quite literally, knowledge or wisdom. 268
The suggestion that moderation is self-knowledge in the Charmides nicely
dovetails with the argument from the Protagoras that moderation and wisdom are “one
thing.” That this argument shows up just prior to the poetic interlude in the Protagoras,
which is itself occasioned by a failed attempt to flesh out an account of moderation, helps
to explain why Socrates would invoke the Delphic maxims in his preamble.269 Namely,
because these maxims centrally involve both moderation and the relevant kind of
knowledge: a self-reflexive knowledge that also turns out to be identified, conveniently,
with the knowledge that god is most properly said to possess (344c3).270 Finally, it provides
the key to answering the question posed at the end of the previous section: what sort of
knowledge, when lost, constitutes the only real kind of faring ill for the good human being?
The answer is self-knowledge.271 The knowledge that the self is intellect, and so identical
with the knowledge or wisdom that is being known.
We can now begin to see why it is so important for Socrates to identify virtue with
wisdom or knowledge in the Protagoras: one cannot possess virtue if one does not possess
knowledge.272 The sort of knowledge one must possess is self-knowledge. But if self-

Cf. Sophist 253b ff. and Republic 438c4, 511b3
As North (1966) argues, at least up to the time of Plato, moderation (σωφροσύνη) was thought of as a
single quality covering an area which we would divide roughly between two concepts: self-knowledge, and
self-mastery. In ordinary speech ‘moderation’ was used to indicate what might be thought of as a kind of
‘self-knowledge’ (i.e. knowing your place) and of what might be thought of as a kind of ‘self-mastery’ (i.e.
the ability to restrain immediate impulses in the service of one’s reasoned plans).
270 Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1177b27–1178a8, and Metaphysics 1072b25–1073a3
271 Cf. Annas (1985) p. 118: “self-knowledge is not an intuitively clear notion, and it may be helpful to come
at it first through the claim, twice made in the dialogue, that self-knowledge is the virtue of sophrosune.”
272 Cf. Republic 443d ff.; intellect or knowledge is capable of existing in separation from the body, but when
embodied it so transforms and unifies all of the other virtues that they become entirely indistinguishable.
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knowledge is just the self-reflexive knowing of the forms by the forms, then one cannot
possess virtue or knowledge without grasping the forms—without being a philosopher. 273

§5 COURAGE & WISDOM
When the discussion of poetry finally draws to a close, Socrates reminds Protagoras
of the results of their initial exchange (349b2). He summarizes their findings and then asks
Protagoras if he still holds that wisdom, moderation, courage, justice and piety are each
distinct, heterogenous parts of virtue. While Protagoras is now prepared to concede that
most are “reasonably close to each other” (349d5), courage remains a stumbling block.
Protagoras continues to maintain that someone can be ignorant (i.e. lack wisdom or
knowledge) and yet still be courageous (349d7). Socrates attempts once more to
demonstrate that courage is wisdom. He does so by first securing Protagoras’ assent to all
of the following claims:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Courageous people are confident (349e2)
Knowledgeable people are confident (350a3)
Knowledgeable people are always more confident than unknowledgeable people (350a11)
Unknowledgeable people are confident (350b1)
Unknowledgeable people are not courageous (350b5)

These claims collectively entail that only those people whose confidence is accompanied
by knowledge will be courageous. 274 Socrates then utilizes these claims in order to produce
the following argument:

Cf. Phaedo 65c ff., 79d ff., 82c ff.; Republic 477a2, 479e–480a; Parmenides 134a3: “then knowledge
itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, which is what truth is?”
274 Socrates in fact reaches the converse of this conclusion: those people whose confidence is not
accompanied by knowledge will not be courageous (350c2).
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1) The wisest are the most confident (350c3, inference from c)
2) The most confident are the most courageous (350c4, a–e)
3) Therefore, wisdom is courage (350c5)275

Protagoras rejects this argument. 276 He points out that while he had accepted that (a)
courageous people are confident, he had not accepted the inverse claim that (a*) confident
people are courageous. In context, it is clear that Protagoras takes himself to be challenging
the second premise of the argument.277
Protagoras insists that had Socrates tried to secure his assent to (a*) he would have
qualified his answer: only some confident people are courageous. 278 Protagoras uses an
analogy to help explain why he would have qualified his answer: the confident are to the
courageous, he says, as the powerful are to the strong. And while power comes from
knowledge and passionate emotion (351a2), strength comes from nature and proper nurture
of the body (351a3). The upshot of this analogy is that it promises to shed some light on
why Protagoras seems to think that wisdom is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
possession of courage: if courage is indeed like strength, then it comes from nature and
from the proper nurture of the body.279 And someone can certainly be strong without being
wise.280 Unfortunately, however, Protagoras fumbles the analogy. When he spells it out

What actually follows is that the wisest are the most courageous, not that wisdom is courage. But it also
follows that wisdom is at least necessary for courage, since those who lack wisdom will not be courageous.
276 Cf. Taylor (1976) pp. 150–60
277 Protagoras has not only misconstrued the second premise, but fails to properly identify the salient claim(s)
on which it rests. However, this misconstrual is certainly understandable: “The most confident are the most
courageous” sounds awfully close to the inverse of “the courageous are confident.” For someone who is
supposed to be keeping track of this (verbal) argument in real-time, such a slip-up would be understandable.
278 Recourse to counterfactuals is not necessary: the answer is implicit in his assent to (b), (d) and (e).
279 Put another way, while nature and proper nurture of the body are necessary for courage, knowledge and
passionate emotion are neither necessary nor sufficient for courage. Cf. Protagoras 326c1
280 Cf. Protagoras 326b5–c2, where Protagoras attributes cowardice to physical deficiencies.
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explicitly, he claims that courage—unlike strength—comes from nature and from the
proper nurture of the soul (351a8).
At this juncture, it is worth recalling the discussion of courage from the Laws. Just
as moderation had come in two varieties—popular and exalted—so too had courage come
in two varieties.281 Much like popular moderation, popular courage had been described as
a quality that naturally develops in children and animals “without the aid of reason”
(963e3).282 In this respect, popular courage is indeed similar to strength. Exalted courage,
on the other hand, was identified with wisdom. 283 What should become clear is that
Protagoras continues to defend something like popular courage: the kind of courage that
develops naturally and can be possessed without wisdom. What should also become clear
is that Socrates continues to argue for something like exalted courage: the kind of courage
that he identifies with wisdom. 284 We will again return to these points in greater detail
below.

§6 VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE
So which is it? Does courage come from nature and proper nurture of the body, or
does it come from nature and proper nurture of the soul? Protagoras seems patently

Popular courage and moderation are invoked at Euthydemus 281c ff., Meno 88a ff., Republic 430b ff., and
Statesman 306a ff. They are arguably also invoked at Laws 681b ff. and 710c ff., and at Republic 374e ff.
282 Cf. Republic 430b5, where popular courage is invoked—the kind found “in animals and slaves, which is
not the result of education.” This is said to be civic courage.
283 Laws 963e3: “Why is it that after calling both by a single term ‘virtue’ (ἀρετήν), in the next breath we
speak of two virtues: courage and wisdom? I’ll tell you why. One of them, courage, concerns fear, and is
found in wild animals (τ θηρία) as well as in the characters of very young children (τ ν παίδων θη τ ν
πάνυ νέων). The soul becomes courageous naturally, without the aid of reason ( νευ γ ρ λόγου κα φύσει
γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή). By contrast, without reason a wise and intelligent soul ( νευ δ α λόγου ψυχ
φρόνιμός τε κα νο ν) is out of the question. That is true now, has always been, and always will be; the two
processes are fundamentally different.”
284 Plato seems to be harking back to the Protagoras (329d2) when discussing the unity of the virtues in the
Laws: “whether it is a single entity, a composite whole, or both or whatever (ε τε ς ν ε τε ς λον ε τε
ἀμφότερα ε τε πως ποτ πέφυκεν)” (965d6).
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confused.285 Rather than point out this confusion, however, Socrates changes tack. 286 In an
abrupt shift, he now seeks to defend the striking claim that knowledge is sufficient for
virtue (352c1–7). We have already gone some way toward explaining why Socrates would
do this. Protagoras has insisted that wisdom or knowledge is neither necessary nor
sufficient for courage. If knowledge turns out to be sufficient for virtue, however, then it
will not only be sufficient for courage, but for courageous action as well, since courageous
action is a species of virtuous action.
Socrates now proposes that if someone possesses knowledge, they will unfailingly
act on it. But he doesn’t think that the majority of people will go in for such a view. Here
we return to Socrates’ famous description of what most people think about knowledge,
which had been discussed at length in chapter one:
Most people think this way about it, that it is not powerful (ο κ σχυρ ν), neither a leader
nor a ruler (ο δ’ γεμονικ ν ο δ’ ἀρχικ ν ε ναι). They do not think of it in that way at all,
but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a person, what rules ( ρχειν)
them is not knowledge but rather anything else, sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure,
sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of it as being utterly dragged
around by these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does the matter seem like that to
you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing, capable of ruling a person, and
that if someone were to know what is good and bad, then they would not be forced by
anything to act (πράττειν) otherwise than knowledge dictates ( πιστήμη κελεύ ), and
wisdom (φρόνησιν) would be sufficient to save them? (352b3–c7)287

Indeed, insensitivity to this distinction between body and soul—specifically with respect to nurture—also
proves to be an important trip-up in the Statesman (275d9). That Plato seems to be harking back to the
Protagoras in the Statesman is evidenced by the fact that this point is immediately preceded by a myth which
concludes with the story of Prometheus (274c5)—the very story that initiates the extended discussion of
virtue in the Protagoras. Not only this, but a discussion of courage and moderation—both the popular and
exalted kinds—bring the Statesman to close (306b–311c).
286 Protagoras misinterpreted both the spirit and the letter of Socrates’ argument that wisdom is courage.
287 δοκε δ το ς πολλο ς περ πιστήμης τοιο τόν τι, ο κ σχυρ ν ο δ’ γεμονικ ν ο δ’ ἀρχικ ν ε ναι· ο δ
ς περ τοιούτου α το ντος διανοο νται, ἀλλ’ νούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπ πιστήμης ο τ ν πιστήμην
α το ρχειν ἀλλ’ λλο τι, τοτ μ ν θυμόν, τοτ δ δονήν, τοτ δ λύπην, νίοτε δ ρωτα, πολλάκις δ
φόβον, ἀτεχν ς διανοούμενοι περ τ ς πιστήμης σπερ περ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης π τ ν λλων
πάντων. ρ’ ο ν κα σο τοιο τόν τι περ α τ ς δοκε , καλόν τε ε ναι
πιστήμη κα ο ον ρχειν το
ἀνθρώπου, κα άνπερ γιγνώσκ τις τἀγαθ κα τ κακά, μ ν κρατηθ ναι π μηδεν ς στε λλ’ ττα
πράττειν
ν πιστήμη κελεύ , ἀλλ’ καν ν ε ναι τ ν φρόνησιν βοηθε ν τ ἀνθρώπ ;
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Protagoras agrees that this is indeed how the many view knowledge—but he sides with
Socrates, against the popular view, in maintaining that “wisdom and knowledge (σοφίαν
κα πιστήμην) are the most powerful (κράτιστον) forces in human activity” (352d1).288
By getting Protagoras to agree that wisdom and knowledge are sufficient for virtue
and for virtuous action, generally, Socrates has managed to clear away most of the
difficulties flagged in the previous section in one fell swoop. First, since Protagoras is
prepared to admit that knowledge is sufficient for virtuous action, knowledge also turns
out to be sufficient for courageous action. Second, since knowledge turns out to be
sufficient for courageous action, Socrates has effectively isolated the appropriate source of
courage: courage comes from the soul, not from the body. Not only this, but Socrates has
also isolated the appropriate source of courage within the soul itself: it comes from
knowledge, not from passionate emotions like anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear
(352b7).289 And anyone who acts without knowledge is acting from ignorance. As it turns
out, acting from ignorance is just what it means to be self-defeated:
Self-defeat (τ ττω ε ναι) is nothing other than ignorance (ἀμαθία), and self-mastery (τ
κρείττω αυτο ) is nothing other than wisdom (σοφία). (358c3–5)290

We are already familiar with the way in which moderation is nothing other than wisdom,
but what are we to make of the claim that self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom?

This is consistent with his earlier claim that “wisdom is the greatest part” of virtue (330a1).
At least if passionate emotions like anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear arise in the absence of knowledge.
It seems possible that such emotional responses can be caused by knowledge. Cf. Phaedo 66c2
290 ο δ τ
ττω ε ναι α το λλο τι το τ’ στ ν ἀμαθία, ο δ κρείττω αυτο λλο τι σοφία.
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In the discussion of ‘self-defeat’ in the Laws, it had been suggested that, by this
expression, “we are all much more likely to mean someone defeated by pleasure than by
pain” (633e4). This seemed to suggest that self-mastery should also be more concerned
with pleasure than with pain. 291 But victory over pleasure had not been initially described
as a kind of self-mastery. Rather, it had been described as a kind of moderation: the popular
kind of moderation that can be possessed without wisdom (635e4–636e3). Popular
moderation, as it turns out, has to be repeatedly practiced if it is to become perfect or
exalted:
So will anyone become perfect (τελέως) in moderation if they haven’t done battle against
the many pleasures and desires that urge them to commit shameless and unjust actions—if
they haven’t defeated (νενικηκώς) them by dint of reason (μετ λόγου), effort, and skill,
both in play and in earnest? (647d5–7)292

The imperfect kind of moderation, described in this passage as the victory of reason in its
“battle against the many pleasures and desires that urge people to commit shameless and
unjust actions,” is exactly how self-mastery is described in the puppets passage, where selfdefeat is glossed as the defeat of reason in this sort of battle.
Conveniently, this is also how self-defeat is described by the many in the
Protagoras. Lack of restraint in the face of pleasure—yielding to it, or giving in to it, or
being defeated by it—is what they refer to as “being overcome by pleasure” (353a1). This
‘lack of restraint’ can be fruitfully contrasted with precisely the sort of ‘restraint’ that is
modeled by the popular kind of moderation or self-mastery, which centrally involves

Cf. Republic 389d7, 430e6
Σώφρων δ ρα τελέως σται μ πολλα ς δονα ς κα πιθυμίαις προτρεπούσαις ἀναισχυντε ν κα ἀδικε ν
διαμεμαχημένος κα νενικηκ ς μετ λόγου κα ργου κα τέχνης ν τε παιδια ς κα ν σπουδα ς
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conflict between reason and feelings of pleasure, and which can be possessed without
wisdom. But what can we say about the sort of moderation or self-mastery that is nothing
other than wisdom?
Recall my suggestion, in chapter three, that perfected or exalted moderation models
the perfected or exalted kind of self-mastery—the kind of self-mastery that, like exalted
moderation, would be “compelled to be wisdom” (710a5). This suggestion finds explicit
support here in the Protagoras, where Socrates argues at length for the kind of self-mastery
that turns out to be “nothing other than wisdom” (358c3). But we can now say even more
about why this exalted self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom: it is because the ‘self’
that is doing the mastering is nothing other than wisdom: it is intellect.

§7 CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT?
Socrates is eventually able to secure Protagoras’ (reluctant) agreement that courage,
like the rest of virtue, is wisdom (360e4). But he points out that they have effectively
swapped answers to the original question: can virtue can be taught? Recall that Protagoras
had originally maintained that virtue is teachable, while Socrates had been skeptical
(319b1–328d3). Now it is Socrates who maintains that virtue is teachable, while Protagoras
is skeptical (361c3). The dialogue thus concludes with an explicit dilemma about the
teachability of virtue:
1) If virtue is “wholly knowledge” (361b7), then virtue can be taught.
2) If virtue is “anything other than knowledge” (361b5), then virtue cannot be taught.
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Since Protagoras declines further discussion, the dialogue ends in an impasse (ἀπορία),
with Socrates suggesting that the question of whether or not virtue is teachable can only be
answered once it is determined “what virtue is” (361d2).293

7.1 Answering the Question
We are now prepared to answer that question. Perhaps the first thing to note is that
virtue (like moderation and courage) comes in two varieties: popular and exalted. Recall
that exalted virtue—like exalted moderation and courage—was discovered to be nothing
other than wisdom or knowledge. This is the sort of virtue that Socrates has been arguing
for throughout the Protagoras. Indeed, he is correct to maintain that (exalted) virtue is
“wholly knowledge.”294 But exalted virtue turns out to be a more-than-human virtue. It is
the sort of virtue that god most properly possesses (344c3), and which is only fleetingly
possessed by a small number of good people. Recall, too, that popular virtue—like popular
moderation and courage—was discovered to be distinct from wisdom or knowledge. 295
This is the sort of virtue that Protagoras has been defending throughout the dialogue.
Indeed, he is correct to maintain that (popular) virtue is “other than knowledge.” But
popular virtue turns out to be a less-than-human virtue. It is the sort of virtue that humans
possess in common with children, and even some animals.

Cf. Meno 71a2; Socrates circles back to Prometheus and Epimetheus (361d3, 320d1). It is notable that
Epimetheus only assigns natural abilities to non-rational animals (321c1), while Prometheus steals craftwisdom from Athena and Hephaestus and assigns them outright to humans (321d4). Prometheus is unable,
however, to assail “the high citadel that is the house of Zeus” (321d8). It is only later, when humans are on
the brink of extinction (because they lack the ability to band together) that Zeus himself sends Hermes to
distribute wisdom to humans (322c2). Notably, wisdom is not stolen; it is freely given.
294 Cf. Phaedo 66a6, 69c2, 76c12, 79d6; Republic 505b9, 517c4–5
295 Cf. Phaedo 69b6–7, 82b2; Republic 500d5–9
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This distinction between popular and exalted virtue is precisely what explains why
Socrates and Protagoras appear to have switched positions regarding the teachability of
virtue. Protagoras had initially maintained that popular virtue is teachable, and Socrates
had disagreed. Now, Socrates maintains that exalted virtue is teachable, but Protagoras
disagrees. By distinguishing between these two kinds of virtue, we can see that they have
not actually swapped positions—they have just been talking past each other. But while
disambiguating ‘virtue’ gets us somewhat closer to determining whether or not it can be
taught, it is not the only term that needs to be disambiguated. We also need to have a clearer
sense of what is meant by ‘teaching.’
Clearly, an assumption shared by both Protagoras and Socrates is that knowledge
is imparted through teaching. They also seem to agree that technical knowledge—the kind
of knowledge that craftsmen possess—is paradigmatically teachable. Consider, then, the
following passage from the Timaeus, which marks an important distinction between
teaching and persuasion:
If a significant distinction formulated in a few words were to present itself, that would suit
our present needs best of all. So here’s how I cast my own vote: If intellect and true belief
are distinct (ε μ ν νο ς κα δόξα ἀληθής στον δύο γένη), then these “by themselves”
things entirely exist, these forms, the objects not of our sense perception, but of intellect
only (παντάπασιν ε ναι καθ’ α τ τα τα, ἀναίσθητα φ’ μ ν ε δη, νοούμενα μόνον). But
if, as some people think, true belief does not differ in any way from intellect, then all the
things we perceive through our bodily senses (σώματος α σθανόμεθα) must be assumed to
be the most stable things there are. But we do have to speak of intellect and true belief as
distinct, of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and the one is not
like the other. It is through teaching (δι διδαχ ς) that we come to have intellect, and
through persuasion ( π πειθο ς) that we come to have true belief. Intellect always
involves a true account (τ μ ν ἀε μετ’ ἀληθο ς λόγου) while true belief lacks any account
(τ δ λογον). And while intellect remains unmoved by persuasion (κα τ μ ν ἀκίνητον
πειθο , τ δ μεταπειστόν), true belief gives in to persuasion (τ δ μεταπειστόν). And of
true belief, it must be said, all men have a share (πάντα νδρα μετέχειν), but of intellect,
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only the gods and a small group of people (νο δ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δ γένος βραχύ τι).
(51d2–e10, my emphases)296

That intellect or knowledge is capable of being taught and that it is distinct from true belief
are familiar claims that are repeated throughout the Platonic corpus.297 But I want to focus
specifically on the claim that it is through teaching that we come to have knowledge, and
through persuasion that we come to have true belief. This claim allows us to sufficiently
disambiguate the question of whether virtue can be taught. What we really have are two
very different questions, with two very different answers:
1) Can exalted virtue be taught? Yes, because it is “wholly knowledge” (361b7) and we
acquire knowledge through teaching.
2) Can popular virtue be taught? No, because it is “other than knowledge” (361b5) and
we acquire what is other than knowledge (i.e. belief) not through teaching, but through
persuasion.

Since each horn of the original dilemma in fact tracks a distinct sort of virtue, they are no
longer horns of a dilemma. The dilemma has thus been dissolved, rather than resolved. But
we now possess a satisfying and definitive answer to the original question: can virtue be
taught? The answer is a qualified yes: the only sort of virtue that can be taught is the virtue
that is wholly knowledge—exalted virtue. But exalted virtue is exceedingly rare: “only the
gods and a small group of people” turn out to possess it—just as Socrates had staunchly
maintained. By contrast, popular virtue and the true beliefs required for it come cheap:

ε δέ τις ρος ρισθε ς μέγας δι βραχέων φανείη, το το μάλιστα γκαιριώτατον γένοιτ’ ν. δε ο ν τήν
γ’ μ ν α τ ς τίθεμαι ψ φον. ε μ ν νο ς κα δόξα ἀληθής στον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν ε ναι καθ’ α τ
τα τα, ἀναίσθητα φ’ μ ν ε δη, νοούμενα μόνον· ε δ’, ς τισιν φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθ ς νο διαφέρει τ
μηδέν, πάνθ’ πόσ’ α δι το σώματος α σθανόμεθα θετέον βεβαιότατα. δύο δ λεκτέον κείνω, διότι χωρ ς
γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε χετον. τ μ ν γ ρ α τ ν δι διδαχ ς, τ δ’ π πειθο ς μ ν γγίγνεται· κα τ μ ν
ἀε μετ’ ἀληθο ς λόγου, τ δ λογον· κα τ μ ν ἀκίνητον πειθο , τ δ μεταπειστόν· κα το μ ν πάντα
νδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νο δ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δ γένος βραχύ τι.
297 Cf. Republic 477e4; Gorgias 454d2–455b1; Meno 87c3, 97b ff.
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nearly everyone turns out to possess it—just as Protagoras had staunchly maintained
(323a1–b2, 324e1).

7.2 Censuring Protagoras
Protagoras claims to be a sophist, a wise person. He also claims to be virtuous, and
capable of teaching virtue to others (317b6, 319a7, 348e2–349a2). But the popular sort of
virtue he possess cannot be taught, since it turns out to be other than knowledge. At best,
Protagoras instills true beliefs about virtue by means of persuasion. 298 At worst, however,
he instills false beliefs about virtue. This is precisely the worry that Socrates had originally
expressed to Hippocrates:
I wouldn’t be surprised, my friend, if some of these people [the sophists] did not know
which of their products are beneficial and which detrimental to the soul (κα τούτων
ἀγνοο εν ν πωλο σιν τι χρηστ ν πονηρ ν πρ ς τ ν ψυχήν). Likewise those who buy
from them, unless one happens to be a physician of the soul (τ ν ψυχ ν α ατρικ ς ν).
So if you are a knowledgeable ( πιστήμων) consumer, you can buy teachings (μαθήματα)
safely from Protagoras or anyone else. But if you’re not, please don’t risk what is most
dear to you on a roll of the dice, for there is far greater risk in buying teachings than in
buying food. (313d9–314a2)299

Hippocrates has had a good, traditional upbringing: he already possesses what would be
considered a high degree of competence in popular virtue. He now wants to be taught the
sort of virtue that is modeled on technical knowledge—the exalted kind of virtue that is

As we saw in the Laws, one sort of guardian possesses wisdom, while other sort of guardian only possesses
true opinion (632c5). I had there argued that only those guardians who possess wisdom possess exalted virtue,
while those guardians who merely possess true belief possess popular virtue. In the Republic, this tracks the
distinction between guardians and auxiliaries (414b4).
299 τάχα δ’ ν τινες,
ριστε, κα τούτων ἀγνοο εν ν πωλο σιν τι χρηστ ν πονηρ ν πρ ς τ ν ψυχήν· ς
δ’ α τως κα ο νούμενοι παρ’ α τ ν, ν μή τις τύχ περ τ ν ψυχ ν α ατρικ ς ν. ε μ ν ο ν σ
τυγχάνεις πιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστ ν κα πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι νε σθαι μαθήματα κα παρ
Πρωταγόρου κα παρ’ λλου τουο ν· ε δ μή, ρα, μακάριε, μ περ το ς φιλτάτοις κυβεύ ς τε κα
κινδυνεύ ς.
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acquired and imparted through teaching. 300 But this is precisely the sort of knowledge (and
precisely the sort of virtue) that Protagoras does not possess. This is why Socrates takes
Protagoras to task for claiming to teach it.
Socrates’ criticism of Protagoras is perhaps nowhere on fuller display than in his
exegetical treatment of Simonides. According to Socrates, Simonides did not believe that
wise people should be overly-critical of those who are not ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ in the strict
or exalted sense. It is enough, he says, if most people try to refrain from acting shamefully
(345d4)—try to refrain from flouting popular views about virtue (347c4). This is because
wise people understand that all mistaken views and actions are involuntary. As Socrates
puts it:
Simonides was not so uneducated as to say that he praised all who did nothing bad
willingly, as if there were anyone who willingly did bad things. I am pretty sure that none
of the wise men thinks that any human being willingly makes a mistake or willingly does
anything wrong or bad. They know very well that anyone who does wrong or bad does so
involuntarily. (345d6–e5)301

This is why wise people will not be overly-critical. Indeed, they will often reconcile
themselves to praising people who make mistakes. The wise person “accepts without any
objection what is in between” (346d2) good and bad.302 They are “happy with an average
person who does nothing shameful” (346d9). This, of course, turns out to be the sort of
person who possesses popular virtue. But someone who possesses popular virtue is not
actually good—rather, they are in between good and bad. Such a person is competent in

Cf. Frede (1992) p. x
ο γ ρ ο τως ἀπαίδευτος ν Σιμωνίδης, στε τούτους φάναι παινε ν, ς ν κ ν μηδ ν κακ ν ποι , ς
ντων τιν ν ο κόντες κακ ποιο σιν. γ γ ρ σχεδόν τι ο μαι το το, τι ο δε ς τ ν σοφ ν ἀνδρ ν γε ται
ο δένα ἀνθρώπων κόντα ξαμαρτάνειν ο δ α σχρά τε κα κακ κόντα ργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ε σασιν τι
πάντες ο τ α σχρ κα τ κακ ποιο ντες κοντες ποιο σιν
302 Cf. Phaedo 90a1, 113d ff.
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virtue, but they are certainly no expert. Protagoras has been shown to be just such an ‘in
between’ person.
Now, the wise person would not usually be critical of someone like Protagoras.
More often than not, they would simply reconcile themselves to praising him. But
Protagoras represents himself as possessing exalted virtue: he claims to be both wise and
good—an expert—and to make others wise and good as well (348e2–349a2). This is over
the line:
[I]f you spoke something even moderately reasonable and true […] I would never censure
you. But the fact is you have lied blatantly yet with verisimilitude about extremely
important issues (ν ν δ σφόδρα γ ρ κα περ τ ν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκε ς ἀληθ
λέγειν), and for that I do censure you (δι τα τά σε γ ψέγω). (347a1–3, my emphasis)303

While these words are ostensibly spoken by Simonides to Pittacus, the veil is thin: Socrates
would not normally be taking someone like Protagoras to task, but he has “lied blatantly
yet with verisimilitude” about virtue, and for that he is being censured. 304 Not only is
Protagoras himself no expert in virtue, but—what is far worse—he deceives others.305

7.3 The Role of Education
We have now seen the way in which the distinction between popular and exalted
virtue shows up as a dominant (though implicit) theme throughout the Protagoras, and
how it helps to answer the unresolved dilemma about virtue with which the dialogue

σ ο ν, κα ε μέσως λεγες πιεικ κα ἀληθ […] ο κ ν ποτε ψεγον· ν ν δ σφόδρα γ ρ κα περ τ ν
μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκε ς ἀληθ λέγειν, δι τα τά σε γ ψέγω.
304 It is perhaps worth noting the similarity in names: Simonides/Socrates and Pittacus/Protagoras (358c7).
305 Cf. Protagoras 358c7: “ignorance is to have a false belief and to be deceived about matters of importance.”
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concludes. But a final question remains: how are popular and exalted virtue related to one
another?
Protagoras canvasses the many ways that popular virtue is acquired in his ‘Great
Speech’ (325c6–326d2). It begins in early childhood (325c6), when parents seize on every
word and action of their young children, pronouncing them good or bad, just or unjust
(325d3). This education continues when these children are sent to school, where teachers
pay more attention to their conduct than their lessons (325e1). When it comes to their
lessons, they are given the works of good poets that contain “many passages describing in
glowing terms good men of old, so that the child is inspired to imitate them and become
like them” (326a2). Music teachers “arrange the scores and drill the rhythms and scales
into the children’s souls, so that they become gentler, and their speech and movements
become more rhythmical and harmonious” (326b1). These children are then sent off to
athletic trainers “so that they may have sound bodies in the service of their now fit minds
and will not be forced to cowardice in war or other activities through physical deficiencies”
(326b6). When their formal education ends, they must finally be compelled to “learn the
laws and to model their lives on them” (326d2).
This should all sound very familiar. These turn out to be all of the ways that wouldbe guardians are educated in the Republic (376e–412b). This education is also how popular
virtue is inculcated in the Laws:
I call education (παιδείαν) the initial acquisition of virtue in children (παραγιγνομένην
πρ τον παισ ν ἀρετήν). If pleasure and love and pain and hatred develop correctly in our
souls when we are not yet able to grasp the account (μήπω δυναμένων λόγ λαμβάνειν),
and when we do grasp the account they agree with it because they have been correctly
trained by appropriate habits, this harmony is virtue in its entirety (α τη ‘σθ’ συμφωνία
σύμπασα μ ν ἀρετή). But the part of virtue that consists in having properly nurtured
pleasures and pains, so that we hate what we should hate and love what we should love
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from beginning to end, if you separated this off in your account and called it education
(παιδείαν), you would be exactly right, in my view. (653b1–c4)306

One acquires correct beliefs through proper education, which is a sort of ‘persuasion’ that
guides the feelings and emotions of children along the right paths before they are able to
“grasp the account.” Someone so educated will eventually come to possess some degree of
popular virtue—their education will minimize both the occasions on which (and the degree
to which) their feelings and emotions come into conflict with their reasoned judgements.307
But only someone who is able to sufficiently “grasp the account” will ever come to possess
the full harmony between reason and emotion that the Athenian is prepared to call “virtue
in its entirety,” and that we have been calling exalted virtue. This suggests that the
acquisition of popular virtue is a necessary prerequisite for coming to possess exalted
virtue—a suggestion which also finds confirmation in the Republic:
Vice would never know either virtue or itself, (πονηρία μ ν γ ρ ἀρετήν τε κα α τ ν ο ποτ’
ν γνοίη), but virtue of a nature that is educated over time will develop knowledge of itself
and of vice. (ἀρετ δ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόν μα α τ ς τε κα πονηρίας πιστήμην
λήψεται). It is this person who becomes wise (σοφός) as it seems to me, not the bad person.
(409d7–e1, my emphasis)308

παιδείαν δ λέγω τ ν παραγιγνομένην πρ τον παισ ν ἀρετήν· δον δ κα φιλία κα λύπη κα μ σος ν
ρθ ς ν ψυχα ς γγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δ τ ν λόγον, συμφωνήσωσι τ
λόγ ρθ ς ε θίσθαι π τ ν προσηκόντων θ ν, α τη ‘σθ’ συμφωνία σύμπασα μ ν ἀρετή, τ δ περ τ ς
δον ς κα λύπας τεθραμμένον α τ ς ρθ ς στε μισε ν μ ν χρ μισε ν ε θ ς ξ ἀρχ ς μέχρι τέλους,
στέργειν δ
χρ στέργειν, το τ’ α τ ἀποτεμ ν τ λόγ κα παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τ ν μ ν
ρθ ς ν προσαγορεύοις.
307 The Myth of Er contains an extraordinary account of a man who lived a good life—but when given the
choice of a new life, chooses the life of a tyrant (619b7–d1). Socrates accounts for this terrible choice by
claiming that he “shared in virtue by habit without philosophy ( θει νευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετ ς μετειληφότα)”
(619c6). Cf. Republic 538d ff., where a worry is presented about the sort of person who has been properly
educated but does not possess wisdom.
308 πονηρία μ ν γ ρ ἀρετήν τε κα α τ ν ο ποτ’ ν γνοίη, ἀρετ δ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόν
μα α τ ς
τε κα πονηρίας πιστήμην λήψεται. σοφ ς ο ν ο τος, ς μοι δοκε , ἀλλ’ ο χ κακ ς γίγνεται.
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Only those who have been properly educated and so have come to possess popular virtue
can ever hope to acquire the knowledge or wisdom that just is exalted virtue. In the same
vein, only such wise and virtuous people will ever know themselves.309
With all of this in place, we are finally prepared to see that the Republic—far from
being in tension with the Protagoras—represents the full working out of the solution to its
concluding dilemma about virtue. For if Socrates wants to consistently maintain, as he
seems to, that:
1) Popular virtue is other than knowledge
2) Popular virtue is necessary (but not sufficient) for the possession of exalted virtue
3) Exalted virtue is wholly knowledge

Then it must be the case that belief plays a central role in the acquisition virtue. Otherwise,
the initial acquisition of popular virtue—the proper channeling of feelings and emotions in
children—would be entirely unnecessary. The (false) dilemma that virtue is either “wholly
knowledge” or wholly “other than knowledge” thus sets the stage for the complete account
of virtue developed in the Republic. The account developed in the Republic splits the horns
of this dilemma by demonstrating how feelings and emotions can be brought under rational
control—that is, by demonstrating how someone can become self-mastered.

As Gerson (2006) writes: “We are intellects. The valorization of human virtue without the recognition of
this truth is not the solution to any important philosophical problem; it is the problem itself.”
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
We are finally in a position to answer the interpretive question with which we
began: why is the Socrates of the Protagoras concerned to reinterpret putative cases of
psychic conflict as cases of ignorance, and what happens to this account in light of the
argument for soul-partitioning found in the Republic?

§1 PROTAGORAS & REPUBLIC
In the Protagoras, Socrates claims that most people think that they can (and often
do) act against their better judgement:
They maintain that most people are unwilling to do (ο κ θέλειν πράττειν) what is best,
even though they know what it is and are able ( ξ ν α το ς) to do it. And when I have
asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they are
being overcome ( ττωμένους) by pleasure or pain or are being mastered (κρατουμένους)
by the things I referred to just now. (352d4–e2)310

The many call the experience of acting against their better judgement ‘being overcome by
pleasure.’ Socrates does not think that the experience they are describing is possible; he
does not think that anyone can act against their better judgement.
He argues instead that those who “make mistakes with regard to good and bad do
so because of a lack of knowledge, and […] a mistaken act done without knowledge […]
is one done from ignorance. So this is what ‘being overcome by pleasure’ is—ignorance in

310

κα
γ

ἀλλ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τ βέλτιστα ο κ θέλειν πράττειν, ξ ν α το ς, ἀλλ λλα πράττειν·
σους δ γ ρόμην τι ποτε α τιόν στι τούτου, π δον ς φασιν ττωμένους λύπης
ν νυνδ
λεγον πό τινος τούτων κρατουμένους τα τα ποιε ν το ς ποιο ντας.
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the highest degree” (357d6–e1).311 In other words, Socrates thinks that most people fail to
do what is best because they are ignorant—not because their better judgement is somehow
overcome. Against the popular view, he maintains that:
[N]o one who knows (ε δώς) or believes (ο όμενος) there is something else better than what
they are doing, something possible, will go on doing what they have been doing when they
could be doing what is better. Self-defeat (τ ττω ε ναι) is nothing other than ignorance
(ἀμαθία), and self-mastery (τ κρείττω αυτο ) is nothing other than wisdom (σοφία).
(358b8–c5)312

He immediately clarifies that “ignorance is to have a false belief and be deceived about
matters of importance” (358c7). So whenever someone is ‘overcome by pleasure,’
according to Socrates, it is because they made a mistake—they acted on a false belief about
what was best and so were ignorant about the right course of action. By maintaining that
no one can act against their better judgement, Socrates seems to argue as if everyone were
entirely guided by reason, and as if, therefore, the soul were simply rational.313
In the Republic, by contrast, Socrates no longer treats the soul as though it were
simply rational—he partitions the soul, such that it is now possible for reason to be
overcome by some opposing psychic force. The Socrates of the Republic thus seems to
rehabilitate the phenomenon that the many had called ‘being overcome by pleasure’ against
its purported denial by the Socrates of the Protagoras. He now seems to countenance the
possibility of psychic conflict.

Cf. Laws 689a5–b7, 689d4–e1
ο δε ς ο τε ε δ ς ο τε ο όμενος λλα βελτίω ε ναι
ποιε , κα δυνατά, πειτα ποιε τα τα, ξ ν τ
βελτίω· ο δ τ ττω ε ναι α το λλο τι το τ’ στ ν ἀμαθία, ο δ κρείττω αυτο λλο τι σοφία.
313 Cf. Frede (1992), p. xxx: “Here in the Protagoras, Socrates seems to argue as if the soul just were reason,
and the passions were reasoned beliefs or judgements of some kind, and as if, therefore, we were entirely
guided or motivated by beliefs of one kind or another.”
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We are finally prepared to see, however, that the Socrates of the Protagoras
reinterprets putative cases of psychic conflict as cases of ignorance because he is only
concerned with the sort of person who possesses wisdom or knowledge. A wise person will
unfailingly act on their knowledge of what is best—they always follow the dictates of
reason (352c5). This is why he claims that self-mastery is nothing other than wisdom or
knowledge (358c3). It is a kind of ‘mastery’ because reason or knowledge unfailingly rules.
It is described as ‘self’ mastery because the self just is reason or knowledge: the self is
intellect. So whether the soul turns out to be simple or composite in the Protagoras,
knowledge rules with complete authority: the person who possesses knowledge cannot be
‘overcome’ by anything.
We are also prepared to see that, in the Republic, Socrates countenances the
possibility of psychic conflict because he is initially describing the sort of person who lacks
knowledge—someone who acts in accordance with belief, and so is subject to the distorting
power of appearances.314 Such people inevitably experience psychic conflict, and they
vacillate between being self-mastered and self-defeated. While such people sometimes act
in accordance with true beliefs about what is best, they also sometimes act in accordance
with false beliefs about what is best. While they are not perfectly self-mastered (as those
who possess knowledge are), they could be said to be in the process of becoming selfmastered if—through concerted effort—they repeatedly side with reason in such cases of
psychic conflict.315

314
315

Cf. Republic 431a ff. and 602c6–d6
Cf. Laws 647d5–7
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Consider the case of Odysseus: his reasoned judgement of what is best is ultimately
able to overcome his passionate desire for revenge (441b2). Although he is initially
conflicted about the best course of action, he sides with reason, against spirit. In this
instance, at least, he is self-mastered. Now consider the case of Leontius: his reasoned
judgement of what is best is ultimately overcome by his passionate desire for sexual
gratification (439e6). Much like Odysseus, he is conflicted about the best course of
action—but he sides with appetite, against reason, and so comes to regret his action. In this
instance, at least, he is self-defeated. But note that both the self-mastery exhibited by
Odysseus and the self-defeat exhibited by Leontius are the result of an internal conflict, in
which reason was pitted against some other part of the soul.
Nevertheless, the simple fact remains that in the Republic, no less than in the
Protagoras, the self-mastery exhibited by those who possess knowledge is not the result
of any sort of internal conflict. Those who attain harmony between the various parts of the
soul in the Republic are, of course, the philosophers—those elite citizens who alone attain
knowledge and so possess wisdom. The degree to which the possession of this knowledge
so transforms and unifies them is astonishing:
They regulate well what is really their own and rule themselves (τ
ντι τ ο κε α ε
θέμενον κα ρξαντα α τ ν α το ). They put themselves in order, are their own friends,
and harmonize the three parts of themselves like three limiting notes in a musical scale—
high, low, and middle. They bind together those parts and any others there may be in
between, and from having been many they become entirely one (κα παντάπασιν να
γενόμενον κ πολλ ν), moderate and harmonious (σώφρονα κα ρμοσμένον). Only then
do they act […] regarding as wisdom (σοφίαν) the knowledge ( πιστήμην) that oversees
such actions. And they regard the action that destroys this harmony as unjust […] and
regard the belief that oversees it as ignorance. (443d3–e8)316

ἀλλ τ ντι τ ο κε α ε θέμενον κα ρξαντα α τ ν α το κα κοσμήσαντα κα φίλον γενόμενον αυτ
κα συναρμόσαντα τρία ντα, σπερ ρους τρε ς ρμονίας ἀτεχν ς, νεάτης τε κα πάτης κα μέσης, κα ε
λλα ττα μεταξ τυγχάνει ντα, πάντα τα τα συνδήσαντα κα παντάπασιν να γενόμενον κ πολλ ν,
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These individuals join what had previously been three into one, binding them together in
such a way that, from having been many, they become “entirely one (παντάπασιν να),
moderate and harmonious (σώφρονα κα

ρμοσμένον).” Such people, as the diction here

seems to imply, are so radically unified that the several parts of their soul operate as a
single entity, guided wholly by reason. For the composite soul that is ruled by knowledge
in the Republic, then, psychic conflict is no more possible than it had been for the soul
ruled by knowledge in the Protagoras.
Any suggestion, then, that the Republic and the Protagoras are in tension with
respect to their treatments of the soul, or with respect to the possibility of psychic conflict,
is at best oversimplifying and distorting. The Socrates of the Protagoras is simply
unconcerned with the sort of person who lacks knowledge: he is only interested in rejecting
the popular view that someone in possession of knowledge can somehow be conflicted
about the best course of action, or even act against their better judgement.317 This is no less
true in the Republic. For when knowledge rules in the composite soul, such a person enjoys
precisely the sort of psychic peace that Socrates had claimed they would in the Protagoras
(356e1). In both dialogues, then, Plato consistently presupposes the hypothetical
impossibility of acting against knowledge. 318 He is prepared to maintain that those (rare)

σώφρονα κα ρμοσμένον, ο τω δ πράττειν δη […] σοφίαν δ τ ν πιστατο σαν ταύτ τ πράξει
πιστήμην, δικον δ πρ ξιν […] ἀμαθίαν δ τ ν ταύτ α πιστατο σαν δόξαν.
317 Indeed, there is even some evidence internal to the Protagoras that Socrates thinks someone who lacks
knowledge, and so is only in possession of belief will experience something akin to psychic conflict. For
someone who merely possesses belief will be susceptible to the power of appearances, which “makes us
wander and exchange the same things up and down many times, and regret our actions and choices” (356c9).
318 Cf. Republic 350d3: “We agreed that justice is virtue and wisdom and that injustice is vice and ignorance.”
Cf. Republic 351a3: “But, now, if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue, it will easily be shown to be stronger
than injustice, since injustice is ignorance.” Cf. Republic 428b6: “Now, this very thing, good judgment, is
clearly some kind of knowledge, for it is through knowledge, not ignorance, that people judge well.”
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individuals who possess wisdom or knowledge cannot be forced by anything to act against
its decrees. Such people will not experience psychic conflict: they are entirely unified by
the knowledge or wisdom with which they self-identify. They are perfectly moderate,
perfectly just, and perfectly courageous because they are perfectly wise. Their selfknowledge is what allows them, finally, to be perfectly self-mastered.
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